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Abstract 
Emergent farmers have rapidly increased in numbers on the sub-Saharan African continent 
during the last couple of decades. The main interest in this study lies in how emergent farm-
ers have materialised as a class in a political economic context and historical process and 
what societal impact they have had. Emergent farmers as a class are understood as capable 
of reproducing their means of subsistence and creating surplus value without having to 
own their means of production. Mkanda Extension Planning Area (EPA) in Malawi has 
served as the empirical area for this matter. 
During the fieldwork, 31 persons were interviewed. The interviews gave insights into 
farmers’ living conditions. An explorative survey was also conducted with 31 informants, 
of which 13 persons also participated in the interviews. The explorative survey provided 
an overview of farm characteristics in the area. In addition, two focus group discussions 
were held to gain perspective on shared experiences among farmer groups regarding the 
position-ing of emergent farmers, how they and other types of farmers can be classified and 
how the relationship between farmers appear. The field work was combined with a desk 
study to investigate political, socioeconomic and environmental conditions through which 
emergent farmers have materialised. 
Emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have materialised through inheritance and acquisition 
of property such as land; other natural resources; material assets and technology. They have 
grown through extension service and credit regimes; sales of cash crops and livestock; agri-
businesses; incomes from employment and off-farm activities. They have advanced 
through family and class support; labour power control; strategic utilisation of volatile 
agricultural markets and income diversification. They have progressed through agricultural 
institutions, political favouritism and resource exchange with state representatives; 
traditional authorities; traders; investors; large-scale buyers and other farmer groups. 
Emergent farmers have contributed to and been shaped by the development of 
the capitalist mode of production during Malawi’s postcolonial history. The farmer class 
has enabled increased capital investments and accumulation and contributed to new 
businesses; production methods; market directions and means of livelihood in rural areas. 
They have provided links between local production conditions; extraction of raw 
material; capital exchange; means of profit and growth opportunities.  
At the same time, emergent farmers have constituted a minority that has served certain 
class interests. While emergent farmers have influenced the socioeconomic and ecological 
dynamics in rural places such as Mkanda EPA, the class has maintained structures that 
have reproduced inequality among the population.
Keywords: capital accumulation, surplus value, food regime, patronage, differentiation, live-
lihood, diversification, food security 
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1 Introduction 
In The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MDGS) III (Government of Malawi 
2017a) agriculture1 is designated as a key priority area for national economic growth and 
development (ibid.:32). A publicly stated objective is “to achieve sustainable agricultural 
transformation and water development that is adaptive to climate change and enhances 
ecosystem services” (ibid.:34). The question is how. 
In a number of sub-Saharan African countries, there has been a significant rise since 2000 
of what may be referred to as domestic emergent investor farms, medium-scale farms or a 
rural-based hybrid capitalist class2 (Jayne et al. 2016; Jayne et al. 2019; Anseeuw et al. 
2016; Sitko & Jayne 2014). According to authors in other studies (ibid.), these farmers 
hold arable land from 5 to 100 hectares (where the range differs depending on the study). 
They have a background as civil servants; professionals; traditional leaders; businesspeo-
ple or relatively successful small-scale farmers who have expanded their operations by 
reinvesting revenue from agricultural sales and other sources of value.  
Between 2000 and 2015, the land size occupied by emergent farmers has almost doubled 
in the Malawian districts Mchinji, Kasungu and Lilongwe (Anseeuw et al. 2016). The 
rapid rise of emergent or medium-scale farms is remarkable in a country where the major-
ity of the rural population experiences severe land pressure while being dependent on ag-
riculture: In Malawi, there are 186 people on average per square kilometer – a compara-
tively high population density on the continent – in one of the world’s poorest nations 
(Government of Malawi 2017a:32; Government of Malawi 2019:13; Jayne et al. 2016; 
Jayne et al. 2019).3 Agriculture accounts for about a third of Malawi’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and generates over 80 percent of the national export earnings (Govern-
ment of Malawi 2017a:32). Eighty-six percent of the country’s population lives in rural 
areas (Government of Malawi 2019:10) and the vast majority is engaged in crop and live-
stock production. The average arable land size per person is 0.22 hectares (Trading Eco-
nomics 2020).4  
According to Jayne et al. (2016) and Jayne et al. (2019), emergent farmers’ presence in 
rural and peri-urban areas has created new dynamics in agricultural technology and inno-
vation; markets; socioeconomic relationships between urban- and rural-based actors and 
groups within farming communities as well as how natural resources are managed and 
used. The appearance of emergent farmers raises questions about what has driven their 
growth and how they have been involved in societal resource allocation and accumula-
tion. 
1 Agriculture in capitalism is the economic interests of farming including their institutions and activities 
that affect farmers’ production and reproduction (Bernstein 2010:124). 
2 Class is interpreted as a distinctive group’s relationship to the means of production. 
3 The annual population growth rate is 2.9 percent (Government of Malawi 2019:4). The population density 
has increased from an average of 138 people per square kilometer in 2008 (ibid.:13). 
4 The total arable land area in Malawi is 3.8 million hectares (out of a total of 9.428 million hectares of land) 
(Trading Economics 2020). 
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Research problem and purpose 
This thesis provides an exploration into political economic contexts and historical pro-
cesses that have given rise to emergent farmers as a class, their characteristics, position-
ing in agricultural transformation and societal impact. 
The study was undertaken in Mkanda Extension Planning Area (EPA)5 located within 
Mchinji District, which is found in western Malawi and is part of the Central Region (see 
Figure 2. Map of Malawi and Mchinji District in chapter 3). In Mkanda EPA, agriculture 
has involved increased capitalisation of land, labour and other means of production dur-
ing the last decades. The agricultural transformation has had far-reaching effects on farm-
ers’ living conditions. Mkanda EPA provides an empirical field where one can explore 
themes such as whether emergent farmers are impeding a climb out of poverty for a ma-
jority of rural residents. Or, if they can be seen as one of few agents for economic vitality, 
increased farm productivity and income diversification in a Malawian rural area. 
The question on which the study is based is: 
• How have emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA materialised as a class in a political eco-
nomic context and historical process and what societal impact have they had?
Key descriptive concepts in the study 
In the thesis, emergent farmer as a term is used with emphasis on how farm actors are po-
sitioned in relations of production and reproduction. Farm(er) types are therefore mainly 
categorised on the basis of sociological (type of farming) criteria. Emergent farmers as a 
class are treated as capable of reproducing their means of subsistence and creating surplus 
value without having to own their means of production. An approach to them as a coher-
ent group is how they “negotiate spaces of accumulation and access to resources in ways 
that [potentially] put them in a privileged position to increase the productivity and profita-
bility of the various activities they perform” (Oya 2007:460). Farm actor is used to en-
compass actors involved in the agricultural value chain: raw material extractors; produc-
ers; farm intermediaries (e.g. supervisors and group leaders); civil servants; professionals; 
traditional leaders; local businesspeople; traders; wholesalers; manufacturers; processors; 
parastatal agents; policy and decision makers; investors; capital owners and civil society 
organisation (CSO) representatives.  
Anseeuw et al. (2016) characterise the emergent farmer as an actor who has been 
disadvantaged by colonial government policies, but gradually become part of a more 
commecialised type of agriculture. As a constrast, the authors point to the fact that there 
are better-off farmers who have not been historically disadvanted or overcome an 
emerging stage to reach their position. According to Jayne et al. (2016) and Jayne et al. 
(2019), one type of emergent farmer has a small-scale farm background in rural commu-
nities, but has expanded their scale of production (a process where labour is applied in 
changing the nature of raw material to satisfy conditions of human life) and reproduction 
5 An EPA is an agricultural administrative unit where agricultural policies from the central government are 
implemented through extension services. According to such a model, agricultural knowledge, skills, methods 
and technologies are transferred from researchers to farmers via extension workers.
(means for humans to secure the conditions of life and future production from what is 
produced or earned in the present) (Bernstein 2010:128). Another type of emergent 
farmer has invested in farming with income or other financial sources outside agriculture. 
Moreover, there are emergent farmers with a relatively privileged background within 
family networks who have owned and managed estates, or whose precursors in other 
ways have reached influential positions within the agricultural sector. These types of 
emergent farmers are included in the study. 
I see emergent farmers as part of the Malawian middle class, which in the rural context is 
positioned between small-scale and large-scale farmers. According to Bernstein (2010:3-
4), the small-scale or smallholder farmer is found in households with a simple reproduc-
tion orientation, whose means of production and reproduction are determined by the fam-
ily’s labour power (ibid.:129). Their production primarily serves household subsistence 
needs. Emergent farmers are able to sustain and expand their means of production and re-
production by combining market and social relations. Large-scale farmers are fully in-
volved in market relations for profit.  
In terms of farm size, Anseeuw et al. (2016) define the Malawian medium-scale farmer as 
someone who holds between 5 and 50 hectares of land. This is also the general range of 
land size for emergent farmers used in the study. Most emergent farmers included have 
10-30 hectares of land. However, some emergent farmers have less than 5 hectares of
land. What is of particular interest in such cases is how they have created value within and
outside their land – including how productively they have used property and from where
they have received income.
Recurrent descriptive concepts 
Some recurrent concepts used are worth clarifying here: Livelihood, diversification and 
household. In the study, I assume the definitons given by Ellis (2000), which builds on 
the work of Chambers & Conway (1992): “A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, 
physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these 
(mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by 
the individual or household” (Ellis 2000:10). “Rural livelihood diversification is defined 
as the process by which rural households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio of 
activities and assets in order to survive and to improve their standard of living” (ibid.:15).  
Household is the primary social unit through which emergent farmers have been studied. 
Household is conceived as “the social group which resides in the same place, shares the 
same meals, and makes joint or coordinated decisions over resource allocation and 
income pooling” (ibid.:18). Emphasis is given to interhousehold rather than 
intrahousehold relations, altough some elements of the latter is discussed as well. 
Theoretical entry 
The significance of the research question about how emergent farmers have materialised 
is influenced by agrarian political economy, as it is defined in mission statement of the 
Journal of Agrarian Change “the social relations and dynamics of production and repro-
duction, property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both 
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historical and contemporary”. The exploration of the political economic context and his-
torical process in which emergent farmers have materialised centres around social rela-
tions between capital and labour. An underlying element affecting such relations is how 
capital users in their pursuit to accumulate profit invest in agricultural production to make 
more profit. Another central theme is how relations of production, consumption and re-
production are materialised within and between classes (Bernstein 2010; Scoones 2016). 
In the thesis, capital refers to variable capital (labour power: labourers’ capacity to work 
and which they can sell for wages to buy means of subsistence – the only capital that, 
when used to produce a commodity, generates greater value than its own value) and/or 
constant capital (technology, raw material and land – which in the production of new 
commodities only can contribute to its existing value) (Bernstein 2010:25-26).  
I trace the materialisation of emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA to how capital has moved 
and been organised through them during Malawi’s postcolonial history. The agricultural 
transformation that emergent farmers in the study area have been involved in is inter-
preted by how capital as a force appears when monetary value takes the form as com-
modity, before returning to the money-form, but then with a greater sum than what was 
initially capitalised (Bernstein 2010:25). Figure 1 displays main factors that are addressed 
in the thesis in relation to the materialisation of emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA. 
Figure 1. Political economic factors of the materialisation of emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA. 
Illustration: Gustav Broms. 
Significance of how the empirics is interpreted through domestic power relations 
The interpretation of the empirical material based on the question about how emergent 
farmers have materialised as a class and the societal impact they have had is partly 
characterised by the importance of domestic power interests. More specifically, I take 
into account the role and positioning of emergent farmers in an environment where state 
resources are considered as the patrimony of the ruler and particular client 
Political economic factors of the 
materialisation of 
emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA 
Land and other natural resource relations
• Land inheritance, acquisition, purchasing 
power and entitlement
• Family distribution, division and use
• Access to arable land; woodland; 
water sources and other raw material
• Access to fertile land
• Resource exchange with other landholders
Household conditions
• Socioeconomic and sociocultural background, 
direction, bonds and status
• Assets, resources and income sources
• Responsibilities, consumption and needs
• Farm and off-farm activities, labour power 
and technology 
• Potential to generate surplus value used for 
livelihood security and productive investments
• Strategies and ways of handling economic, social
and ecological opportunities, risks and crises
Public, market and civil society positions
• Civil service employment or pension
• Means of collateral
• Access to extension services and credit
• Ability to utilise volatile markets
• Connection, participation, recognition         
and cooperation in networks; groups           
and agricultural institutions and organisations
• Bargaining power
groups (Chirwa & Dorward 2013:65). In Malawi, the state has been treated as a sphere 
without agreed moral imperatives (Ekeh 1975) and served as a means for political leaders 
and other elite groups to transfer public resources to themselves and in return provide 
support and loyalty – i.e. patronage – to selected clients (van Wyk 2007). Individuals 
with positions of power have used public institutions as resource pools from which re-
sources are distributed to kinship networks, ethnic groups and residents in their home 
area. The exchange has implied moral obligations that are reminiscent of social principals 
in family and kin relations. 
Consequently, corruption in the public arena has been a mode of action associated with 
the need for rulers to build and consolidate social networks and patron-client relation-
ships. The political resource appropriation has rested on rent-seeking strategies, where 
privileged groups have sought to acquire an increased share of the existing wealth, with-
out necessarily creating new wealth. They have accumulated wealth from monopoly trad-
ing, subsidies, donor support, foreign investments and control over scarce resources in 
ways that have led to misappropriation of public funds and positions (Cammack, Kelsall 
& Booth 2010:2). 
The presidential office has dispensed and regulated patronage to gain and sustain legiti-
macy, authority and support in relation to three main client groups: the political elite, the 
middle class and the wider mass (ibid.). Different presidents have had their specific ap-
proaches and interests in how they have reinforced support and loyalty from targeted cli-
ents. In this light, I ask in what ways emergent farmers have materialised within the cli-
ent groups shaped by the neopatrimonial state (where a formal law and administration 
framework exists, but public institutions are controlled by patronage networks) (Booth et 
al. 2006). (Neo)patrimonialism as an ideology gives insight into how ruling ideas win 
consent when they are embodied as the general interest and common sense of societal 
groups – beliefs that in turn can affect the materialisation of emergent farmers. 
Significance of how the empirics is interpreted through food regimes 
I also handle the empirical material concerning the materialisation of emergent farmers – 
and their relationship to capital – by encountering the actor as embedded in food re-
gimes, which is “a rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a 
world scale” (Friedmann 1993:30-31). Each food regime is organised within particular 
geopolitical configurations of production and food relations that take place through capi-
talist powers (McMichael 2009). With this theoretical perspective, I place emergent 
farmers as part of broader historical and political economic conjunctures (cf. ibid.).
Significance of how the empirics is interpreted through means of production 
My concern about how emergent farmers have materialised and their societal impact also 
lead me to process the empirical material through how the capitalist mode of production 
that characterise their means of production has involved them in relations of capital, class 
and labour. 
The capitalist mode of production as a system of organising production and distributing 
value is based on the social relation between the owner of the means of production and 
labour (the social form of work). In agrarian societies such as Mkanda EPA, farmers have
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exchanged labour to produce and reproduce themselves through their labour power; land; 
tools; mechanised technology; seeds; livestock; food; shelter; rest; other needs as well as 
values associated with social and cultural interactions (cf. Bernstein 2010:18, 26). The 
farmers’ subsistence has required that part of their income has been allocated to the 
consumption of the producer and those dependent on him or her; the technology used in 
the cultivation and the inputs applied for each production cycle (cf. ibid.:71-72).  
The value of someone’s labour power is based on its exchange value: the labour that has 
gone into producing something – that is, the value of the resources that the labourer must 
consume to replenish his or her work capacity (Araghi 2003). In the capitalist mode of 
production, a labourer’s labour power becomes the property of the capitalist. The ex-
change value (the relative value of a commodity in relation to other commodities) of 
someone’s labour power is expressed in wages or other types of payment (including 
food). When capital and labour are separated, the labourer must buy back the commodity 
that has been produced from the capital owner.  
The capital owner generates profit from the value difference between the production 
costs (the use of variable capital in combination with constant capital) and the price of 
the commodity (Bernstein 2010:25-26). Surplus value in capitalist relations is realised 
when the capital owner appropriates the value invested in producing a commodity that 
exceeds what is required to meet the producer’s (labourer’s) reproduction needs. Ex-
pressed differently, the capital owner’s capital accumulation for the acquisition of more 
capital requires that surplus value is generated through labour – where the value of what 
the labourer puts on his or her subsistence is less than the cost of producing the commod-
ity (ibid.:36, 126, 129). In short, the margin between the exchange value and surplus 
value is the basis of exploitation, capital accumulation and profit. The profit generated 
from surplus value can be increased either by an extension of the labourer’s working 
hours, or a reduction of their payment (Araghi 2003).  
This theoretical approach to the empirical material of the study is analysed in chapter 8. 
2  Methodology and methods 
Below, I clarify the scientific underpinning for how the research was conducted. I also 
describe what methods were applied to handle the question how emergent farmers in 
Mkanda EPA have materialised in a political economic context and historical process. 
Research approach 
The understanding of emergent farmers in the study is characterised by what kind of so-
cial relations and historical patterns connect them as a class. My search for knowledge is 
based on how emergent farmers have been formed through societal structures (established 
social patterns); political economic systems (set of social relations) as well as agricul-
tural institutions (rules of the game) and organisations (patterns of action). The treatment 
of emergent farmers is shaped by their social positioning in relations of production and 
reproduction. I look at the political economic conditions that have influenced their 
positioning and scope for action – what is possible for them to do. I also make sense of 
what happens between them and other societal groups.  
During the research process, I asked questions; sought empirical material; looked for lit-
erary sources and interpreted the material with an abductive approach. In other words, I 
moved between a specific empirical phenomenon and hypothetic overarching patterns 
and whether they could explain what I experienced in Mkanda EPA (cf. Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009:4). When I conducted the study, I developed the use of empirical 
material successively while adjusting and refining theoretical traces (proposed coherent 
conceptual characteristics). By alternating between theory and empirical facts in the light 
of each other, I could reinterpret my understanding of the research phenomenon. 
Furthermore, in order to develop underlying conditions that could explain emergent 
farmers as a societal group and contexts in which they have materialised, I analysed the 
empirical facts in combination with previous relevant studies (cf. ibid.).  
Methodical direction 
I gathered empirical material – knowledge based upon experience – through interviews, 
focus group discussions and an explorative survey. The field work was done in Mkanda 
EPA between February and March 2018. The decision to choose Mkanda EPA as the em-
pirical field was influenced by how the place would allow me to get relevant information 
about the research problem from a relatively small sample of empirical sources 
(Flyvbjerg 2006).  
In addition to the field work, I formed the understanding of emergent farmers through a 
desk study to identify key factors that have influenced how emergent farmers have mate-
rialised in relation to long-term and wider societal circumstances (cf. WFP 2009:48). I re-
viewed studies (articles, reports and public documents) with perspectives on political, 
economic, social and environmental conditions that have affected and been affected by 
how farming is done in the area (cf. ibid.).  
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In order to approach emergent farmers as a class and their positioning in agricultural 
transformation, I asked four central questions as entries to the primary and secondary 
sources, articulated by Bernstein (2010:22-24; 2017):  
• Who owns what (how are the means of production and reproduction distributed)?
• Who does what (how is the social division of labour organised)?
• Who gets what (how is the product of labour and its use in reproduction distributed)?
• What do they do with it (how are the social relations of consumption, reproduction
and accumulation materialised)?
With these questions put into use, I could place emergent farmers in the intersection be-
tween concrete situations and structural forces of power, politics and economics (Scoones 
2016). 
Primary sources 
During the fieldwork, I was accompanied by a field assistant. He helped me with translat-
ing questions and responses in Chewa and English during interview situations, when in-
formants had difficulties with expressing themselves in English. He and I also had recur-
rent discussions about the findings. The field assistant is a graduate student from Li-
longwe University of Agriculture & Natural Resouces (LUANAR), where he has studied 
Nutrition and Food Science.  
I collected the empirical facts through theoretical sampling: I focused on informants and 
sources of information that were relevant to my research question and theoretical expla-
nation of the empirical phenomenon (Creswell 2014:189; Silverman:60-63, 122). My se-
lection of informants was based on treating human beings as representatives of a specific 
societal problem (ibid.:4; ibid.:61, 67). I chose informants in consultation with govern-
ment extension officers in Mkanda EPA. The criteria for who would be included in the 
study were based on the person’s livelihood direction; farm orientation; socioeconomic 
conditions; gender and land size (cf. Creswell 2014:189-189; Hansen 2003; Lund 2014; 
Silverman 2015:71-72; van Maanen 2001). The sample consisted of informants who were 
both full-time and part-time farmers; focused on different types of production; lived in 
relative poverty; were able to meet their subsistence needs and were relatively wealthy; 
included women and men and had a land size that was either smaller than 2 hectares; be-
tween 2-5 hectares or larger than 5 hectares. 
The informants signified an approximately equal proportion of individuals who reside in 
three sections within Mkanda EPA. The sections are located closer or further away from 
Mkanda trading centre. The sections differ in terms of physical features and its popula-
tion’s average farm size as well as livelihood conditions. Some informants were also in-
cluded later during the course of the fieldwork, depending on how their roles and interests 
in society could complement the understanding of emergent farmers’ positioning in rela-
tions of production and reproduction. I continued to collect facts from the field until devi-
ant cases faded and empirical saturation was met to answer the research question (Cre-
swell 2014:189; Lund 2014; Silverman 2014:69, 99-100, 124). The empirical material 
was organised in categories, codes, groupings or themes (Creswell 2014:14, 197-200; Sil-
verman 2015:256-257).  
By structuring the material, I could distinguish emerging themes and factors about how 
emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have materialised in relation to other studies and my 
theoretical assumptions. The themes were used to create subheadings in chapter 7 (where 
a large part of the interview material is mainly used) and chapter 8 (where emergent 
farmers are analysed based on social relations and materials are used from interviews and 
focus group discussions). Overall themes in chapter 7 are therefore food security; market 
relations; land relations; farmers’ participation in agricultural institutions and organisa-
tions as well as natural resource relations. The overall perspectives in chapter 8 focus on 
social relations between farmer groups in terms of class, gender and labour. 
Secondary sources 
In the process of integrating secondary sources, I mapped topics, attributes and the im-
portance of the text sources to be explored (cf. QuestionPro 2019). Next, I narrowed 
down the sources that could contribute purposefully to my study. I reviewed writings that 
were more closely or broadly related to the topic to further sort out in what political eco-
nomic context and historical process emergent farmers have come into being. I combined 
and compared information from the selected secondary sources with my findings from the 
empirical field. By doing so, I explored research gaps; source reliability; which questions 
could be answered and on what basis logical coherence was uncovered about the research 
phenomenon (ibid.). 
Empirical explorations 
In the next section, I outline the sampling methods and sources that constitute the re-
search material. 
Explorative survey 
Initially during the field work, I undertook an explorative survey with 31 small-scale and 
emergent farmers. They represent a roughly equal number of individuals from three dif-
ferent sections in Mkanda EPA (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Participants in explorative survey 
Gender Small-scale farmers 
(number) 
Emergent farmers 
(number) 
Total (number) 
Man 4 13 17 
Woman 10 4* 14 
Source: Information from explorative survey. *Three of the female emergent farmers live in male-headed 
households.  
The explorative survey included questions about the informant’s household: the number, 
age and gender of the members; income sources; assets; land size; farm practices; type of 
produce; market relations; off-farm activities; ability to meet basic needs; ability to create 
surplus value and institutional connections. The explorative survey provided an overview 
of farm characteristics in the area. I could thereby begin to discern what categorically 
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defined specific types of farmers. The findings from the survey also guided my selec-
tion of informants that were to be further interviewed about the research problem (Cre-
swell 2014:16, 19) – depending on how their direction could contribute with in-depth 
knowledge about how emergent farmers have materialised as a class; what impact they 
have had on their surroundings and how other farm actors have related to them. 
Interviews 
During the field work, I relied on broadly formulated questions that pointed at the re-
search problem. The interviews were semi-structured from an interview guide with spe-
cific themes (Creswell 2014: 8-9, 18-19, 194) about how the informant has experienced 
livelihood conditions and directions; farm actor positionings and relationships; the agri-
cultural development in the surroundings and socioeconomic differences between farm-
ers. The interviews provided a nuanced and multifaceted material (Creswell 2014:190; 
Silverman 2015:166, 186) about conditions and complexities that farmers live in (Al-
vesson 2003). I interviewed 31 persons (23 men and 8 women) who had ties to Mchinji 
District and Mkanda EPA (see Table 2). Among them, 13 informants (8 emergent male 
farmers; 1 emergent female farmer; 1 small-scale male farmer and 3 small-scale female 
farmers) also participated in the explorative survey. The informants were generally inter-
viewed individually. Group interviews were conducted in a few cases with a small num-
ber of participants. 
Table 2. Interview subjects 
Category Men (number) Women (number) Total (number) 
Emergent farmers 8 1 9 
Small-scale farmers 2 3 5 
Agrodealers and traders 4 1 5 
Large-scale estate farmers 1 1 
Large-scale estate farm 
managers 
1 1 
Agribusiness company 
representatives 
3 1 4 
Agricultural extension 
officers 
1 1 2 
District development 
officers 
3 1 4 
Source: Information from the individual interviews conducted. 
Focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions were arranged initially during the field work. One focus group 
discussion was done with 12 male emergent farmers. A second focus group discussion 
was held with 12 female small-scale farmers. In each focus group discussion, I wanted to 
include participants who shared some characteristics – in this case gender and socioeco-
nomic conditions (cf. Bosco & Herman 2010; Silverman 2015:206-207). The group divi-
sion thus enabled the participants to discuss issues based on shared experiences both in 
terms of class and gender – and possibly express differences within their respective social 
category. 
Focus group discussion with male emergent farmers (left) and female small-scale farmers (right). 
Photo: Gustav Broms. 
During the discussions, I applied Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools (Cavestro 
2003): historical timeline, wealth ranking and seasonal calendar. The tools used and dis-
cussions in general provided perspectives on how common and distinguishing features of 
farmer groups could be identified and elaborated in terms of production and reproduction 
relations; self-image and image of others; assets; resource use; farm and off-farm engage-
ments; seasonal activities and major events that seem to have affected the participants’ 
living conditions. In sum, the information from the focus group discussions helped me 
categorise the participants’ perceptions of social groups; distinguish conditions in the re-
search problem that seemed important to focus on in the continued study and analyse the 
materialisation of emergent farmers from a class and gender perspective (cf. Silverman 
2015:218-222).  
Implication of the methodical direction 
The different research sources explored with various methods enabled me to approach 
emergent farmers from several angles. I could ask whether the content from the sources 
emerged as mutually supportive, complementary or contradictory (Lund 2014; Creswell 
2014:185, 191-191; Silverman 2015:42-45, 91-93) and elucidate, link, reexamine and 
verify findings (Silverman 2015:226). In other words, I sought to reinforce the scientific 
value of the thesis by comparing different types of data and find out whether they sup-
ported the claims of one another and in combination contributed to a more convincing 
and comprehensible conclusion – or if there were still gaps I needed to explore and fill. 
In the empirical field, I needed to handle the fact that those I interacted with expressed 
themselves from a certain position and role, which was influenced by my presence (Cre-
swell 2014:189-189; Hansen 2003; Lund 2014; Silverman 2015:71-72; van Maanen 
2001). Therefore, I tested impressions, preconceptions and interpretations about specific 
research material against other sources with modes of suspicion, questioning and reflec-
tion (Willig 2014). I strived to make the interpretations of the research sources reliable 
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and valid through comprehensible reasoning; clarity of the text; comparison between 
sources of data as well as other studies and logical cohesion regarding the meaning of the 
studied phenomenon and how the material related to the research problem (Lund 2014; 
Silverman 2015:91-93).  
The significance of the thesis primarily lies in how the analytical constituent properties 
(or patterns) in the studied phenomenon make sense and stimulate further investigations 
and theoretical understanding about how emergent farmers and the contexts in which they 
exist can be seen as something conceptually true (Silverman 2015:81-89; Creswell 
2014:201-204).  
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3  Study area: Mchinji District and Mkanda EPA 
Mkanda EPA is one of six Extension Planning Areas (the local Ministry of Agriculture 
office) in Mchinji, a district within the central region which borders Zambia in the west 
and Mozambique southwards. Mkanda EPA lies in western Malawi, adjacent to Zambia. 
It is located some 35 kilometres north of Mchinji Boma – the district centre. Mchinji 
Boma is located at one of the main paved roads – M12, about 110 kilometres from the 
capital Lilongwe and 10 kilometres from the Zambian border (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Maps of Africa, Malawi and Mchinji District. Source: Google Maps 2019, own processing. 
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Table 3. Geographic and demographic conditions in Mchinji District and 
Mkanda EPA 
Classification Mchinji District Mkanda EPA 
Land area (ha) 334 600 (2018) 103 660 (2018) 
Arable land (including wood-
lots) (ha) 
222 455 (2018) 60 775 (2018) 
Leasehold land (including es-
tates and business properties) 
(ha) 
71 237 (2018) 27 399 (2018) 
Customary land (including in-
dividual farmland; households; 
accommodation as well as pub-
lic land controlled by the state 
or community such as public 
buildings; infrastructure; recre-
ational sites; grazing areas; 
marketplaces; business loca-
tions and burial grounds) (ha) 
151 218 (2018) 33 376 (2018) 
Dambo land (wetland) (ha) 55 576 (2018) 18 296 (2018) 
Forest reserves and community 
forests (ha)  
42 551 (2008) 14 225 (2018) 
Hills and surface water (ha) 14 018 (2018) 10 304 (2018) 
Average landholding size per 
person (ha) 
0.37 (2019) 0.33 (2018) 
Average landholding size per 
household (ha) 
1.66 (2019) 1.65 (2018) 
Number of households 134 799 (94 110 male-headed, 
40 689 female-headed) (2019) 
36 341 (23 671 male-headed,  
12 670 female-headed) (2018) 
Average household size 
(number of people) 
4.5 (2019) 5 (2018) 
Population (number of people) 602 305 (3.4 percent of the total 
population in Malawi) (2019) 
181 705 (2018) 
Share of the population for-
mally engaged in off-farm eco-
nomic activities (percent) 
20.6 (mainly wholesale and retail; 
accommodation; food services 
and social welfare services) 
(2017) 
? 
Sources: Government of Malawi 2017b:70; Government of Malawi 2019:12, 47, 74, 211; Mchinji District 
Agriculture Office 2008:6, 26; Mchinji District Agriculture Office 2018 and information provided by the 
Agriculture Extension Development Coordinator in Mkanda EPA. 
Mchinji District is part of Kasungu Agricultural Development Division (ADD) (see Fig-
ure 3).  
Figure 3. Administrative structure of agricultural institutions. Source: Munthali & Murayama 2013. 
Mchinji District 
Over 90 percent of the population in Mchinji District relies on farming (Government of 
Malawi 2017b:125). The area has a mix of smallholder-, emergent- and large-scale farms 
– although the majority of the population is small-scale farmers. The population density is
192 persons per square kilometre (Government of Malawi 2019:14). The population has
increased with almost 148 000 people between 2008 and 2018 (ibid.:6). The mean
household size is 4.4 persons (Government of Malawi 2017b:12). Among the population,
57.6 percent consider themselves to be very poor and 29.4 percent poor (ibid.:144). The
literacy rate among the residents over 15 years old is 73.4 percent (ibid.:25). The
proportion of the population who have never attended school is 13.2 percent (ibid.:27).
Among the people who have been to school, 12.1 percent has completed eight years of
education (ibid.:29).
Mkanda EPA 
Mkanda trading centre is the hub in the EPA. The trading centre is reached on a partly 
paved and sandy road, which occasionally is impassable during the rainy season. Poor 
road infrastructure and access to government services have limited the range of market 
activities to small-scale food processing; agricultural and household equipment trade; 
handicraft; carpentry; construction; retail stores; manufacturing and wholesaler facilities; 
grocery shops; bars; workshops; restaurants; guesthouses and transportation services as 
well as selling of electronics (including mobile phones), clothes and media products. 
There are basic public functions present including health; education; law enforcement; 
food market regulations and administration of natural resources and electricity. 
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Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) present in the area provide services on similar 
issues that the public institutions are responsible for. There are also agricultural 
organisations and credit institutions in the EPA. 
The majority of the population in Mkanda EPA is dependent on farming as their main 
livelihood source (see Table 4 for main farm activities carried out in specific seasons dur-
ing the year). Their main energy sources for cooking and heat are firewood; charcoal; gas 
and grass/straw. The lighting sources are torches; lamps; lanterns; solar panels; the elec-
tricity network; generators; paraffin and candles. A majority collects water from bore-
holes and wells. People also get water directly from streams and ponds. Some residents 
have access to tap water in their house. Farmers mainly grow maize; burley tobacco; 
groundnuts; soybeans and horticultural crops (vegetables and fruits), but also pigeon 
peas; red beans; cowpeas; Irish potato; sweet potato; cassava; pumpkin; sunflowers; rice 
and sugarcane. They also engage in forestry to some extent. They mainly raise poultry 
and goats, but also pigs; ducks; doves; rabbits and cattle. Mkanda EPA has relatively fer-
tile soil conditions which consist of sandy and clay loam. Streams flow from the Rusa 
River, which runs through parts of the district. The climatic conditions are relatively good 
for agriculture. The dry season lasts from May to October and the rainy season between 
November and April. 
Table 4. Main farm activities during the year 
July-September October-         
December 
January-March April-June 
Farm activities Land clearing/ 
tilling 
Tilling/Planting Planting Harvesting 
Input acquisition/ 
Seed selection  
Mechanised tilling Input acquisition 
Planning for the 
next season 
Weeding Weeding Planning for the 
next season 
Ridging Ridging 
Manure             
application 
Fertiliser/manure 
application 
Fertiliser            
application 
Harvesting 
Marketing/  
selling 
Marketing/      
selling 
Marketing/    
selling 
Socioeconomic 
conditions 
Main food 
availability 
Peak labour 
demand 
Peak labour       
demand 
Main food     
availability 
Main monetary 
exchange 
Main monetary 
exchange 
Main social 
events 
Main social 
events 
Source: Information given by participants in focus group discussions. 
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4 Overview of relevant agricultural conditions in 
time and space 
In this chapter, I outline major historical events that have affected Malawian agrarian 
societies (including Mkanda EPA). I also summarise livelihood characteristics among 
specific farmer groups in Mkanda EPA. 
Below, in Table 5, an overview is given of significant political economic events that have 
shaped agrarian societies such as Mkanda EPA and the conditions for emergent (and 
other) farmers there. 
Table 5. Major political economic events affecting the materialisation of 
emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA 
1964-1990 (chapter 5) 1990-2000 (chapter 6) 2000-2019 (chapter 7) 
• Land Bill 1965 (Land classifi-
cation)
• Large-scale estate expansion
during the 1960s and 1970s (in-
creased domestic commercial
interest in arable land and class
difference between farmers)
• Integrated Rural Development
Programme (IRDP) late 1960s
(state expansion)
• Formation of ADMARC 1971
(state intervention on the agri-
cultural market)
• Special Crops Act 1972 (leg-
islation defining who can pro-
duce what)
• Farmer group/club model
1978 (state-sanctioned capital
distributed to selected farmers)
• Oil and geopolitical crises as
well as state-debt crisis in the
late 1970s (increase in produc-
tion costs and restructuring of
the estate sector and the cash
crop market)
• Market liberalisation policies
(including the repeal of the Spe-
cial Crops Act and trade deregula-
tion) during the 1990s (liberalised
production and trading condi-
tions, including the spread of
commercialised input use among
farmers; expansion of burley to-
bacco production through clubs
and estates and increased class
differentiation and price volatil-
ity)
• Food crises/shortages 1979-
1980, 1986-1987, 1991-1992,
1993-1994 and 1997-1998 (waves
of differentiation among farmers;
rising maize prices; collapsed
credit systems; relative increase
in household spending on maize
and reintroduction of input subsi-
dises in the late 1990s)
• Burley tobacco price decline
1998 ® (structural change in to-
bacco buyers’ preference; farm-
ers’ production orientation and
household income sources)
• Removal of the price band 2000
(private trader expansion)
• Collapse of civil servants’ real
salary value during the 2000s
(civil servants invest in agricul-
ture as a livelihood security and a
business opportunity)
• Food crises/shortages 2001-
2002, 2004-2005, 2012-2013,
2015-2016 (waves of differentia-
tion among farmers; rising maize
prices; continuation of input sub-
sidy programs; livelihood diversi-
fication and growth of farmer or-
ganisations; agribusinesses; in-
vestors; NGOs and microfinance
institutions and new production
models such as contract farming)
• National Land Policy 2002
(passed into the new Land Act
2016) (strengthened legal support
for individualised land tenure and
increased commodification of nat-
ural resources)
• Food crisis and financial crisis
2007-2008 (domestic and interna-
tional land rush and increased in-
vestment and speculation in agri-
culture and rural markets)
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• Strategic grain reserve 1981
(state control mechanism over
the agricultural market)
• Structural adjustment pro-
grams 1981 ® (revised agricul-
tural support system; rational-
ised public budgeting and fiscal 
policy as well as promotion of 
smallholder cash crop produc-
tion and international trade 
competitiveness)
• Small-scale and medium-scale
estate expansion during the
1980s (state-sanctioned capital
distributed to selected farmers)
Source: Own compilation from academic literature and empirics. The red text marks periods of crises. 
In Table 6, main conditions are presented of how different types of farmers in Mkanda 
EPA can be characterised. The featured attributes are arranged based on information in-
terpreted from an explorative survey and two focus group discussions (see chapter 2). 
Table 6. Farmer class characteristics 
Characteristics       Smallholder farmers  Emergent farmers 
Resource-poor farmers 
(small-scale farmer 
informants) 
In-between farmers 
(small-scale and some 
emergent farmer inform-
ants) 
Better-off farmers (the 
majority of the emergent 
farmer informants) 
Land size (ha) 0-2 2-5 5-50
Main land type Inherited and rented 
plots of customary land, 
including woodlot (in 
some cases). 
Inherited and/or rented 
and/or purchased cus-
tomary and leasehold 
land, including woodlot 
(in some cases). 
Inherited and/or rented 
and/or purchased custom-
ary and leasehold land 
(estates), including wood-
lot(s) and water reserve(s) 
(in some cases). 
Gender of 
household head 
Woman or man. Primarily man. Man. 
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Main income 
sources 
Irregular and informal 
sales of agricultural 
products on the local 
market. Family-based 
small-scale business (e.g. 
sales of raw materials 
such as firewood; cooked 
edibles or products that 
others have produced 
and manufactured).  
Casual farm labour. 
Other manual labour 
such as burning and lay-
ing of bricks, or tasks in 
infrastructure projects. 
Rental of land. Remit-
tances (in some cases). 
Relatively regular sales of 
farm products through 
semi-formal or formal 
relations in local, 
regional and interregional 
markets. Established or 
emerging family-based 
business(es) (e.g. sales 
from fixed places or 
through modes of 
transport) with some di-
versification of activities 
such as carpentry and 
other crafts; 
slaughterhouse operations 
and sales of used 
clothing; animal 
products; crops and 
cooked or prepared foods 
and beverages).  
Trade where they have 
the role of intermediary 
between producer and 
end consumer. Non-
mechanised services (e.g. 
transport and rental of 
houses).  
Civil service employ-
ment or traditional au-
thority position (in some 
cases). Temporary or 
permanent farm labour. 
Management position on 
estates. Rental of houses 
and/or land. Pension. Re-
mittances (in some cases). 
Regular and formalised 
sales in local, regional 
and interregional markets. 
Established business(es) 
that include(s) staff and a 
larger number of labour-
ers (e.g. cross-border 
trade; seed cultivation; 
transport; maize milling; 
shop ownership; 
slaughterhouse 
operations; monetary 
lending; rental of houses; 
mechanised technology 
and specialist expertise). 
Trade where they have a 
noticeable influence in the 
value chain and/or deal 
with larger volumes of 
unprocessed, processed 
and manufactured prod-
ucts (including animal 
products and crops). 
Civil service employment 
or traditional authority 
position, or private em-
ployment. Professional 
(including consultancy) 
services. Rental of 
houses. Pension. 
Market position Net-food buyer. Price 
taker. 
Alternating between net-
food buyer and net-food 
seller. Shifting between 
price taker and price 
searcher. 
Net-food seller. Price 
searcher, at least in cer-
tain market relations. 
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Major credit sources 
and institutional   
commitment
Microfinance institutions 
(in some cases). Services 
from extension officers 
and traditional authori-
ties. Support from rela-
tives. Resource exchange 
with small-scale and 
emergent farmers. 
Farmer clubs and organi-
sations. Microfinance in-
stitutions. NGOs. Ser-
vices from extension of-
ficers and traditional au-
thorities. Support from 
relatives and acquaint-
ances. Resource ex-
change with small-scale 
and emergent farmers. 
Farmer clubs and organi-
sations. Microfinance in-
stitutions. NGOs. Con-
tracting companies. Ser-
vices from extension of-
ficers and traditional au-
thorities (including indi-
viduals within the family). 
Banks. Commitment in 
development committees 
and boards.  
Support from well-off rel-
atives and acquaintances. 
Resource exchange with 
small-scale farmers, 
emergent farmers and 
large-scale farmers. 
Labour
relations 
Works as a casual la-
bourer or tenant. Hires 
casual labour (in some 
cases). Uses family la-
bour. 
Works as a casual or per-
manent labourer. Hires 
casual labour. Uses 
mainly family labour. 
Might work as a perma-
nent labourer. Is or has 
been employed (to a large 
extent). Hires casual and 
permanent labour. Uses 
family and/or non-family 
labour. 
Technology Manual tools. Manual tools. Mecha-
nised technology (e.g. 
ploughs drawn by oxen 
and treadle pump). 
Manual tools. Mechanised 
technology (e.g. tractor, 
harrow and plough). Trea-
dle pump. Motorised 
pump. Maize sheller 
and/or mill. 
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Common household 
assets (excluding 
livestock, crops and 
agricultural technol-
ogy) 
Chairs. Sleeping mats, 
mattresses or simple 
beds. Mobile phone. Bi-
cycle(s). Torch. Lantern. 
Fuelwood stove. Water 
from pump connected to 
borehole or well outside 
the plot.  
One main building. 
House with roof made of 
straw or mudbrick, one 
or no window, mud or 
sand floor, walls of mud 
or handmade brick. 
Furnished basic equip-
ment for kitchen and lei-
sure activities. Commer-
cially purchased pots and 
pans. Beds. Mobile 
phone(s). Radio(s). TV 
set (in some cases). Mu-
sic and/or video player. 
Bicycle(s). Motorbike (in 
some cases). Oxcart. 
Torch(es). Lantern(s). 
Lamp(s).  
Solar panel(s) (in some 
cases). Fuelwood stove. 
Water from pump con-
nected to borehole out-
side the plot or tap in the 
yard. One or few build-
ings. Handmade fence. 
Houses with roofs made 
of sheet metal or un-
burned bricks, windows 
with wooden frames, 
floors of cement or wood 
and walls of brick, ce-
ment or mud. 
Furnished sitting area and 
kitchen. Commercially 
purchased pots and pans. 
Equipment for decoration 
or leisure activities. Beds. 
Mobile phones. Radio(s). 
Music and/or video 
player. Stereo. TV set. Bi-
cycles. Motorbike. 
Car(s)/truck(s) (in some 
cases). Oxcart(s). Connec-
tion to electricity network. 
Torch(es). Lantern(s). 
Lamps.  
Solar panels. Car battery 
(for charging). Generator 
(in some cases). Electric 
or gas stove. Fuelwood 
stove as extra energy 
source. Refrigerator (in 
some cases). Water from 
tap in the yard or faucet in 
the house. Several build-
ings. Manufactured fence. 
Houses with roofs made 
of sheet metal or corru-
gated iron sheet or burnt 
bricks, glass windows, ce-
mented floors, painted ex-
terior walls and interior 
plaster walls. 
Main expenses Food, beverages and 
other basic daily house-
hold needs. Household 
maintenance. Clothes. 
Healthcare. School fees. 
Transport. Use of mobile 
phone. Social events. 
Membership fees. Fire-
wood. 
Healthcare. School fees. 
Social events and support 
to relatives and acquaint-
ances. Household 
maintenance. Farm la-
bour. Inputs. Transport. 
Use of mobile phone(s). 
Membership fees. Loans. 
Services based on mech-
anised equipment and ve-
hicles. Investments in 
farm and off-farm busi-
ness(es). Firewood. 
Charcoal. 
School fees. Social events 
and support to relatives 
and acquaintances. Farm 
labour. Mechanised and 
motorised equipment, in-
cluding maintenance. In-
puts. Investments in farm 
and off-farm business. 
Electricity. Charcoal. Gas. 
Fuel. 
Educational 
background 
(Primarily) primary or 
secondary education. 
Primary or (primarily) 
secondary education. 
Secondary or tertiary edu-
cation. 
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5 Political economic conditions of emergent 
farmers prior to the democratisation 
In this chapter, I describe how emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have materialised be-
tween 1964 and the early 1990s – a period characterised by state monopoly capitalism. 
The main factors considered during this period include the expansion and restructuration 
of the large-scale estates; the government support channelled to certain smallholder farm-
ers; the introduction of structural adjustment programs; the effects of deregulations on the 
agricultural market and the growth of small-scale and medium-scale estates. 
Large-scale estate expansion 
Malawi became independent in 1964 and was led by the then president Hastings Banda 
until 1994, when the country turned from a one-party system to a multi-party democracy. 
By the late 1960s, Banda and his government turned their attention towards the estate 
subsector6 – a British colonial legacy. Government representatives saw estates as a firm 
basis for lending, public revenues, rural employment creation, economic development and 
improved living standards (Mkandawire 1992:179). The government borrowed financial 
means on commercial terms and made substantial investments in the estate sector 
(Hirschmann 1990).  
Individuals and corporations tied to the government negotiated with chiefs to lease what 
was regarded as “virgin” (or unexploited) customary land. Large tracts of land in less 
populated areas were expropriated, cleared and transferred from the customary (small-
holder) to the leasehold (estate) subsector (Mkandawire Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 
1990:22).7 Between 1967 and 1994, more than 1 million hectares of customary land was 
turned into private and public land in the country (Saidi 1999:66).8 The number of estates 
increased considerably in districts within the Central Region: Kasungu; Mchinji and 
Ntchisi. The conversion undermined the tenure security in the communities and increased 
the land pressure and conflicts among customary landholders (Government of Malawi 
2002). 
By 1994, the estates occupied more than 25 percent of the total land area in Mchinji Dis-
trict (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990). The estates were allocated to parastatal and 
6 Estates are commercial farms held under a registered title, where input-intensive cash crops are produced 
for export markets.   
7 Based on the Land Act 1965 (Government of Malawi 1965), the original title in customary land (tenure 
held, used or occupied under customary law) was removed from the chief and community and vested in the 
government in trust for the citizens of Malawi: While the custody of customary land lied in the traditional 
authorities, the legal right ultimately belonged to the state. Government representatives could therefore transfer 
customary land and grant leases up to 99 years to legal subjects (ibid.). 
8 The 1967 Customary Land (Development) Act provided for the conversion of customary land with refer-
ence to the government’s interests in agricultural development (Government of Malawi 1967). At the end of 
the 1990s, customary land constituted about two-thirds of the total land area in Malawi (Saidi 1999:66). 
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private corporations as well as people with political influence and access to public or pri-
vate resources: businesspeople, senior civil servants and political leaders9 (Holden, 
Kaarhus & Lunduka 2006:16).10 Flue-cured and burley tobacco and maize were the main 
crops cultivated in the estates (Prowse 2009). Schools; health centres; agricultural exten-
sion service institutions; agricultural markets and infrastructural establishments – con-
structed for the distribution and transportation of agricultural commodities – gradually es-
tablished in Mkanda EPA (cf. Chirwa & Dorward 2013:66).11 Through the Special Crops 
Act, amended in 1972, estate holders were given exclusive rights to grow burley and flue-
cured tobacco and auction their produce to the highest bidder at international markets. 
At the same time, smallholder farmers were limited to grow cash crops of comparatively 
low value – e.g. maize, groundnuts and sun-cured and fire-cured tobacco. Their surplus 
was sold to the Malawi Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (AD-
MARC),12 at prices below the export price level (Kanyongolo 2005:122). Smallholders’ 
marketable produce was extracted via implicit taxation which amounted to 50 percent 
(Whiteside 2000). In return, crops and fertilisers were sold by ADMARC at subsidised 
rates. The parastatal made considerable profits from the margin between the purchase 
price for smallholder produce and the price at which the commodity was sold 
(Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:23). A significant share of the surplus value was in-
jected in the estate sector as well as the financing of credit and input subsidies for maize 
production. 
Between 1964 and 1977, the average annual GDP growth rate was 5.5 percent in Malawi 
– a comparatively high level on the continent (Harrigan 2003). Agricultural exports stim-
ulated public and private investments in new technology and increased domestic com-
modity production. On average, the estate sector grew with 17 percent per annum, com-
pared to the smallholder sector with a correlated growth rate of 3 percent per year (ibid.).
Elite groups invested their profits from agriculture in sectors such as retail and wholesale;
transport; real estate; financial services and small-scale industries (including food pro-
cessing) (Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:10-11).
The estate expansion in Mkanda EPA implied that large land areas were alienated from 
rural communities in a time – from 1965 to 1977 – when the country’s population nearly 
doubled (Hirschmann 1990). Restrictions in international migration routes further re-
duced smallholders’ mobility and income opportunities. The growing land pressure made 
family-based farming less feasible in parts of the country. A class of landless farmers was 
9 The president had a majority shareholding in Press Holdings with commercial interests in sectors such as 
tobacco, food, energy, retail, clothing, hardware, transport and property (Thomas 1975:48). Press Holding was 
also the largest shareholder in the two national commercial banks, which made loans available for actors within 
the estate sector (Hirschmann 1990). 
10 The corporations that owned estates included General Farming; ADMARC, Press Agriculture and Cham-
wavi Group (closely associated with the president’s family). 
11 Such investments were made through the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). The IRDP 
was launched in the late 1960 and financed by aid and taxation from sources such as the estate and smallholder 
sector. The program supported investments in infrastructure, public institutions, basic service provision and 
food security interventions (e.g. expansion of agricultural extension services, feeder roads and rural market 
facilities). 
12 The parastatal and marketing board ADMARC was established in 1971 as a succession of previous co-
lonial marketing boards. 
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created and formed part of the labour pool for the estate sector – and eventually emergent 
farmers (Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:16). 
Estate labour conditions 
Smallholders and landless farmers supplied cheap labour and tenancy for the estates. 
They generally received wages too low for any substantial household development 
(Mkandawire Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:24). A monthly payment was equiva-
lent to 90 kilo of unprocessed maize, which was just enough to sustain an average-sized 
family (Hirschmann 1990). Some of the labourers had already settled in the area. Others 
arrived from southern Malawi.13 International migrants returned from neighbouring coun-
tries – South Africa and Rhodesia (current Zimbabwe and Zambia) – where men had 
worked in sectors such as mining (Chirwa & Dorward 2013:62).14  
The leasehold tenant 
Much of the estate tobacco expansion was based on tenant production (Kydd & Hewitt 
1986). The tenant was a man and could be a relative to the estate owner; a small-scale 
farmer living near the leasehold or a migrant who lacked reliable livelihood alternatives. 
The tenant was allocated a portion of land to grow tobacco. The tenants built temporary 
houses and barns with grass, sticks and poles – material that was generally provided and 
charged by the leaseholder against the tenant’s tobacco income (Mkandawire, Jaffee & 
Bertol 1990:81-82). The estate owner further kept down the production costs and in-
creased the output value by letting the tenant involve his wife, children or other family 
members as unpaid labour (Nyanda 1989).  
In the early growing season, the tenant received hoes; watering cans; tobacco seedlings 
and fertilisers on credit. Some tenants also received maize seeds to grow food 
(Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertol 1990:77-78). The price the estate owner paid to the tenant 
for the tobacco they produced reached about 20-40 percent of the average price on the 
auction floor (Mkandawire 1999). The final payment was made after the estate owner had 
deducted the costs for the means of production (e.g. fertilisers; seeds; agrochemicals and 
the provision of casual labourers for specific tasks) allocated by the owner. Although to-
bacco price and input-cost guidelines were issued by the Tobacco Association, the estate 
managers could withhold their actual expenses for inputs, services and food rations pro-
vided to the tenants (ibid.:76).  
Consequently, the estate manager tied the tenant to the farm through their remuneration, 
which was directly linked to the margin between the production costs and output. Yet, 
tenants who were successful in producing tobacco and negotiating prices could poten-
tially earn a higher income than other farm labourers (and become emergent farmers). 
Some increased their profit in ways that created distrust between them and the estate 
13 Migrants from the southern region left a region where the average landholding size was the smallest in 
the country, poverty severe and major tobacco cultivation rare (Devereux et al. 2008). 
14 Domestic and international migration was an important income source for Malawian households until 
the mid-1970s, when labour conditions changed in neighboring countries and the Banda-led regime made Ma-
lawians return to provide labour on the tobacco estates (Hirschmann 1990). 
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owner.15 The tenant usually remained on a specific estate for one or two seasons, before 
moving on. 
The permanent labourer 
Permanent labourers were hired seasonally or throughout the year. They were responsible 
for land and nursery preparation; crop cultivation; maintenance; construction and arrang-
ing the harvested tobacco before the sale (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:84). The 
estate managers saw permanent labourers as easier to command than casual labourers and 
tenants because they were directly supervised by the manager or field supervisor. The es-
tate manager controlled permanent labourers by paying them salary at certain intervals. 
The labourer sometimes had to remain on the estate until the tobacco bales16 had been 
sold before getting paid (ibid.). In which case, given the skills, status and regular income 
they received, they could access and use capital in such ways that enabled them to reach a 
higher socioeconomic level than the majority. 
The casual labourer 
Casual labourers were hired to reduce the work pressure for permanent labourers and ten-
ants in the peak labour season (December-February) on the estates. They performed tasks 
such as land preparation; weeding; fertiliser application; harvesting; grading of tobacco 
leaves and packing of bales for the auction floor. Unlike permanent labourers, they did 
not receive housing, food rations or periodic medical treatment. The payment they re-
ceived was given in food or money and was conditioned by the output of their effort 
(ibid.:84).17 The casual labourers lived in villages close to the estate. They sought work 
when they had run out of food or money in the household and the labour demand was 
high. The estate manager controlled the casual labourers through the supervision of per-
manent labourers and tenants. Social tensions were created especially during times when 
the estate owner lacked money to pay the casual labourer with (ibid.:85). Because labour-
ers limited the time on their own land (if they had it) during the growing season, they 
risked reducing the likelihood of creating surplus value from their holdings (ibid.:82) and 
remaining dependent on farm labour as a source of income. 
Agricultural restructuration and differentiation 
ADMARC developed an extensive network and infrastructure of agricultural markets 
around the country, including Mkanda EPA. Agricultural marketing was also done by pri-
vate traders (licensed or otherwise), who adjusted their operations according to state limi-
tations on how much could be traded at what price (Chilowa 1998). 
15 Some tenants stole tobacco; input and tools from the estates. Tenants also avoided paying debts by leav-
ing the estate before the harvest. Another trick the tenant used was to add water to the tobacco and increase its 
weight before the grading was done, which meant that the estate owner could not sell the crop or had to lower 
its price (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:80). 
16 A standard tobacco bale weighs about 100 kilos. 
17 The payments given to child and female labour was considerably lower than what men received 
(Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:84-85). 
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Public support to selected smallholders 
After the national independence, agricultural extension officers began to offer input loans 
and advices to smallholders who were organised in groups – and formed part of the 
emergent farmer class (Devereux et al. 2008:25-26).18 In 1978, the government 
introduced a farmer club model to improve smallholders’ access to credit and advice 
(Kishindo 1988). Being a club member became a requirement to receive extension 
services and inputs on credit. The institutional formation of clubs reminded of the 
previous Master Farmer scheme,19 that turned into the Progressive Farmer scheme in 
1969 – where extension workers identified and favoured farmers who proved to be 
successful in implementing agricultural advice and had more resources than their 
neighbours (ibid.). 
Through the farmer club model, groups were formed with 10-30 members from the same 
village or neighbouring villages. The members elected a committee who managed the 
club’s affairs, paid an annual fee and followed a set of rules and regulations.20 They re-
ceived loans in kind and collected inputs at ADMARC according to individual require-
ments. The members were collectively responsible for the repayment of the input credit 
loan after their produce had been sold through the marketing board.21  
To attract the extension officer’s attention and receive credit and services, the farmer 
needed to demonstrate a certain level of financial security; control enough land to be self-
reliant on food; produce a surplus for sale and be willing to take a financial risk (Hirsch-
mann 1990). It was also beneficial for the farmer to have a certain educational back-
ground and connection with actors who exercised political or public administrational in-
fluence. Furthermore, the household should be male-headed with both the husband and 
wife present. The man should be a full-time farmer and active at the homestead where 
money was earned from established crop sales, or come on regular visits and contribute 
with income from off-farm work or employment. Alternatively, the household should 
have an accumulated wealth that enabled investments in the inputs needed for increased 
yields and the financial security required to obtain credit.  
The farmer also had to produce specific maize varieties that required pure stand cultiva-
tion. Consequently, the recipient had to accept inspections by extension officers and ap-
18 After 1964, extension workers had the mandate to visit smallholder farmers individually, but failed to do 
so because of high extension agent-farmer ratio (Kishindo 1988). Instead, extension officers primarily visited 
the better-off farmers who appeared most responsive to their advice and could convey positive results from the 
efforts made. 
19 The Master Farmer scheme was launched by the colonial government in 1950 (Green 2005:143). In the 
master farmer, the colonial administration saw a potential ally and class who could take the lead in cash crop 
(e.g. tobacco) production; transform farming methods; disseminate agricultural commercialisation; involve 
poorer farmers in labour exchange and expropriate land from less productively “successful” farmers (ibid.:144-
145). 
20 For example, the members had to have a demonstration plot and club house for meetings with the exten-
sion officer. A member who violated the rules risked being denied credit the following season, or have assets 
confiscated (Devereux et al. 2008). 
21 If the debt was not fully repaid after the sale, the club as a whole lost the benefit of future credit (Kishindo 
1988). 
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ply specific fertilisers at given quantities and times (ibid.). Farm actors who met the crite-
ria included civil servants; traders; traditional leaders;22 estate supervisors; tobacco lease-
hold tenants and farmers with enough land and labour supply to increase their productiv-
ity.  
Decline in the large-scale estate sector following the oil crises 
After the global geopolitical instability following the world oil crises in 1973 and 1979, 
weaknesses in the national economy were exposed in the light of increased fiscal deficits; 
a banking liquidity crisis; fall in the foreign exchange rate; rising interest rates due to ex-
tensive borrowing on commercial terms; reduction of business profits and corporate tax 
payments; crop failure; a declining rate of return from farm labour and changing interna-
tional and internal migration patterns (Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:19; Hirschmann 
1990). The Malawian economic base impaired when the export-related crop earnings (e.g. 
from tobacco) reduced and the oil-dependent import costs escalated (Hillbom & Green & 
2018:230).  
ADMARC had to import food in a time when the primary source of revenue – the inter-
locked estate-smallholder production model – destabilised. Many estates went into bank-
ruptcy or were placed under the management of commercial banks (Mkandawire, Jaffee 
& Bertoli 1990:24). The financial instability contributed to a sharp reduction in the repay-
ment of loans from farmer clubs. The government became increasingly selective with 
who would get support (Alwang & Siegel 1999; Zeller, Diagne & Mataya 1997). At the 
same time, the population growth remained relatively high – including over one million 
refugees fleeing the civil war that had erupted in Mozambique in the late 1970s. From 
1968 to 2000, the mean land size per household in Malawi reduced from 1.53 to 0.8 
hectares (Government of Malawi 2001). 
Impact of structural adjustment programs 
In the late 1970s, the government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank to deal with the financial crisis and supply the population with imported 
fossil fuel and food (Hillbom & Green & 2018:231). From 1981, structural adjustments 
were implemented. The credit conditions of the international organisations comprised a 
minimal state and neoliberal agenda (Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:19).23 Interna-
tional competitiveness and economic growth would be achieved through net-food selling 
farmers who produced high-value commodities for the export market. The producer price 
was raised for hybrid maize, tobacco, groundnuts and other crops that were sold via AD-
MARC,24 while the fertiliser subsidies were phased out (Harrigan 2003).  
22 In the thesis, the term traditional leader, or traditional authority, refers to the entire hierarchy of admin-
istrators in customary institutions including family head; clan leader; village headperson; group village head-
person and paramount chief.  
23 The neoliberal economic policies included renewal of foreign exchange reserves; balance of payments; 
reduced public spending and budget deficit (Kaluwa 1992). This would be realised through reforms such as 
pricing and trade deregulation; non-agricultural economic expansion; currency devaluation; input subsidy re-
moval; state fiscal discipline; government enterprise and investment rationalisation and downsized public wel-
fare support (Chizimba 2010:76; Peters 1996). 
24 The price paid for hybrid maize increased by 131 percent between 1977-1978 and 1984-1985 (Sofranko 
& Fliegel 1989).  
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More producers – particularly net-food sellers (emergent farmers) with enough land and 
labour power for agribusiness expansion or changed livelihood strategies – increased their 
production of hybrid maize25 and other cash crops, whereas net-food buyers continued to 
be food insecure and seek low-paid wage labour as a primary source of income (Chilowa 
1998). However, the World Bank and the government did not agree on the food security26 
strategy.27 Despite the market liberalisation measures, the government continued to in-
tervene in the food market and secure staple supplies for periods of food shortages (Harri-
gan 1995; 2003).28 
A rising inflation combined with corruption and abuse of office limited ADMARC’s abil-
ity to purchase hybrid maize at the price producers demanded. The falling world prices 
for tobacco and the increased costs of fertilisers further contributed to make the parastatal 
insolvent and lose control of the maize supply (Peters 2006).29 Some of the marketing 
board’s depots were closed and it was partially privatised. In 1987, ADMARC ceased to 
be the single marketing agent for smallholder produce when licensed private actors were 
allowed to trade food crops (and eventually fertilisers) with small-scale farmers – a deci-
sion that stimulated the growth of the number of local traders (emergent farm actors) and 
large-scale private companies on the agricultural market (Chilowa 1998; Takane 2007). 
25 Hybrid maize was promoted as an alternative to open-pollinated varieties. The hybrid maize seed pro-
duction was monopolised by the National Seed Company of Malawi (an ADMARC subsidiary company) (Chil-
owa 1998). Hybrid maize matures early in the season (provided that sufficient fertiliser is applied) and can give 
higher yields than local (open-pollinated) maize with the same amount of fertilisers. The hybrid maize is ho-
mogenously grown; dried; stored; processed and packed; treated against pests and graded according to quality 
and size before it is sold (Mloza-Banda, Kaudzu & Benesi 2010:28). However, to maintain a certain yield, new 
seeds must be purchased each year.  
Local (open-pollinated) maize varieties can be recycled 2-3 years; are less vulnerable to pests and diseases; 
can withstand prolonged periods of drought; taste different; are adaptive to place-related processing methods 
and require less management in terms of fertilisation and storage (Chinsinga 2011a).  
Both local and hybrid maize are used as food, cash crop and payment for labour (Peters 1999:28-29). 
26 Food security is a measure of the availability of food and the ability of individuals to access it. Food 
availability has to do with the supply of food through production, distribution and exchange. Food access refers 
to the affordability and allocation of food, but also individuals’ and households’ preferences. Food security is 
also determined by how food metabolically is utilised by people (e.g. members in a household). Another aspect 
to consider is food stability: people’s ability to obtain food over time (FAO 2009).  
27 The World Bank argued that food security could best be achieved through free-market-driven production 
of exportable cash crops, where the foreign exchange earnings would be used to compensate domestic food 
deficits with imports. The Ministry of Agriculture, however, saw increased food productivity as a prerequisite 
for land to be released for export crop production without aggravating the situation with food insecurity (Har-
rigan 2003). Their belief was that subsidies, extension services and spill-over effects from commercially suc-
cessful farmers would lead to generally increased maize productivity; secure households’ access to food and 
lower the maize price. Once the revenues had increased from exports, the household members’ total spending 
on staples would decrease, their demand for manufactured goods and services increase and their market inte-
gration strengthen (Orr & Orr 2002). 
28 The government introduced a strategic grain reserve in 1981 (Chilowa 1998). ADMARC released grains 
on the market when local and regional supplies were insufficient in relation to the demand. The government 
used a price band to control the maize price. Floor (minimum) prices were meant to protect farmers’ income, 
while ceiling (maximum) prices were set to protect consumers from unaffordable food products (Chizimba 
2010:77). 
29 The price for the imported and subsidised fertilisers (monopolised by the parastatal Smallholder Farmers 
Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM) doubled between 1977-1978 and 1984-1985. At the same 
time, ADMARC’s input sales increased with an average of 14 percent per year between 1976-1977 and 1983-
1984 (Sofranko & Fliegel 1989). 
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The same year, a food crisis erupted. The food price increased with over 50 percent be-
tween 1985-1986 and 1987-1988 (Sahn, Arulpragasam & Merid 1990:107). Between 
1982 and 1990, the rural minimum wage halved compared to the consumer maize price 
(Whiteside 2000). The government again raised the hybrid maize producer price and rein-
troduced subsidised fertilisers to increase the food crop production (Harrigan 2003). Food 
was imported in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, two severe droughts in 
1991-1992 and 1993-1994 prolonged the period with maize shortages (Chirwa & Dor-
ward 2013:66). The inequality deepened between farmers with and without surplus value. 
Small-scale and medium-scale estate expansion 
Part of the neoliberal order was to secure property rights for the landholder and stimulate 
agricultural investments through the conversion of land under customary tenure to lease-
hold estates. Most of the new estates were relatively small – the majority less than 30 hec-
tares – and held by what Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli (1990) refer to as graduated 
smallholders (i.e. emergent farmers). The land was registered by individuals or heads of 
extended families – men. The leaseholders often converted customary landholdings that 
had been cultivated for years by registering their own property or land that was merged 
by relatives in order to fulfil the minimum requirements for an estate. 
Some of the emergent leaseholders had sold fire-cured tobacco to ADMARC or burley 
tobacco illegally to large-scale estates, while others had worked as estate managers; ten-
ants; clerks or labourers. There were also active; former or retired civil servants; rela-
tively successful small-scale farmers; traditional leaders and small business owners, such 
as shopkeepers. The leaseholders used incomes from crop sales; businesses employment; 
and/or casual labour for investments in their estates. They also utilised incomes from mi-
grant work (within or outside the country), remittances and earnings of members in the 
extended family (ibid.:38). Although their main produce was tobacco and maize, they 
also cultivated legumes, fruits and vegetables that were consumed by the household mem-
bers; used as food for labour or sold to ADMARC, private traders and consumers 
(ibid.:40). They raised livestock including cattle; goats and poultry as food; commodity; 
gifts and store of value (a living “bank”),30 but also for manure and tillage.  
The emergent leasehold farmers had access to loans,31 were granted license to sell bur-ley 
tobacco on the auction floors and received extension services and credit through AD-
MARC, or organisations such as Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) – the leading 
actor in the logistics of tobacco (ibid.).32 The labour force of the emerging estates in-
30 Livestock could be fed intensively in food abundant periods to stand a greater chance to endure droughts 
and other challenging circumstances. In challenging times, farm animals were exchanged for other produce or 
money. 
31 The emergent leasehold farmers found it difficult to obtain long-term loans after the liquidity crisis in 
the large-scale estate sector (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:25). Instead, they received bridging loans 
issued early in the growing season, once the forthcoming tobacco harvest could be predicted (ibid.:86). With 
the loan, they could cover expenses for some of the main activities in the tobacco production: harvesting; grad-
ing and transportation (ibid.:25). However, the loan recipient had to use own financial means for expenses early 
in the season. 
32 The auction floors are owned by what was previously called Auction Holdings Limited (AHL), before 
the corporation was renamed to AHL Group in 2015. The AHL Group consists of five companies involved in 
different parts of the tobacco value chain. The major shareholder is ADMARC (Chirwa 2011:14-15). 
37 
cluded unpaid relatives, tenants (and their family members), permanent labourers and cas-
ual labourers (ibid.:72). A farmer and trader who remembers the development of the pe-
riod in Mkanda EPA comments on the labour relations of the time: 
If you had enough money or food supplies, you could hire people to help you, or you could invite 
family members. Extended family support was crucial to one’s success.33 
Informants explain that the relatives who belonged to a leasehold did not necessarily use 
the land as a coherent unit. Instead, they could divide fields among the family members 
according to patterns that preceded the estate registration. This allowed each family 
greater control over their “own” fields, but also required a higher degree of self-reliance. 
Farmers without enough land for a leasehold certificate and who did not merge land with 
relatives, but with money to offer or close ties to the village chief, could temporarily get 
land transferred by the traditional leader. The land was taken back by the chief after the 
registration had been approved. A motivator for farmers to expand their registered area of 
leaseholds was to increase the amount of tobacco they could sell on the formal market34 – 
something that became important not least after the government introduced a quota sys-
tem for tobacco sales following overproduction in 1982-1983 (ibid.:27). 
During the 1980s, the nominal tobacco prices increased and the estate sector expanded 
faster than in the previous decade (ibid.:24), while the smallholder earnings remained low 
(ibid.:14) (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Small-scale and medium-scale estate expansion in the 1980s. Source: Conroy 1993. 
33 In farming households, large family has been a sign of womanhood for women and virility for men. 
Children have provided a cheap labour pool for tobacco production and in smallholder farming where the work 
has generally been carried out without mechanised technology. Having numerous descendants has also func-
tioned as an old age security, considering the high levels of child mortality in rural areas, where the parents 
have hoped that at least some of their children will reach adulthood and eventually take care of them (Kishindo 
& Mvula 2017). 
34 Some estate owners expanded their leasehold property to obtain additional quota intended as capital for 
production on the main estate (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:52). 
Differentiation within the estate sector 
Estates licensed to produce large quantities of tobacco were the first to sell their quota on 
the auction floors. In general, they received a higher price than the succeeding sellers. Li-
censed producers and traders who made profit early in the season and/or had parts of their 
quota unfulfilled could return to Mkanda EPA and buy additional tobacco from unli-
censed farmers and traders, or growers who had produced more than their allocated quota. 
Emergent leaseholders who materialised from the late 1970s to the early 1980s could rel-
atively easy acquire valuable capital, including fertile land (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 
1990:38). They started cultivating burley tobacco in a period without stated production 
limitations and with a major price rise. They invested in ploughs; baling jacks; tractors 
and trucks. Those with non-farm employment resigned from their profession and became 
full-time farmers. On the contrary, leaseholders who emerged in the latter half of the 
1980s had less access to arable land and experienced greater credit and market con-
straints (ibid.). They relied on poorly trained managers who run the daily farm operations. 
Their farm income and investment level remained relatively low and those with salaried 
jobs were likely to remain in the formal labour market. 
Chapter analysis of emergent farmers’ materialisation through patronage 
As demonstrated in the chapter, between 1964-1979, patrons in the political, administra-
tive and financial spheres acquired leasehold estates and controlled the investments, pro-
duction and revenues through such property. The revenues from taxation of smallholder 
production contributed to the financing of the estate sector. Patronage was structured 
through the upper societal strata of active and retired politicians; civil servants; profes-
sionals; traditional leaders and businesspeople with close ties to the regime and the main 
flows of monetary value (Mkandawire, Jaffee & Bertoli 1990:14). The elite licensed ex-
port crops; organised and offered extension services; approved bank loans to each other 
and regulated monetary sources through government agencies (Booth et al. 2006; 
Hirschmann 1990).  
Although the assets of elite groups in places like Mkanda EPA were closely associated 
with access to leaseholds, it was not the control of land that enabled their positions. Ra-
ther, they acquired land as capital through their political status. Leaseholds were utilised 
by political leaders and their respective supporters as a source to feed the “personality 
politics” (Booth et al. 2006).  
The neopatrimonial route changed direction in the early 1980s after the economy was in 
crisis and financial support was sought from the IMF and the World Bank. The govern-
ment turned its attention to the export of cash crops through small-scale farmers, while 
the agricultural policy alternated between removal and reintroduction of input subsidies; 
high farmgate prices and low food prices and deregulations and government interventions 
(Harrigan 2003). Patronage through tobacco was extended to farmers who worked on 
large-scale estates, joined clubs and registered small-scale and medium-scale estates (cf. 
Devereux et al. 2008). 
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Chapter analysis of emergent farmers’
materialisation through the prevailing food regime 
Between 1964 and the early 1990s, emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA materialised during 
a decolonising process where a recently independent state was committed to national de-
velopment and agricultural modernisation (cf. Bernstein 2010:73). The agricultural sector 
transformed through embedded liberalism (liberal political elements in combination with 
economic regulation) (McMichael 2005:275). The political economic conditions of agri-
culture was based on a state- and aid-centred order of power, with donors and agribusi-
ness actors who sanctioned the state’s expansion into urban and rural areas (Raynolds et 
al. 1993; Bernstein 2010:74).  
The oil price spikes in the 1970s led to a recession in the world economy (Friedmann & 
McMichael 1989; Araghi 2003; Bernstein 2010:79). In Malawi, the debts increased to 
countries and institutions in the global North. As the national agricultural model for prof-
itability was undermined, the government began to seek a new development path through 
structural adjustment programs, free trade reforms and increased financialisation (a pro-
cess where financial or monetary means come to dominate other forms of capital) of pub-
lic and private affairs (cf. Friedmann 1993; Bernstein 2017). Nevertheless, recurring food 
crises continued, while class differences were maintained and deepened. 
Emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA were structured by a regime that promoted maize self-
sufficiency and production of certain crops. A minority of rural residents were entitled to 
credit, subsidised inputs and extension services; went through higher education and 
reached lucrative positions in the civil service and agribusinesses. In sum, emergent 
farmers created surplus value through their involvement in tobacco and maize production.  
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6  Political economic conditions of emergent 
farmers after the democratisation  
In this chapter, I describe how emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have materialised be-
tween the early 1990s until the millennium, a period featured by neoliberal market re-
forms and the introduction of democratic rule. The main factors highlighted during this 
period include the continued liberalisation of agricultural products, services and trade; the 
expansion of burley tobacco production through clubs, leaseholders and intermediary 
buyers and how changing market conditions for maize and tobacco have affected the 
socioeconomic relationships between farmers. 
Continued market liberalisation and expansion of tobacco production 
In the early 1990s, the government repealed the Special Crops Act and prohibited cus-
tomary land from being converted to estates (except in special cases) (Chizimba 2010:79; 
Kishindo & Mvula 2017). The introduction of multiparty democracy in 1994 marked a 
clear end for ADMARC’s monopoly on trade in smallholder inputs and crops. Burley 
tobacco production was no longer restricted to leaseholders. Farmers who joined tobacco 
clubs could receive credit for inputs, produce burley on customary land and sell the com-
modity on international markets (Harrigan 2003; Jaffee 2003).35 
By 1994, the exchange rate on savings and loans were fully liberalised (Chizimba 
2010:78). Two years later, the liberalisation of marketing of inputs had been completed 
and the input subsidies removed. The pricing for all crops was deregulated except for 
maize (which was controlled with a price band) (Chilowa 1998). Free trade agreements 
were signed with partners in Europe, USA and countries within Africa. After 1996, any-
one could in theory market seeds and inputs (ibid.).36 However, intermediary tobacco 
buyers – individuals or organisations – had to obtain a quantity specific license from the 
Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) to buy tobacco from smallholders at negotiated 
prices and sell it on the auction floors (Chirwa 2009).37  
An increased number of producers and traders engaged in the burley tobacco value chain 
(Tobin & Knausenberger 1998). Producers and traders (including emergent farm actors) 
began to import and export cash crops and manufactured goods across the Malawian and 
Zambian border. The main road connecting Lilongwe and the Zambian border created op-
portunities for men and women to conduct small-scale businesses, with Mchinji Boma 
used as a market hub. When the emergent burley producers devoted a greater proportion 
of land for tobacco and less for food production, their demand for food crops increased – 
which improved the revenues for the net-maize sellers (Hillbom & Green 2018:276). In 
the 1990s, the fertiliser use and hybrid maize production increased significantly among 
35 Since the mid-1990s, the three biggest licensed buyers have accounted for almost 90 percent of the total 
tobacco export volume (FAO 2003:67). The dominating tobacco-exporting firms are tied to multinational com-
panies based in USA and Europe (ibid.). 
36 The regime anticipated that the agricultural market liberalisation would stimulate the private sector to 
take over functions previously provided by parastatals and other state institutions (Chinsinga 2011b). 
37 The intermediary buyers did not have to grow tobacco themselves, but should have relevant experience 
in the sector (van Donge 2002). 
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better-off farmers – despite rising market prices for inputs (Peters 1999:13; Harrigan 
2003; Takane 2007; Dorward, Chirwa & Jayne 2011). 
The crop that gave farmers in Mkanda EPA the highest possible return was burley to-
bacco (Devereux et al. 2008). Smallholder and emergent farmer tobacco production re-
placed the previous large-scale estate dominance. In which case, burley tobacco required 
an expenditure level that was higher than for other crops (Harashima 2008). To become a 
successful burley producer, one needed a high supply of labour38 and inputs, but also ap-
propriate skills.39 The producers had to reach a certain volume of the crop in order to sell 
tobacco on the auction floors (ibid.). 
Characteristics of the expanding burley tobacco class 
In general, the most prominent burley producers had the largest farms and highest aver-
age income (Harashima 2008). The head in the burley producing household was generally 
a man (Orr 2000; Harashima 2008). The level of education among them was higher than 
for non-tobacco producers. Successful producers had more full-time adult labourers (both 
family members and non-family workers). They cultivated a higher proportion of crops 
for sale. They were likely to have a maize surplus. They owned livestock. Their main in-
come outside the farm came from employment, trade or other businesses, rather than farm 
labour. The land and other capital they had were often related to their family’s previous 
socioeconomic conditions (ibid.). 
Club membership inclusion and exclusion 
Tobacco club membership depended on one’s social status; background; financial capac-
ity; farming skills; collateral and labour power. The member had to possess land that was 
at least 2 hectares, including woodlot (Negri & Porto 2007). The club’s regulations were 
intended to ensure that the members produced enough tobacco, sold it as a group and re-
paid the credit loan collectively.40 Some of the leading club members – the better-off and 
well-connected farmers – could treat other members as subordinates and allocate quota, 
costs and revenues unequally among the members (cf. Peters 1999:20-21). They also 
allowed non-members (e.g. extension officers) to sell tobacco through the club in 
exchange for favours or a share of their sale. Despite signs of arbitrary exercise of power, 
the management skills developed in many clubs including record keeping; admin-
istration of bank accounts; crop processing; transportation and conflict resolution (cf. 
ibid.). 
38 Labour efforts are required almost the whole year for tobacco production. Nurseries have to be prepared 
when the early rains fall, which tends to be in October. After the harvesting and processing of the tobacco, the 
sales begin in April and last until September. 
39 Burley tobacco can be produced, managed and cured without needs of major energy sources, storage 
requirements or different control mechanisms. Unlike flue- and fire-cured tobacco, which require 
firewood for leaf curing, burley is cured by air in open-sided thatched sheds. The farmer’s skills in curing the 
tobacco play a major role for the final leaf quality. The following steps – sorting and packing the 
burley into bales – also require special aptitude (Chirwa, Kydd & Dorward 2006; Negri & Porto 2007). 
40 The regulations stipulated fines to members who did not show up at regular meetings; denial 
of membership to farmers with a default history; prohibition for members to join an additional club; input 
use control (to prevent side sales of fertilisers); farm assistance among the members and social 
support to members in the event of illness (Negri & Porto 2007). 
The clubs in Mkanda EPA were affiliated with agricultural organisations, predominantly 
National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (NASFAM) and Tobacco Associa-
tion of Malawi (TAMA) (Negri & Porto 2007; Chirwa 2009).41 The members tied social 
bonds with each other and expanded their network with other farm actors. They improved 
their business and farming skills through group learning and extension services.42 The 
club members procured inputs of high quality, secured means of transport and utilised 
depots and warehouses for their tobacco (Harashima 2008; Negri & Porto 2007). 
Burley tobacco producers’ trade practices 
Some burley traders (who could also be producers) in Mkanda EPA did not restrict their 
affairs to the locality, but also sold tobacco in Zambia (cf. Negri & Porto 2007). Tobacco 
traders who materialised in the area made it possible for relatively resourceful producers 
– emergent farmers – to increase their competitiveness, e.g. by reducing transport costs, 
avoiding interference in mismanaged clubs and using a sales channel for tobacco vol-
umes that exceeded their quotas (Chirwa 2009). For tobacco farmers who did not produce 
the crop through an estate or club, the licensed traders in the area constituted their main 
source of sales. The licensed traders in turn motivated unlicensed local residents to act as 
their intermediaries (including emergent farm actors).
The increased market competition triggered deceitful methods of capital accumulation 
among farm actors: A licensed producer or trader who sold tobacco on behalf of a non-
licensed farmer or trader could withhold parts of the profit. An emergent farmer who has 
long experience of the development in Mkanda EPA illustrates how forms of value ex-
change and theft could take place between the parties: 
An unlicensed farmer or trader asked a licensed producer or trader if they could sell tobacco through 
their account. The intermediary buyer then bought the unlicensed farmer’s or trader’s tobacco at a 
lower price than what the final buyer offered on the auction floor. Alternatively, the two parties 
agreed that the unlicensed person would receive a certain share of the profit once the tobacco had 
been sold as part of the licensed person’s quota. However, the intermediary buyer could claim 
that the price obtained on the auction floor was lower than what was actually the case and retain 
the difference. Some intermediaries did not return to the unlicensed farmer, but kept the money from 
the sale. 
According to informants, club members and leaseholders who acted as informal interme-
diary buyers could avoid the costs imposed on licensed traders, while controlling tobacco 
inputs and outputs that circulated through their club or estate. Such control allowed them 
to incorporate small-scale farmers in a system where the smallholder was offered inputs,
41 NASFAM is a smallholder owned organisation that deals with tobacco and crops including groundnuts, 
soybeans and other legumes. The organisation offers its members credit; input supply; farmer, business and 
technical training; market access; contract assistance; purchase of produce; transportation; storage and 
advo-cacy. 
TAMA is a non-profit organisation that is partly owned by a major tobacco merchant. The organisation 
assists tobacco producers with marketing; transport brokerage; satellite depots; warehouse storage; extension 
services; bargaining for better prices and lobbying. 
42 The extension services included technical support and training in marketing; quality control 
and literacy. Farmers learned about appropriate application of fertilisers and how to manage the specific 
crop throughout the growing season (Chirwa 2009).
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food and money in exchange for tobacco delivered to the emergent farm actor. Lease-
holders and tobacco club members also exchanged capital with large-scale estate actors. 
For instance, if a large-scale estate owner or manager had more tobacco seedlings than 
needed, they could sell or donate it to emergent burley producers. Large-scale producers 
also sold food to emergent farmers from their stocks.  
Farmer groups are losing ground 
Residents interviewed in Mkanda EPA remember how the focus on burley tobacco and 
hybrid maize among farmers meant that fertilisers were applied without much considera-
tion as to whether the soil’s nutrient was maintained or restored. Moreover, the expansion 
of burley production and the growing population contributed to deforestation – which af-
fected people’s livelihoods. 
Extension officers preached for the use of inorganic fertilisers, even if the soil was already 
fertile. Nowadays, you cannot get a good harvest without fertilisers. (Emergent farmer with long 
experience of living in Mkanda EPA). 
While ADMARC was disintegrated from most farmers’ daily lives, structural barriers 
restricted private traders from taking over market shares that the parastatal left behind 
(Chilowa 1998).43 Anyhow, parallel grain markets gradually developed (Chizimba 
2010:83-84) where private traders and their intermediaries (including emergent farm ac-
tors) strengthened their position in the trade with smallholders. They took advantage of 
the seasonal and spatial price variations in a context where few farmers were organised 
and reliable marketing institutions remained inaccessible for most producers (Mvula, 
Chirwa & Kadzandira 2002).  
In years when the maize supply skyrocketed and the producer price fell, farmers who 
only sold small amounts of crops lost margins. In years with food shortages, the 
government became increasingly dependent on importing maize financed with 
commercial loans. When the maize supply was low and the consumer price increased, 
more smallholders ran out of food before the next harvest (Peters 1996). While the 
overall margins for the poorer farmers decreased (Peters 2004), morbidity and mortality 
related to HIV/AIDS contributed to reduced family-based labour power, land 
abandonment and less productive exchange between relatives and acquaintances (see 
Figure 5).  
43 Such barriers included high transport costs; inadequate storage facilities; poor grading technology; unre-
liable crop procurement and insecure marketing, selling and financing terms (Mkwezalamba 1989). 
Figure 5. Socioeconomic causes and effects of ADMARC closure of seasonal markets.
Source: Mvula, Chirwa & Kadzandira 2002. 
Farmers drawn deeper into the supply of labour 
Farmers with an average land size or input-output ratio below what was required for the 
household to reproduce itself became functionally landless (Orr 2000). Informants recall 
how net-food buyers set aside a larger portion of their plot(s) to maize and a few other 
food crops for own consumption. Those who could not rely on own farming as a means 
of livelihood became increasingly dependent on providing farm labour. They also rented 
out or sold land, received handouts and got support from relatives. In short, they were 
trapped in a situation of low maize productivity (Dorward, Chirwa & Jayne 2011) (see 
Figure 6). 
44 
45 
Figure 6. Farmer circulation in low maize productivity. The light green arrows represent feedback effects. 
Source: Dorward, Chirwa & Jayne 2011. 
Eventually, the labour supply exceeded the demand in Mkanda EPA and other parts of the 
country, which reduced the labourers' income level and bargaining power against the em-
ployer (Hillbom & Green 2018:287-288). Below, the conditions for casual farm labour in 
the area are clarified based on empirical sources from the field work: 
Labourers clear land; dig; weed; ridge; sow; plant; apply fertilisers and har-
vest. They dry, grade, pound and grind other households’ crops. They cure, 
sort and bundle burley tobacco leaves. They look after people’s garden. 
They carry and draw water for construction of bricks or roads. They cut, 
collect and carry grass and wood for the employer. They build houses and 
thatch roofs. They manufacture farm equipment. 
Much work is carried out between October and March, when a range of la-
bour efforts are required. During the rainy season, seasonal labourers from 
other parts of the country may arrive to Mkanda EPA. The agreement be-
tween the employer and the labourer might involve shared production risks 
(in terms of environmental conditions and price fluctuations) – which can 
reduce the amount paid to the labourer, but also secure his or her access to 
food. Once the agreed labour period has ended, the labourer may leave the 
village and seek another employer in the following season. 
Poor farm households with inadequate land size, soil fertility and working 
capital are exposed to the ”hungry gap” (especially between November-De-
cember and February). During this period, the farm labour demand peaks, 
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while investments in inputs and medication for malaria and other illnesses 
are needed. Food and money obtained outside the own farm becomes criti-
cal for residents whose food stock runs low or has been emptied after the 
last harvest. 
The wage labourers’ low payment gives them little opportunity to increase 
their liquidity and monetary value. The fact that labourers may spend con-
siderable time away from their own farm at a time when preparation of the 
arable land, planting of crops and clearing of weed is needed, means that 
they are likely to start late in the rainy season (between November and 
March) with the cultivation. Insufficient inputs and lack of farm manage-
ment reduce the poorer farmers’ chance to get a surplus (cf. Alwang & 
Siegel 1999). Although their landholding is small, they may lack sufficient 
labour power to utilise it productively. While the adults are away and work-
ing, the children may be left alone, with little to eat and increased risk of 
school dropouts, which contributes to keeping them in poverty (cf. White-
side 2000).  
New rules of the game 
In the late 1990s, the production of tobacco in Malawi surpassed the demand on the 
world market (FAO 2003:66). After 1998, the price of burley tobacco decreased 
(Harashima 2008). The inflation increased and industries collapsed (Chizimba 2010:84). 
The ruling elite, at this time based in the southern region, mismanaged public finances 
and triggered sharp falls in the value of the national currency (Chirwa & Dorward 
2013:67). Traders bought tobacco of low quality from small-scale producers.44 Crop 
diseases spread. The dominating tobacco companies called for stricter trade regulations 
(van Donge 2002).45 
The fall of tobacco was disastrous for many families, especially those who had no savings for 
the future. They used to spend their income quickly and hope to make more money again next 
season. When the tobacco prices fell, they had little or nothing left in their pockets. (Emergent 
farmer with long experience of living in Mkanda EPA). 
Farmers had to travel farther to buy inputs from retailers. Members of tobacco clubs had 
difficulties repaying loans. Estate owners struggled to get loans and other financial sup-
port. Estate labourers lost their jobs or received lower wages. Local businesses made 
losses when the money spent by estate labourers decreased. Groceries and other stores 
(usually owned by tobacco burley producers and traders) closed. 
44 Unlike estate farmers who brought burley tobacco directly to the auction floors and raised their income 
by producing tobacco of high quality, the profit for intermediary buyers depended on quick turnovers (van 
Donge 2002). The more transactions they made through the same bank loan, the higher the potential profit they 
could expect. 
45 The government suspended the intermediary buyer license system in the 2002/2003 season. Once again, 
only producers (or organisations representing them) could market tobacco on the auction floors (Prowse 2011). 
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For us who produced burley, it was really hard to stop relying on tobacco as our main cash crop, 
because we had looked at those who did not grow tobacco as inferior to us. (Male emergent farmer). 
The World Bank advocated further financial liberalisation, devaluation of the national 
currency and reformation of ADMARC (Harrigan 2003). While ADMARC continued to 
intervene in the domestic grain market, the responsibility for grain imports and exports 
was taken over by the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) – a Trust formed in 
1999.46 In 2000, the price band was removed and replaced by indicative prices. The un-
clear market rules continued to hold back private investments and limit broad reforms tar-
geting rural areas and agricultural markets (Chirwa, Kydd & Dorward 2006). The food 
insecurity situation worsened (Chirwa 2006; Chirwa & Zakeyo 2003). 
Chapter analysis of emergent farmers’ materialisation through patronage 
The transition to multi-party democracy in 1994 paved the way for elite groups with a 
background in the private sector. The president and his surrounding clientele sought 
wealth within a short time frame to enrich themselves; fund their careers and pay 
supporters and allies with money or material assets to gain their loyalty and retain power 
(Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:25). After the democratisation of Malawi, the alloca-
tion of international aid motivated elite and middle class groups to secure as much access 
to the inflow of the financial resources as possible (Jul-Larsen & Mvula 2009). 
A government position became an entrance to business opportunities (Anders 
2002:53-55). The civil service became politicised and incapable of implementing 
development policies. In other words, the neopatrimonial integration between the 
political leadership and technocracy formed a civil service that became a means of 
patronage, rather than an instrument of policy (Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:4). 
Political actors and civil servants distributed patronage in the form of agricultural 
resources made available through clubs and farmer organisations. Among the client 
groups were emergent farmers who began to grow tobacco or expanded such production 
and increased the market supply of other cash crops. 
Chapter analysis of emergent farmers’
materialisation through the prevailing food regime 
From the early 1990s, neoliberalism as an ideology and political program – focused on 
the state’s withdrawal from market interests (Bernstein 2010:127) – became more promi-
nent as a solution to the fiscal crisis. Agricultural commodities were further incorporated 
into a universal world price dictated by the freedom, movement and investment security 
of financial and monetary value. The volatility of the financial assets increased as the 
state took a step back from its regulatory market power. Emergent farmers made progress
46 The NFRA is responsible for managing the strategic grain reserve and maintaining a balance between 
the demand and supply of maize. The agency stores maize in silos and makes it available on the market in 
times of food shortage.  
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partly by exploiting the proletarianisation47 of poorer residents. 
Emergent farmers as a class accumulated monetary value by buying crops from small-
holders during periods and in situations when external traders were absent and the seller 
had little or no margins, or agreed to produce cash crops for them at a relatively low cost. 
Emergent farmers made profits on markets where the short-term price level differences 
increased and the production costs further impoverished net-food buyers. They acquired 
capital through farmer institutions where the membership was restricted. They repro-
duced class relations where the survival of the poorer farmer depended on the interests of 
the more prosperous one (Borras 2003). 
47 A process where classes of farmers are dispossessed of land and other means of production and become 
increasingly dependent on wage labour for their subsistence (Bernstein 2010:128; 2015). 
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7  Current political economic conditions of 
emergent farmers 
In this chapter, I explore how emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have materialised since 
the early 2000s, a period when transnational financing sources have expanded in the area. 
I discuss the phase through factors such as the political economic management of food 
security; the development of the commodity and service market in Mkanda trading 
centre; the livelihood diversification among farmers; the increased corporate interests and 
financial stakes in the agricultural value chain; the leasing, selling and buying of land; 
the emergence of new agricultural institutions and the livelihood implications of how nat-
ural resources have been used. 
Farmers’, traders’ and governing actors’ response to food insecurity 
In 2001-2002, 2004-2005 and 2007-2009, the maize price rose by 354 percent, 218 per-
cent and 395 percent respectively (Ellis & Manda 2012). The recurrent food crises had 
far-reaching effects on the agricultural market and farmers’ livelihood conditions. Below 
is an account of how the government acted on the agricultural market during this period 
and the effects it had for traders and farmers: 
A food crisis in 2001-2002 followed abnormal rainfall and pressure from 
the World Bank and the IMF on the government to reduce its grain re-
serves, which resulted in maize supply shortages (Devereux 2002). In 2001, 
the NFRA exported the maize in its reserves to release funds and repay 
loans, avoid storage losses and return to a situation with lower grain levels.  
In 2002, ADMARC was requested to reduce its financial losses and entered 
the market late in the season. By then, private traders had already accumu-
lated the lion share of the maize available on the market. The NFRA had to 
import maize from South Africa at a high cost. Local politicians and well-
connected businesspeople and traders were accused of creating an artificial 
shortage by buying maize at a low price from the strategic grain reserve. 
Such actors made significant profits when they sold maize after the gov-
ernment had trebled the selling price (ibid.). 
In 2005, the government declared an export ban on maize and fertilisers. 
The ban was lifted in 2007, but reinstated the following year. In 2006, 
private traders (including emergent farm actors) were banned from selling 
maize in local markets, which left ADMARC as the sole maize seller 
during a period when it had no stocks of the crop to sell (Ellis & Manda 
2012). At the same time, ADMARC followed the government instruction to 
provide (crop) marketing services only in areas where the competition with 
private traders was limited. However, private actors (e.g. agrodealers) 
continued to be virtually unable to store enough grain and satisfy the 
consumer needs when there was a shortage of food. They were unwilling to 
buy maize from smallholders in remote areas and could not import enough 
maize to meet the demand.
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The cropping season 2008-2009 was another period when ADMARC 
bought maize comparatively late after farmers had sold a large share of the 
harvest to private buyers (Jayne et al. 2010:31). Before the season, the 
NFRA had stockpiled maize that had not been released on the market, be-
cause government representatives held the view that there was an excess of 
maize circulating among private actors (Chinsinga & Chirwa 2013). Once 
again, the government attempted to control the national maize price and 
availability by forcing traders to release their stocks through the parastatal 
and prohibiting them from buying, hoarding and selling maize through 
other market channels. At the same time, the government tried to sell the 
crops in the stocks they controlled and avoid making losses from price falls 
when food was imported (Ellis & Manda 2012). 
The government’s strategy to control the stockpiles caused heavy costs for 
the responsible institutions and contributed to steep rises in the maize price. 
The ban on private trade in maize, which was reintroduced in 2008, gener-
ated a cash flow crisis from the price squeeze on the commodity and limited 
the producers’ sales options, which discouraged many farmers from making 
any significant investments in maize (Chinsinga & Chirwa 2013). In addi-
tion, the flow of cross-border inputs was reduced (Ellis & Manda 2012). In 
September 2008, small-scale and medium-scale traders (i.e. emergent farm 
actors) were exempted from the ban on private marketing of maize. They 
moved between production and trading locations by bicycle, motorcycle, 
carts and pickup trucks (ibid.).  
During the ban, maize traders in Mkanda EPA had little choice but to sell 
the commodity to ADMARC (cf. Jayne et al. 2010:31). Alternatively, trad-
ers and farmers (i.e. emergent farm actors) without direct access to elite 
groups but with a surplus value accumulated stored their maize until the 
ban had expired and the prices changed before they released the commodity 
on the market – unless their crops had been consumed; confiscated; 
deteriorated; destroyed or stolen (ibid.:53). Traders who had bought crops 
at a higher price than the price set by the government were likely to make 
losses. Some emergent farmer informants remember how their profit and 
monetary assets decreased and thus their ability to buy inputs for the next 
cropping season – which put them at risk of harvesting less maize and 
facing increased food insecurity. 
An informant recalls how residents in 2001-2002 had to swap a 50-kilo bag of fertiliser or 
a goat for 20 kilos of maize. Household members sold livestock and other household as-
sets; rationed their food consumption; changed what they ate and moved to towns and mi-
grated to neighbouring countries in search of food or money, or exchanged it for sex. Peo-
ple offered labour for a negligible payment and stole food, livestock and crops. Children 
dropped out of school, driven by hunger. Young women got married. Adults of working 
age struggled with feeding children and elders. Diseases spread. 
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Reinstatement of subsidy politics 
The food crises from the late 1990s and onwards resulted in a reintroduction of input sub-
sidies. Emergent farmers – civil servants (e.g. teachers; health workers; agricultural ex-
tension workers; police officers; military officers and employees in ministries or parasta-
tals); professionals; relatively successful farmers and community authorities – increased 
their investments in land and means of production in Mkanda EPA. These actors were 
driven by acquiring monetary value that arose from the financing of subsidised inputs, a 
growing food demand and an interest among civil servants to find alternative incomes48 in 
addition to what they received from the public institutions – that were mismanaged and 
resource unstable (Booth et al. 2006).49 
In 1998, the government, with the support from donors, introduced the Starter Pack Pro-
gram. Smallholders received hybrid maize and legume seeds, fertilisers and extension ser-
vices intended for cultivation of 0.1 hectares. Similar programs followed (Chirwa, Kydd 
& Dorward 2006; Harrigan 2003). A maize surplus was produced in the country, the root 
crop production increased and the smallholder farmer economy improved (Chizimba 
2010:79; Chibwana et al. 2010), before the subsidies were gradually phased out and the 
input price increased again (Chizimba 2010:80). 
In 2004-2005, lengthy dry spells combined with the scaling down of the subsidy pro-
grams created the worst maize grain harvest in the decade, with an acute shortage of food 
staples and other basic necessities (Chibwana et al. 2010). In an effort to improve the cash 
crop production and increase the national food security, the government introduced the 
national Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP).50 Although the initial phase of the pro-
gram resulted in high implementation costs, the food production increased with bumper 
yields in 2005-2006 (Dorward et al. 2008). 
Growth of agrodealers 
The subsidy programs have attracted private and non-governmental organisations to 
Mkanda EPA. Multinational and domestic input suppliers (e.g. Seed Co; Funwe Farm; 
Pannar Seed; Monsanto; Demeter and NASFAM) have placed bids and signed contracts 
to become suppliers in the input schemes and enter a guaranteed market for their products 
and services.51 Their seeds, fertilisers and agrochemicals have been sold in agrodealer 
shops in Mkanda trading centre, which may be run by emergent farm actors: current and 
retired seed company officials; professionals; civil servants or people with a business 
48 For instance, agricultural extension officers interviewed have struggled with visiting famers in the field 
because they have lacked funds for motorbike fuel. Instead, they have been dependent on farmers visiting their 
office or moving by bicycle taxi, unless they have travelled in better-off farmers’ motorised vehicles. 
49 Civil servants experienced how the presidency refused to delegate significant responsibilities over public 
domains to them. They feared or were reluctant to take action in the absence of superiors (Anders 2001). 
50 In theory, the FISP household recipients are farmers who cannot afford inputs on the commercial market, 
but have 0.4 hectares of arable land on which they can effectively use the subsidised input package and imple-
ment the advices given on agricultural practices (Devereux et al. 2008; Ragasa & Mazunda 2018). The targeted 
households receive coupons (input entitlements) which they can exchange for fertilisers, high-yielding seeds 
and agrochemicals. 
51 Multinational seed companies dominate the breeding, processing and supply market of seeds in Malawi 
(Chinsinga 2011a).
background.52 In remote areas, farmers have had few options but to buy ill-suited seeds at 
a high cost from visiting agrodealers and informal traders.  
Emergent farmers’ positioning in the FISP 
Government staff, Village Development Committees (VDCs)53 and traditional authorities 
(e.g. village headmen) have been involved in identifying who should receive subsidised 
inputs. Informants point out that the households with the greatest chance to receive subsi-
dised inputs have been part of emergent farmers as a class: they have had a relatively 
large land size under cultivation; been closely associated with traditional leaders and 
extension officers; produced a surplus value from cash crops; had access to relatively 
stable sources of income and been able to buy fertilisers at market price. They have come 
from households with comparatively few members – where the head is usually a man. 
Household heads who have resided in the area for a longer period have had a greater 
chance to receive more coupons than the recommended packet size (cf. Chibwana, Fisher 
& Shively 2010; Dorward et al. 2008; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne & Chirwa 2011; Holden & 
Lunduka 2010 & Dorward & Chirwa 2011; Ragasa & Mazunda 2018). By strategically 
selecting who will be be privileged in this context, traditional, community and public 
authorities have been able to receive services in return.  
Informants describe how some emergent farm actors have taken advantage of subsidy in-
put leakages from the formally intended recipients – a phenomenon that has also been ob-
served by Chirwa & Dorward (2013:113-118).54 A market has formed where the targeted 
beneficiaries have shared fertilisers with other community members or sold subsidised in-
puts and vouchers to better-off farmers at a lower price than the level in the private mar-
ket. Among the sellers are those who have had urgent needs of money or food. Others 
have lacked money for means of transport to redeem the coupons and paying the tip re-
quired by the seller. There are also recipients who have been unable to endure the long 
queues to the redemption points and confront eventual stock-outs, or doubted the mar-
ginal effect of using the inputs in the own field(s). Such sellers have generally failed to 
increase their food supply and felt compelled to sell parts of the harvest intended for their 
own food consumption (cf. ibid.:241-242). Emergent farmers involved in the trade with 
coupons and subsidised inputs have, on the other hand, achieved an advantageous market 
position by selling inputs during periods when most agrodealers have been absent (cf. 
Dorward, Chirwa & Jayne 2011). 
52 Only agrodealers contracted by the seed companies – which in turn are connected with the political 
establishment – formally supply inputs through the FISP, apart from the parastatals ADMARC and SFFRFM 
(Chinsinga 2011a; Chirwa 2011:21; Chirwa & Dorward 2013:191). The input supplier 
determines which products should be marketed in the agrodealer shop (Chinsinga 2011b). Most agrodealers 
only stock seeds – predominantly hybrid maize – from the seed companies with whom they have 
a contract (ibid.). The majority of the agrodealers are only active in the period when the FISP inputs 
are distributed and until the specific seed company has collected the excess inventories (ibid.). 
53 A body that represents a group of villages under a traditional authority and is responsible for 
identifying needs and facilitate planning and development in local communities. 
54 Voucher diversion are caused by non-existent beneficiary names put on the recipient list, theft and cou-
pons withheld and redistributed by extension officers; ADMARC staff; traditional leaders; 
intermediary buyers; politicians and criminals. Influential actors have also counterfeited and printed 
additional vouchers (Peters 2006; Chirwa & Dorward 2013:113). 
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Farmers’ handling of market uncertainties 
The period in the early 2000s was characterised by high real interest rates; fiscal deficits; 
a significant government debt; influx of aid money; devaluation of the national currency 
and farm produce price variations within and between years.55 The prospects for broader 
socioeconomic development were limited (Dorward, Chirwa & Jayne 2011). An emergent 
farmer recalls his situation at the time: 
I had taken a loan from Malawi Rural Finance Company to buy inputs. That season, I harvested 
about 80 bales of tobacco. When I sold the bales, I made no profit. I could not pay the labourers their 
wages or cover other costs. I struggled to repay the loan and get back on my feet. 
In recent times, net-food sellers in Mkanda EPA, including successful burley tobacco 
producers, have bought maize at a low price, sold the tobacco harvest and used the 
revenue to buy inputs and make other household investments. There are also burley 
tobacco growers who have borrowed money from relatives or acquaintances before the 
growing season and made investments in means of production. If the season has been 
rewarding, the borrower has paid the debt after the harvest been sold and retained a profit. 
In cases where the expenditure has exceeded the revenue, the borrower has continued to 
be indebted and risked ending up in a deteriorating socioeconomic situation. 
55 The average annual difference between the highest and lowest maize price month was 60 percent between 
1989 and 2009 (Ellis & Manda 2012). In most years, the retail maize price has been at its lowest after the 
harvest in June and July and risen by 50-100 percent over the next six months, with a peak between December 
and February (Devereux 2002). 
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Emergent farmers’ involvement in Mkanda trading centre’s market development 
Market day in Mkanda trading centre. Photo: Gustav Broms. 
In Mkanda trading centre, the business environment is characterised by trade in commod-
ities such as field crops; garden vegetables; fruits;56 farm inputs; livestock; animal prod-
ucts;57 food ingredients; cooked food; bread; pastries; snacks; home-made or factory-
made beverages; sunflower oil; firewood; charcoal; timber and merchandise (including 
clothes; shoes; household equipment and electronics). The inflow of imported finished 
goods and raw material has increased during the present. There are retail and wholesale 
facilities;58 market stalls; small-scale grocery shops; rental of houses and other property; 
agrodealer stores; commerce in permanent locations and on the spot (e.g. during market 
56 Farmers in Mkanda EPA cultivate and trade the following crops in various combination: tobacco; maize; 
groundnuts; soybeans; cowpeas; red beans and other legumes; sunflowers; cassava; sugarcane; rice; Irish po-
tato; sweet potato; tomatoes; onions; cabbage; cucumber; eggplant; pumpkin; other leafy vegetables; banana; 
mango; guava; orange and papaya. Some farmers also keep beehives and produce honey. 
57 Livestock like goats; pigs; poultry and cattle provide income opportunities for the owner and processor 
in a context where a growing number of relatively well-off residents and visitors demand meat; milk; eggs and 
other animal products. 
58 Wholesale and retail facilities owned by agribusiness companies may be run by staff who have been 
employed by the head office, relatives of them or emergent farmers in the area. The revenue realised through 
the sale is sent to the head office of the agribusiness company (cf. Chirwa & Matita 2015:21-22). 
There are also local residents who run shops (operated by themselves or family members) and offer goods 
that have been procured from local growers and providers or larger retail and wholesale shops. Such businesses 
might be run by people who have had a relatively successful farm background or work(ed) as civil servants or 
on estates (cf. ibid.:19, 21). Someone running a store may in turn involve local residents in temporary work, 
such as loading and offloading goods. 
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days); hair-dressers; transport services; offer of the use of mechanised equipment;59 
workshops; repair services; money lending; crafts sold for everyday needs and businesses 
focused on leisure and occasional visits (such as bars; restaurants; tea-rooms and 
guesthouses). 
Emergent farmers have been involved in such activities. They have used monetary value 
from inheritance; sales; savings; salaries; pensions and resources from well-to-do rela-
tives (including relatively highly educated children with employment) to construct better 
houses and buildings; support relatives and other dependants; finance the use of mecha-
nised technology (e.g. processing facilities such as maize shellers and mills) and use it in 
their production or as a service for others; hire labour; improve and extend their 
landholding and invest in off-farm businesses. They have bought furniture; household 
utensils; electronics; clothing; bicycles; motorbikes; cars; lorries and oxcarts. By owning 
motorised vehicles, some emergent farmers have been able to expand which market they 
have had access to. For instance, they have been able to transport larger quantities of 
goods and people within the area, but also to urban markets. Their mobility has increased 
their ability to reach favourable agreements with buyers and sellers. Moreover, when 
they have offered their vehicle as a transport service for others to use, they have created 
an additional source of income.  
Among the informants, there are emergent farmers who have gradually shifted or diver-
sified their main cash crop(s) to products such as groundnuts and soybeans60 in relation to 
the growth of the food and animal feed industry and consumer market for such products. 
The involvement in animal production has been another important source of growth for 
emergent farmers. One informant claims that breeding pigs has become his most profita-
ble source of income. He has noticed how more farmers with enough financial means 
have invested in enclosures; buildings; fodder and other resources required to become 
profitable in animal husbandry. The informant has experienced that 
when someone has profited from selling crops, I hear them say “I want to buy cattle”, “I want to 
have pigs”, or “I want to raise chickens”. More animal products are consumed in the trading centre. 
When I sell two or three pigs, I can afford maybe ten bags of fertiliser. 
The informant has increased his number of goats; pigs; chickens; doves and ducks. He 
strives to become less dependent on inorganic fertilisers and rely more on animal manure. 
Before, when I worked as a civil servant and consultant for NGOs, I only had a small number of 
farm animals. Even if I could afford the fertilisers I needed, it costed me a lot of money. Since 
becoming a fulltime farmer, I have reduced my spending on inputs and can use part of the difference 
to pay the school fees for my children. 
59 For instance, small-scale traders may operate near hammer mills to buy small quantities of maize, ground-
nuts or soybeans from household members who need money to grind the crop. 
60 Groundnuts and soybeans require less or no fertilisers compared to maize and tobacco. On the other hand, 
maize is, as farmers put it, “heavy”. A bag packed with maize weighs more than a corresponding volume of 
groundnuts. 
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Emergent farmers have also invested money in solar panels, car batteries and generators 
for lighting and charging of electronic equipment. Among them are those who have of-
fered customers to charge their mobile phone from the owner’s solar panel or car battery. 
The use of radio and mobile phones has spread and expanded farmers’ sources of infor-
mation about how farming and rural business ventures can be managed and in what direc-
tion the market develops. Farmers who have had the financial means have utilised mobile 
phones to communicate with people in their social and market network; be updated on 
price changes; notify buyers about products they want to sell; search for sales channels 
and negotiate prices.  
In sum, emergent farm actors’ investments and consumption patterns have contributed to 
new off-farm linkages within the local economy and business opportunities for residents 
and visitors. The processing of sunflowers into oil in Mkanda trading centre is an 
example of how a crop has generated new market values and attracted more stakeholders 
to the area: 
In 2015, a businessperson based in Lilongwe opened a small factory in 
Mkanda trading centre with the goal of producing cooking oil from sun-
flowers. The factory is the only stationary mechanical processing plant in 
the area except for mills where maize, groundnuts and soybeans are grinded 
into flour. Previously, farmers who produced sunflowers sold it to local 
traders, or transported it to buyers in Zambia. Once the machine – imported 
from China – had been installed and the factory opened, producers and trad-
ers began to deliver sunflowers to the plant, mainly between April and 
August.  
The seller can choose whether to sell raw material to the factory or have it 
processed into oil – which is consumed directly in the household, sold in the 
local market or offered to traders. When the sunflowers are sold as raw 
material, the seller earns about 100 kwacha61 per kilo. However, in periods 
when the supply of sunflowers is relatively low, the price can increase to 
about 150 kwacha per kilo. If the producer or trader wants to process the 
sunflowers into oil, the person has to pay the factory manager 50 kwacha 
per kilo. 
In practice, those who sell sunflowers as raw material can use the money to 
pay the factory manager and extract oil on the spot. Alternatively, the seller 
may leave with the payment for the raw material, but later return and buy 
oil after the main crop sales season, when the most active household 
expenditure period has ended. The factory owner keeps the sunflower cake, 
which is sold to the processing industry, where it is used as animal fodder 
or manure. 
Those who buy sunflower oil from the factory usually come between Sep-
tember and November. In the factory, the customers pay about 800 kwacha 
per litre for the product. The sunflowers can be stored up to two years in the 
factory without great risk of deterioration. 
61 Kwacha in the thesis refers to Malawian kwacha. 
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From 1 kilo of sunflowers, about one-third of a litre is produced. In the 
trading centre, one litre of such oil is sold for about 1 000 kwacha. Produc-
ers and intermediaries who sell the oil in the trading centre pack it in bags 
or bottles of different sizes and offer it at prices that give them profit. Still, 
the local cooking oil is cheaper than corresponding products from 
companies like Sun Seed, which refines the oil to a higher degree.  The 
sunflower oil sold at the factory or in market stalls is bought by residents 
for home consumption and small-scale business operators who fry sweet 
potato; Irish potato; chicken; pork; buns and other food. Their operating 
costs have reduced as they are no longer limited to the use of imported 
cooking oil. 
Trade relations in Mkanda EPA 
While the poor state of infrastructure has limited emergent farm actors’ mobility between 
urban and rural areas and across the border, it has also reduced their competition with ex-
ternal actors and increased their bargaining power in relation to smallholders (cf. Chirwa 
& Zakeyo 2003). Emergent farm actors have become increasingly involved in the trading 
of commodities with buyers and sellers in Zambian trading centres. An informant points 
out that much of what is sold in the trading centre has been imported from Zambia.  
We export maize flour; soybeans; groundnuts and tobacco. When food is scarce in the area or spe- 
cific crops are cheaper in Zambia, traders import produce from there.  
The interaction between the neighbouring countries has also stimulated labour exchange. 
Informants describe how some migrants who have gone to Zambia have come back with 
money of a relatively high value. Other migrants have returned to their farm with little to 
eat, a negligible income from the cultivation and little money for investments.62 
The growing trade in Mkanda EPA has resulted in an increased number of market actors. 
A description is given below of main agricultural market relations in the area: 
Actors on the market: Emergent farm actors sell agricultural commodities 
to consumers or traders in the local and regional market; companies they 
are contracted with and intermediary buyers who have contracts with large-
scale wholesalers, retailers and processors like the NFRA; Mulli Brothers; 
Farmers World; Kulima Gold; Export Trading; Chibuku Products; Rab Pro-
cessors and the Zambian Food Reserve Agency (FRA) as well as feed man-
ufacturers such as Central Poultry; Feltons and Multifoods.  
Among the large-scale traders, there are those who have contracts with the 
government through the NFRA; the World Food Programme (WFP) and 
other NGOs. Some traders, such as owners of local retail and wholesale 
62 Out-migration occurs when residents seek labour or higher payment outside Mchinji District. Men travel 
to Zambia or places like Malawi’s capital, Lilongwe, during the food shortage period. They provide labour on 
farms or as artisans. Migrants in Mkanda EPA may consist of wealthier farm actors who invest in land and 
trade, middle class people who have been employed in the area or poorer citizens who seek jobs as tenants 
and casual labourers. 
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shops, also buy crops from farmers in the area and sell the accumulated 
farm produce to large-scale agribusinesses. A few large-scale market actors 
oper-ate in the area on a more permanent basis and rent warehouses in 
Mkanda EPA, where they store the purchased products for an extended 
period of time before selling it. Others visit the area, collect products for a 
limited time and transport it to the company they represent. 
Large-scale estate farmers either sell products directly on international mar-
kets (e.g. tobacco companies with its own production); to companies with 
whom they have contracts or intermediary buyers representing the afore-
mentioned wholesalers, retailers and processors.  
Mobile traders (including intermediary buyers) represent the primary link 
between Mkanda trading centre and more distant markets and warehouses 
(cf. Jayne et al. 2010:29). They are contracted by large warehouse owners 
or agribusiness companies and have bigger trucks than what emergent farm 
actors use. They can connect emergent farmers to large-scale buyers in ur-
ban areas (primarily Lilongwe and Blantyre), give access to export markets 
and provide information about how markets develop. There are also mobile 
traders who travel by bus and minibus to markets in Malawi and Zambia 
and buy second-hand clothes; shoes; electronics and household products 
from Indian and Chinese owned companies, which they return with and sell 
in the trading centre. 
The relationship between ADMARC and the NFRA: In practice, AD-
MARC buys different types of crops from small-scale farmers. The crops 
are stored in warehouses and silos until the products are sold on the market. 
A given quota of the maize bought by ADMARC in a specific year is trans-
ferred to the NFRA, where it is stored in silos, unless the stocks are already 
full and the excess product is exported. The quota that ADMARC buys 
depends on factors such as the government’s intention and budget; the 
maize harvest volume and how much of the crop that is already stored at the 
NFRA – which also receives maize from contracted private intermediary 
buyers (registered bidders including large-scale traders, estate farmers and 
farmer organisations).  
The benefits for the government of retaining maize in ADMARC’s 
warehouses include reduced transport costs and shorter lead times between 
purchases, storage and sales. An advantage for the government of 
transporting maize to the NFRA’s silos is that it can be stored up to five 
years without any significant risk of loss or damage. The government then 
also has centralised control over the supply of maize and can distribute it in 
the country depending on where there is a possible shortage of food. 
The market phase April-May: Local traders (including emergent farm ac-
tors) and intermediary buyers who represent large-scale companies buy 
crops such as maize from net-food buyers at the beginning of the harvest 
season (April-May), when the price is at its lowest and the sellers have run 
out of food or money (cf. ibid.:36). As described for previous periods, there 
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are also emergent farm actors who make agreements with farmers before the 
growing season and provide them with inputs and possibly other resources on 
the condition that they sell their harvest to them at an agreed price. Farmers 
with higher margins (and alternative income sources) (i.e. emergent farmers) 
may sell some produce during this period and continue to sell crops other 
parts of the year. Some of the producers selling crops during this period 
expect that they will have to buy maize later in the season. 
Local traders (including emergent farm actors) make a profit by collecting 
maize bought in smaller quantities and selling it to larger traders – either 
directly or through mobile intermediary buyers. There are also some large-
scale companies with staff in the area who buy products directly from 
producers. Wealthy traders and buying companies store the purchased crops 
until later in the year when the demand is expected to increase and the selling 
price rise.
Some of the competition early in the harvest season between the locally based 
and large-scale traders is driven by the fact that the agribusiness companies 
strive to accumulate as much maize as possible before ADMARC sets a floor 
price and starts buying produce from small-scale farmers (provided they have 
something to sell, have the means and time to visit ADMARC’s facility, 
accept the buying price and the parastatal has money available to pay with).  
The market phase June-August: Once ADMARC enters the market (in 
June-July), the minimum maize price offered to the farmers increases
(ibid.:37). By then, the price paid by the private traders (large-scale compa-
nies and intermediary buyers, such as emergent farm actors) tends to be 
slightly higher than what the parastatal offers. It is mainly locally based 
traders who sell maize to ADMARC. The purchase prices tend to increase and 
a larger number of producers start selling significant quantities of maize and 
other food crops.  
The market phase September-November: In September-November, 
producers who have kept food crops off the market sell maize and other prod-
ucts to obtain revenues and finance the preparations for the upcoming farm-
ing season (cf. ibid.:36). They sell the produce to local traders and interme-
diaries (including emergent farm actors) who deliver it to distant and/or large-
scale buyers. Farmers using irrigated technology harvest the crops in such 
fields and use it as food for the household members and labourers, but also 
sell it in surrounding markets. Some producers also sell their products to 
ADMARC. By this time, private traders’ storage space tends to be full and 
their purchases decrease. The local demand for staple food increases as more 
households run out of supplies.
The market phase December-March: In December-March, large-scale 
traders who have stored crops sell the commodities through local traders
(including emergent farm actors), wholesalers and retailers when the demand
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and selling price is high (ibid.:38). Traders also travel to other areas where 
they buy produce, return with it and sell it. ADMARC sells maize and 
other crops to an extent that is partly due to the availability of food in the 
households. During years when the harvest is low and food scarce, it 
becomes critical that maize is supplied from the NFRA via ADMARC, 
where a limited amount is sold at a regulated price and quantity (20 kilo) 
per person until the warehouse is empty. Farmers (including emergent 
farmers) with remaining staple food stocks and irrigated crops left in the 
fields consume it; use it as payment for labour; share it with extended 
family members or sell it on the market. 
Apart from buying produce, farmers exchange food with each other. Net-
food buyers depend on help from relatives; NGO support and government 
interventions; crops sold by ADMARC; loans from money lenders or other 
financial institutions; payment through labour supply and leasing or selling 
land as well as other household assets. They also change their diet and 
reduce how much they eat in a day (cf. Chirwa & Zakeyo 2003). 
During the marketing season, traders put up posters and boards with information about 
the price at which they buy specific crops. The price can change daily and vary depend-
ing on the buyer. Several informants explain that if a smallholder arrives with a bag of 
maize, while an emergent farmer comes with ten bags of the corresponding crop, the 
buyer will offer the small-scale farmer a lower price or refrain from buying it.  
For me as a farmer, it is valuable if I can establish a relationship with a trader, as it helps me to 
secure a market channel, while the trader can predict what kind of crops will be delivered in terms of 
quality and quantity. (Male emergent farmer). 
Farmers’ relationship to land inheritance, entitlements, sales and leases 
The tenure conditions changed when the new Malawi National Land Policy was approved 
in 2002, which formed the basis for the new Land Act passed in the parliament 2016 
(Government of Malawi 2016). As a response to the growing land pressure and scarcity 
(even though agricultural land in the country has remained uncultivated); the depletion of 
natural resources; the population density and the speculative holding of urban plots in the 
country, the government expressed the need to redistribute parcels; improve the 
population management and family planning; secure land users’ property rights and 
motivate landholders to make more productive and environmentally sustainable 
investments (Government of Malawi 2002; Deininger & Xia 2017). As a result of the 
policy process and objectives, the following categories of land are acknowledged in the 
Land Policy and Land Act:  
Private land includes customary estates (registered customary land); lease-
holds (a contract that gives someone the exclusive right to use and transfer 
public, private or customary land for a fixed period of time) and freeholds 
(large-scale plantations or estate land that is held in perpetuity by the 
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owner, without time limits or government interference placed on the 
owner).  
Under the Land Act, the state has the authority to lease customary and pub-
lic land to individuals; groups; organisations or corporate bodies. Custom-
ary land that is registered as a leasehold is converted to public land. At the 
end of the lease period, the land reverts to the landholder(s) or the state. 
There is no minimum size of a leasehold, but estates are considered to be 
land that is 10 hectares or more. 
Public land is acquired, held, managed and used by a government body or 
traditional authority in trust for the people of Malawi. Public land includes 
tenure owned by the government, such as properties with public infrastruc-
ture and buildings established to serve specific common interests, e.g. in 
the form of schools and health care centres. Public land also consists of ar-
eas intended for settlement schemes; national parks; forest reserves; recrea-
tional areas and historically and culturally significant sites. In addition, the 
category includes lapsed leaseholds and land vested in the government as a 
result of uncertain ownership; abandonment or land that cannot be used for 
any particular purpose.  
Unallocated (non-individualised) customary land is also public for the 
residents within a Traditional Land Management Area (TLMA). Such land 
includes dambos (wetlands that occupy a shallow, seasonally waterlogged 
depression near drainage sources such as lakes and rivers); community 
forests; grazing areas; marketplaces; business locations and burial grounds. 
The land is held, occupied or used for the benefit of the community, where 
the rights and management are dictated under customary law. 
The traditional authorities’ main role is to preserve customary land as an 
asset base for current and future generations in the community. Traditional 
leaders do so together with Land Committees (that operate at different lev-
els and include headpersons and elected members from the TLMA) by de-
marcating, registering, allocating and managing customary land as trustees 
for the inhabitants; enforcing land management policies; upholding civil 
justice in accordance with the customs and traditions of the area; protecting 
the community’s cultural values and general welfare; giving advice to the 
government on traditional affairs; mediating in land disputes and witness-
ing and acting as notaries in land transactions. 
62 
Mechanisms for land registration 
After the new Malawi National Land Policy was implemented, communal land has be-
come more formally registered and demarcated through customary estates.63 The registra-
tion of land can be a time-consuming and costly process, especially for poorer farmers, 
who might question its value if they perceive that the control of property held by an au-
thority is beyond their reach (cf. Lust, Swila & Dulani 2016). The processing of registra-
tion and claims may include fraud, corruption, theft and delays (Ngwira 2003). Compara-
tively educated and wealthy farmers – generally men (including emergent farmers) – in 
Mkanda EPA with the ability to follow the process and access to responsible authorities 
have more likely been able to obtain land titles and secure individual property rights: 
According to the Land Policy and the Land Act (Government of Malawi 
2002; 2016), all customary landholders are encouraged to demarcate and 
register their property for farming and residential purposes and as a means 
to secure the holding; mobilise capital; access credit and make invest-
ments. The registration of customary estates involves Land Committees 
that allocate land and grant certificates with the approval of the appropriate 
traditional authority.  
In order for a certificate or transaction of a customary estate to be valid, it 
must be signed by the chairperson of the Land Committee; witnessed by a 
traditional leader; approved and recorded by the Land Clerk (employed by 
the local government: the District Assembly) and confirmed by the 
grantee(s) of the customary estate, who should also pay an application fee. 
The certificate issued must be registered by the District Land Registrar to 
be valid. 
The grant and usufruct of the customary estate depends on whether the ap-
plicant is considered capable of using the land productively and in accord-
ance with the stipulated terms and conditions – requirements for payment 
of any fees, charges and taxes. To protect the customary estate from 
alienation without consent, the titleholder is encouraged to keep a survey 
plan where the boundaries of the land are marked and the interests regis-
tered. However, customary land granted to someone who is given use 
rights and demarcated by responsible community representatives may be 
recognised as the owner of it, whether registered or not.  
The registration and administration of public land classified as government 
land or leaseholds and the issuing of TLMAs is controlled by the Commis-
sioner for Lands – a public officer – who may delegate such matters to sub-
ordinate officers in the District Commissioners Office (where land is regis-
63 Customary estates are owned, held or occupied as private land by individuals; families; groups; clans or 
associations that have registered the property as such within a TLMA (Government of Malawi 2002; 2016). 
Someone with the entitlement to a customary estate has usufruct to it and can lease it; bequeath it; sell it or use 
it as mortgage – unless there are overriding interests of the community or the state – which has sovereign rights 
over it. The community retains a residual interest in the land and regulates who can take over the property and 
how it should be used (Chirwa 2008; Matchaya 2009). 
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tered in the Land Registry). The commissioner and local government au-
thorities also use the Land Clerk to give the Land Committees advice on 
the management of customary land. The Land Committees make 
recommendations to the commissioner on whether leaseholds should be 
granted; extended; revoked or returned to the customary owners. The 
administration of leaseholds also includes collection and disbursement of 
ground rent as well as enforcement of covenants.  
An emergent farmer and community leader comments on the transition from communal-
based to individual-based power relations regarding land rights: 
The village head no longer has any real power over how customary land is transferred in the 
community. You cannot just approach the chief with money or gifts such as a chicken to get land. 
You have to negotiate with the property owner. 
Customary land distribution among family members 
The residents in Mkanda EPA have mainly accessed customary land through inheritance, 
marriage or distribution of unallocated tenure (although the latter is rare in the present 
because of the individualisation and competition related to land) (cf. Chirwa 2008; 
Matchaya 2009). In general, little land has been available for community members who 
have left their parental home. Heirs to landholders in poor households have inherited 
minor plots from the family’s land, which has given rise to individual tenures that have 
been too small for the inheritor to meet basic needs; adopt productivity-increasing 
production methods and harvest a surplus for sale (cf. Chirwa 2006).64  
Informants comment that an heir (e.g. an emergent farmer) who has managed to accumu-
late more capital and financial means than the other family members can allow the sib-
lings to use his or her inherited plot and instead focus on individually purchased land. Al-
ternatively, if some family members have been unable to utilise their inherited land pro-
ductively or been uninterested in cultivating it, the more successful sibling may buy out 
the others or let them keep the land, but take over the use of it. In return, the more 
succesful sibling can provide for the others – or push them away. 
While some members in a family expand their arable area, others can no longer live off the land. 
Only few farmers can still make ends meet from the land they have inherited. (Emergent farmer and 
community leader). 
Family members without the ability to expand or diversify their resource base have had 
to cultivate their plot more intensively; experienced how the soil lost fertility and been in-
creasingly exposed to volatile markets. On the contrary, households with fewer descend-
ants and enough working capital have had more land for division, but also better pro-
spects to afford the children’s education; care for the family members’ subsistence needs; 
64 Historically, if a family no longer had enough land to accommodate their children’s households, the 
village head could create additional agricultural holdings from the stock of unallocated customary land. Cur-
rently, the access to non-inherited land has become limited to actors who can pay market prices for (additional) 
arable fields. 
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utilise public and private services and benefit from agricultural commodification.65 The 
same informant explains: 
The land and other assets you inherit depends on the legacy of your kin. When your ancestors consulted 
the village head about land to cultivate, they were asked how much land they needed. If they 
responded that they wanted a large area of land, they had to prove that they had the power and ability 
to utilise it well. If not, the village headman would reallocate some of the land to someone else. 
Estate land distribution within families 
Relatively small estates (which has been a central form of property for the materialisation 
of emergent farmers) has been held by individuals or families who have either formally 
divided it and individually registered parts of the land, or let one or more heirs take over 
the property. Interviews with small-scale and emergent farmers reflect that even in cases 
where the property has remained intact as a coherent unit, the relatives may divide it in-
formally among themselves and allow each individual family to use a certain part of the 
estate (similar to what is described about emergent leaseholds in chapter 5). Such a solu-
tion has required that the family members have been able to agree with each other about 
how the division should be done, what meaning it has and what activities can take place 
there. By doing so, they have avoided the costs and administration it would entail if each 
individual household had registered their own land. At the same time, the extended 
family has retained the rights and other policy-related benefits that an estate provides. 
Alternatively, according to informants, if one inheritor – an emergent farmer – has taken 
over the entitlement, the siblings may allow the registered person to manage the entire es-
tate, but agree that the profit should be shared with them. On the other hand, if the entitle-
ment to the property is in the name of the household head, that person may operate in the 
land market independently of the other family members and deprive them of the benefits 
of property ownership. In addition, in cases where the person named on the land certifi- 
cate has been absent from the household, the remaining members who have managed the 
property have not been able to use it as collateral or secure rights to the tenure in other 
ways. A community leader comments that because land entitlement is limited to those 
whose names are registered, the children of someone who has passed away without 
having transferred statutory rights to them have been likely to suffer if other family mem- 
bers have claimed that land.  
Who of the potential heirs who inherited the property has depended on how the land-
holder has drafted his or her will (legal declaration), including whose name(s) has/have 
been stated in the document (Government of Malawi 2011).66 Who has taken over the 
65 Commodification is a process where the elements of production and reproduction become subject to 
mechanisms of market exchange (Bernstein 2010:124).  
66 If the former titleholder has not left a valid will of his or her property, the spouse is entitled to his or her 
household belongings, while the remaining property should be divided between the spouse(s) and the children 
above the age of 18 or other dependents of the intestate. How the shares are distributed is affected by the wish 
of the previous property owner; the basic necessities provided by the intestate during his or her lifetime and 
any contribution from the spouse or child to the value of the estate. If no special circumstances are noted or 
conflicts arise among the heirs about how the shares of the property should be distributed (provided they are 
more than one), the law requires that they share the value of the property equally (Government of Malawi 
2011). 
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control and use of the property has been influenced by factors such as one’s literacy; age; 
gender; financial capacity; status; skills and motives for using the land. In general, 
members of households where the educational level is relatively high have been more 
likely to hold their land together, rather than divide it between them (cf. Muriaas et al. 
2016:15).  
Sociocultural dynamics related to land 
Informants characterise how the dynamics of land rights that are regulated within and be-
tween families have included gender differences and how it has affected who has become 
an emergent farmer: 
A man who is farming on land within a matrilineal system (where the 
lineage is traced through the female line67 – which is common in Mkanda 
EPA) is expected to eventually pass on the land to the female descendants. 
If he is getting married, he moves to the wives’ native home, or remain in 
his village with the wife (depending on conditions such as where land is 
available and the relationship between the couple and their relatives). The 
children belong to the women’s lineage (more specifically the wife and her 
brother(s)) (Ngwira 2003). Women who live in their husband’s home are 
often excluded from certain roles and expected to work harder, be more 
compliant and gain less power than the “owners” of the community. In case 
the couple gets daughters, they are likely to want to expand the landholding 
and provide fields for the children. If the couple only gets sons, the land 
will eventually be taken over by the wife’s sisters or other female relatives 
(cf. Peters 1997). 
The husband in a maternal household may desire to acquire land for himself 
and restrict the property rights of such tenure to himself and/or his children 
(because the husband in a matrilineal family may worry about losing his 
rights to use the wife’s family land in the event of a divorce or the spouse’s 
death, or lack the expectation of access to land if he were to returns to his 
natal village). Alternatively, he can quickly remarry to secure access to land 
(cf. ibid.). 
If the non-local partner in a marriage that has ended returns to the natal 
home, the land allocated to the person may be treated as a temporary trans-
fer until other individuals (usually the children) make claims of it (cf. ibid.). 
However, if land is scarce, the divorced woman or widow may lose her cus-
todial rights as well as the household property and be chased away. 
Traditional leaders do not move to their wives’ home. Instead, the wife is 
allocated land and house especially set aside for her, while retaining her 
customary land rights. Consequently, traditional leaders may have 
67 Women’s access to land is often regulated through the family head, who is almost exclusively a man 
(unless the woman is a single adult or parent in the household). The husband (who tends to be the one making 
the payment if the family buys property and therefore considers himself to have ownership of it) is often the 
person who controls the use of the household’s land and its products. The woman is limited to 
administering property that is considered feminine (such as cooking utensils) (Ngwira 2003). 
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access to more than twice as much land as other residents (Holden, Kaarhus 
& Lunduka 2006:99). 
Disputes among family members about how property should be distributed, accessed and 
inherited have resulted in land being unused for shorter or longer periods. There are in-
formants who talk about how some family members have left Mkanda EPA in search for 
alternative means of survival. Others have moved after getting married, or remained, but 
spent most of their time supplying farm labour. At the same time, different groups have 
continued to compete for land: Malawians from even more land constrained areas; rela-
tively successful farmers with the intent of expansion; businesspeople, civil servants and 
professionals who want to diversify their income;68 traditional leaders who strive to re-
tain, increase or transform their power (from being based on control over communal re-
sources to increasingly being drawn into monetary forms of value); residents who return 
to their family land after their retirement and representatives of large-scale agribusinesses 
seeking to expand or increase the value of their capital holdings.  
Informants have experienced how unutilised or unclearly marked land has been en-
croached by others (including emergent farmers) who may eventually claim the right to it. 
They also talk about farmers who have lost land after taking a loan that they have not 
been able to repay and agreed with the lender to use the property as redemption.  
You need to pay attention to your land and show that you are actively using it. You cannot leave 
your land for long, unless you have someone you trust who can take care of your holding while 
you are away. (Male emergent farmer). 
Several emergent farmers comment how they and other residents have marked their prop-
erty boundaries with trees, bushes or more permanent signs to increase the individual 
control over the land. 
Land sales practices 
The practice to sell and buy customary land has become more common in a context where 
community members see themselves as landowners, rather than holders of customary 
rights (Kishindo 2004). In Mkanda EPA, there have been situations where chiefs have 
treated land in trust of the community as their own and sold it to individual buyers (cf. 
Jayne et al. 2019) (even though they only have the mandate to allocate usufruct or occu-
pancy rights within their area of jurisdiction).69 A recurring situation told by different in-
formants is as follows: 
A village headperson witnesses the transfer of ownership between two par-
ties who sign documents that are not legally binding. The buyer may reside 
68 The salary level of civil servants such as teachers; nurses; police officers and extension officers varies, 
but is on average around 100 000-200 000 kwacha per month. 
69 Sales of customary land by village headmen and other traditional authorities can be a sign that traditional 
leaders are pressured by influential political leaders; civil servants and businesspeople. Traditional leaders may 
also sell land to affluent groups with the expectation of financial reward in exchange. Moreover, they can 
commit such acts in return for gifts, favors or money from strangers or original community members (Kishindo 
2004). 
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outside Mkanda EPA and lack the means or incentives to use the land im-
mediately after the purchase. Another person approaches the former owner 
and expresses the desire to buy the same piece of land. Only the previous 
buyer, the seller and the traditional leader know about the former sale.
The village headperson agrees to witness a second sale of the same land. 
The former owner and the traditional leader share the money from the pay-
ment. The latest buyer may start setting up permanent structure on the prop-
erty. The first buyer appears and notices that someone has occupied the ten-
ure. Both buyers claim that the land belongs to them and refer to their 
signed documents. If they cannot settle the dispute, they may go to court 
and initiate a legal case. 
Regardless of the outcome, the parties risk losing investments and not 
being able to utilise the land while the case is ongoing. The insecure 
conditions of land sales have made farmers reluctant to engage in 
transactions unless the seller can prove ownership of the property in 
question (cf. Peters & Kambewa 2007). 
In Mkanda EPA, sales of land have usually been limited to transfers within families or 
communities, or wealthier farmers selling property to non-family members (cf. ibid.). 
Informants give examples of when land sales have been a sign of profound and lasting 
vulnerability or tension in a family. For instance, selling can take place when the 
landowner needs money in the present more than future access to land. The owner might 
have more land than the household can cultivate. The landholder may lack heirs who have 
the ability or interest to take over the tenure. The farmer may have debts. The parents 
may find it difficult to pay for school fees and other household expenses when the 
children have become more numerous or reached higher education levels.  
Relatively well-to-do farmers – emergent farmers – can sell land if they need money to 
meet the needs of poorer relatives, including their children. A relative may be asked to 
cover expenses for social events, such as a funeral. A household head may have to pay for 
medical treatment of a family member. The landowner may want to invest in an off-farm 
business. Illness or migration in a family that means that fields are not used can also 
cause relatives to sell that person’s land. 
Based on empirical sources from the field work, the buyer has typically been a rural-
based businessperson; a former, retired or active employee; an expanding small-scale 
farmer; an established emergent farmer or an investor. Informants indicate that someone 
who has bought land or leased it for a longer period may have stronger incentives to im-
plement structural changes on the holding (e.g. investing in irrigation and thorough soil 
treatment).  
Land rental practices 
Land leases have also become common in Mkanda EPA. Informants have experienced 
that when someone rents out land it can signal distress (food insecurity) and inability to 
utilise the land productively. The landowner may have reached a high age or become ill. 
The landlord might have insufficient financial means and labour power or be preoccupied 
68 
with working at estates or other farms in the region or neighbouring countries. The in-
come from the land lease can give the owner opportunities to buy fertilisers, seeds and 
agrochemicals for the following cropping season; obtain food and other necessities during 
periods when there is a shortage or make other investments. After the end of a growing 
cycle, the landowner has either extended the lease period (to the same person or another 
leaseholder) or returned it for own use. 
Among the emergent farmers interviewed in Mkanda EPA, there are those who have 
rented out land to other relatively well-off farm actors. Such landlords have had more ara-
ble land than they have been able or willing to use. Some may lease land as a strategy to 
diversify their sources of livelihood. There are also emergent farmers whose siblings have 
worked in other parts of Malawi and who have cultivated or rented out their land while 
they have been away. An informant who has rented out her family members’ land says 
that by doing so, she has allowed “local residents to use the land”. 
In some cases, well-off landlords – e.g. estate owners – have rented out land for a certain 
price and in turn rented plots at a comparatively low cost from farmers whose property is 
further away from the trading centre. Farmers share stories about how they or other land-
owners who have been unable to use the land productively have come to work for the 
leaseholder or buyer – sometimes in the same field as they have leased or used to possess 
– in exchange for food; money; inputs or basic services.70 Their dependency on the
landlord or buyer has possibly deepened, especially if their agricultural income has been
consumed before the next growing season. An informant explains:
You are in need of money. You rent out land and get paid. You spend the money. You get a bad 
harvest. You go hungry. You search livelihood alternatives, but eventually return to the leaseholder. 
You explain: “I need money for food. Can you give me some? If you do, I let you use more of my 
land. I can work for you.” Eventually, the landowner may have lost the control of all land. 
Resource-poor households renting out land have risked being further excluded from fer-
tile land areas and lucrative agricultural markets (cf. Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert 2015). 
On the other hand, emergent farmers who have leased land have been reluctant to fertilise 
the fields, partly because they have rarely had the opportunity to rent the same plot for 
more than one season at a time. 
Customary land for rent mainly consists of fields where maize was grown last season, because the 
owner wants you to grow groundnuts or other legumes so that they can utilise the nitrogen in the soil. 
When I have harvested the crops from the land I rented, I have usually had to leave the land, especially 
if I have managed to get a good yield. The landowner does not like if I have done well when that 
person has not been as successful. If I had fertilised the land with animal or compost manure, it would 
have been a waste for me considering the time it takes for the nutrients to dissolve in the soil. (Male 
emergent farmer). 
70 In such a situation, selling labour power can be seen as a more attractive livelihood source than using the 
land for own production. 
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Wealthier farm actors have potentially leased land from several landlords during the same 
season. Large-scale estate holders, who tend to live in other parts of Malawi (e.g. Li-
longwe) and have someone running the farm for them, have generally entered into more 
long-term leases. Emergent farmers, on the other hand, who rent land have stayed where 
the fields are located. An informant summarises the current land lease situation: 
There are people who have a lot of land that they rent out. They do well. There are people who have a 
lot of land that they cultivate. They do well. There are those who cultivate some of their land and rent 
out part of it. They may do well. There are farmers with little land, of which they rent out most or all 
of the holding. Unless they earn their living from other sources, they do not do well. 
Land implications of the transformation in the estate sector 
The falling tobacco prices and the declining estate burley production towards the late 
1990s gave rise to leasehold land that was not cultivated.71 As a result, conflicts between 
estate owners and smallholders have arisen about the right to land. Some estate land has 
reverted to customary tenure. Some families have received a larger piece of land than 
they had before. However, former estate owners have maintained indirect control over 
large-scale leaseholds and maintained the unequal access to land (cf. Jul-Larsen & Mvula 
2009; Kishindo & Mvula 2017). 
While parastatals such as Press Agriculture and Chamwavi Group have withdrawn from 
the primary production in Mkanda EPA, relatively well-off farmers; former or active civil 
servants; professionals; businesspeople and agribusiness companies have leased or bought 
estate land from the current or former owner. The Malawian government has welcomed 
large-scale international corporations as actors who can bring capital into agriculture; 
create employment and stimulate investments in infrastructure, social services and other 
public goods (Kishindo & Mvula 2017).  
Such actors have been able to access land relatively cheaply, while community members’ 
claims on that kind of property have largely been ignored or undervalued (cf. Wily 2011). 
Existing large-scale estate users in Mkanda EPA have at times left the land dormant for 
speculative purposes or lack of funding. Emergent farm actors who have gained access to 
estate land may let their children inherit the farming operations and family-controlled 
capital, which has facilitated the entry into agriculture and market expansion for the next 
generation of privileged farmers (Jayne et al. 2019). 
The large-scale leaseholders have negotiated with government actors to gain access to lu-
crative loans and aid packages within the framework of investment treaties and interna-
tional trade laws, which has given them new levels of individual protection (Wily 
71 One reason why land has not been utilised is that the tobacco quota allocation system has allowed estate 
farmers with favorable production conditions to reach their tobacco share with only half or less of their lease-
hold land area (Stambuli 2002).  
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2011).72 The current large-scale estate users have produced tobacco; maize; legumes; sun-
flowers and seeds for the domestic and export market. Some of them hold 1 000-2 000 
hectares of land in Mkanda EPA.73 One large-scale estate manager who has been staying 
in the area for a long time has noted that some of the actors who have leased large-scale 
estates have remained in the area for one or two seasons, before seeking land closer to 
urban markets. Others, who have found reliable markets from their position in Mkanda 
EPA and possibly planned to settle here, have stayed longer. 
Apart from land, labour has remained the main local economic resource in the estate sec-
tor, supplied by tenants; contract farmers; permanent labourers and casual labourers. 
Skilled labourers may be recruited from the head office and spend a significant part of 
their income outside the local economy (cf. Chirwa & Matita 2015:17). On the large-
scale estates, emergent farmers have continued to act as managers; supervisors; advisors; 
clerks, secretaries; drivers; carpenters and mechanics, but have also had a broader role in 
making surrounding resources available to the estate owner, such as providing labourers 
on their behalf. 
Emergent farmers’ presence in agricultural institutions and organisations 
The international oil price spike, the global food crisis and the financial crisis, which 
peaked in 2008, have triggered a rush for land and investments in agriculture among do-
mestic and international actors (Hall 2011). Higher international food and oil prices have 
increased the cost of imported commodities (including fertilisers) and agricultural pro-
duction in Malawi (Holden 2013). The food price spike and the Malawian government’s 
response to it has benefited large-scale, politically connected maize traders. Bidders for 
government contracts have in turn attracted more emergent farm actors to seek profit 
opportunities in Mkanda EPA (cf. Jayne et al. 2010:54). 
The last two decades have been marked by a rising urban and rural population in Malawi, 
whose food demand has increased and consumer preferences diversified (Jayne et al. 
2019). At the same time, the net-food buyers have been further pushed back socio- 
economically by relatively high food prices (Chinsinga & Chirwa 2013). In summary, the 
recent rise of emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA has taken place in a period with signifi- 
cant GDP growth on the continent; food price volatility; land market expansion and 
removal of restrictions on private trade, which has led to a wider range of investment 
sources, monetary injections, income types and agricultural positions.
Emergent farmers’ participation in contractual farming
Since 2000, changes have taken place in the tobacco industry with implications for emer-
gent farmers in Mkanda EPA: the expansion of contract farming;74 the creation of district 
72 The land deals are supported by investments from European and North American banks; foreign wealth 
funds; parastatals and financial investors seeking investment alternatives to international financial markets 
(Hall 2011). 
73 There are 24 estates in Mkanda EPA that are larger than 100 hectares. The largest estates are owned by 
Press Agriculture, Chamwavi Group and Central Poultry. 
74 In 2012, a contract farming model called Integrated Production System (IPS) was implemented in the 
tobacco industry (Makoka et al. 2016). 
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markets (as a measure to reduce trade inefficiency, auction floor congestion and attrac-
tiveness of cross-border trade); the discontinuation of the previous licensing system for 
intermediary tobacco buyers; the introduction of minimum prices and greater recognition 
given to matters such as credibility, traceability and quality control (Chirwa 2009; Prowse 
2013). Interviewed emergent farmers have used their own tenure or leased or subleased 
estate land as a path to contract farming – promoted by the government as a means for in-
creased productivity and control of price levels and the production process in the sector 
(cf. Shaba et al. 2017).75  
Based on empirics from the field work, emergent farmers involved in contract farming 
have tended to be middle-aged men. They have had a greater landholding size than the 
majority – usually a minimum of 5 hectares. They have established beneficial relation-
ships with extension service providers, who have played a key role in recommending 
companies or organisations which recipients should enter into business agreements, 
government schemes or CSO projects and programs.76 While their household has relied 
on farming as a major source of income, there are those who have been employed or had 
significant community positions. What follows is an account of basic conditions in burley 
contract farming (contrasted with certain elements of non-contract farming of the corre-
sponding product) that has affected the production conditions for emergent farmers in 
Mkanda EPA: 
Contract farming is based on an agreement between a farmer and pro-
cessing and/or marketing firm on production of certain commodities, 
supply of inputs and payment for delivery (Eaton & Shepherd 2001). In the 
IPS model, a farmer who can set aside at least 1 hectare for tobacco 
(Makoka et al. 2016) and has access to other required resources signs a 
contract with the buyer, either as an individual or through a club (where the 
members may consist of relatives or producers with similar interests and 
who live in the same area). The producer and buyer agree on how much 
land is to be used for the contract and tobacco to be produced in the 
specified area.  
The contract farmer is responsible for finding labour for the crop produc-
tion. The farmer must accept systematic monitoring of the production pro-
cess by the buyer’s inspectors. They also need to follow regulations on pro-
curement; land preparation; fertiliser application; planting; cultivation; har-
vesting; bailing; marketing and transportation (Place & Otsuka 2001). They 
have to make investments in tree planting; terracing; water management 
(including irrigation) and relevant infrastructure. They must have a deposit 
to receive loans. They have to deliver a certain quota to get credit next sea-
son. They need to have knowledge of how tobacco is grown within a crop 
rotation system (ibid.). 
75 After the previous tobacco production system in Malawi collapsed, producers and intermediary buyers 
have experienced high rejection rates on the auction floors and difficulties in obtaining credit and buying the 
inputs needed (Shaba et al. 2017). 
76 Farmers who share social, economic and cultural traits and interests with extension workers or 
leading farmers are likely to be included in the list of recommended names handed to the client. An 
extension worker or other emergent farm actor who recommends farmers to a certain project may expect to 
receive seeds, livestock or other assets in return. 
The contracted farmer uses the contract as a collateral to receive credit and 
finance the purchase of certified tobacco and maize seeds; fertilisers; agro-
chemicals; plastic sheets; strings and other resources (Shaba et al. 2017). 
The sum of the credit loan is deducted from the final sale of the crops. As 
part of the credit, the farmer receives a cash advance in the form of a 
monthly allowance between January and March to buy food, employ addi-
tional labour and buy poles for the tobacco barns (ibid.). 
Tobacco farm actors who grow tobacco independently (and/or buy it from 
non-registered farmers) pay a fee and register themselves at the TCC, be-
fore delivering and selling the crop on the auction floor. The tobacco sold 
by the independent seller is auctioned to bidding companies. Non-con-
tracted farmers have sometimes had to wait for more than two months after 
the tobacco has been bailed until it has been sold on the auction floor. 
Consequently, they have had to spend time and money on contacting 
transporters through TAMA and getting information about when their 
tobacco can be delivered. When the storage time in the TAMA depots is 
extended, the weight decreases and the quality deteriorates. In contract 
farming, such transfer costs are lower for the producer because the buyer is 
responsible for the transportation of the bales (ibid.).  
When a contractual sale takes place, the tobacco is auctioned between the 
contracting parties, where the contracting company buys specific grades of 
tobacco from the grower at an agreed price. If the grower is dissatisfied 
with the price, the person can sell the tobacco to another buyer on the auc-
tion floor (Koester et al. 2004). Although contracted burley producers gen-
erally face higher production costs than non-contracted tobacco farmers, 
they are likely to make more profit as they tend to produce higher quality 
leaves and get a better price (Makoka et al. 2016:39). 
Through their involvement in contract farming and other elements of the tobacco trade, 
emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have become vertically integrated in relationships with 
various tobacco companies (cf. da Silva 2005).77 Emergent farmers have also engaged in 
contract farming where they have multiplied commercially registered seed varieties – 
such as maize; soybeans; pigeon peas; cowpeas and groundnuts – for multinational seed 
corporations (e.g. Pannar Seed Co; Funwe Seed and Monsanto). Informants talk about 
how the seed production has required considerable financial means and capital78 and 
generally excluded farmers with less than 10 hectares of land (cf. Chinsinga 2011a). 
Apart from tobacco leaves and certified seeds, emergent farmers have cultivated crops 
like maize; soybeans; groundnuts and sunflowers on contract.  
77 The corporation Alliance One leases land from large-scale estates to produce tobacco. Premium TAMA 
leases estate land for tobacco production and involve farmers in contract farming. Limbe Leaf as well as Japan 
Tobacco Incorporation contract farmers. 
78 A contract farmer who cultivates basic seeds (produced from breeders’ seeds) or certified seeds 
(produced from basic seeds or a higher class of seeds) must meet specific criteria: No maize should have
been grown during the previous season in the selected field. The land strip to the specific field must 
have a certain minimum distance to the adjacent fields. The field must be of a certain standard that is 
inspected by company representatives during the vegetative growth phase (Mloza-Banda, Kaudzu & Benesi 
2010:16-17). 
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Contract farmers in Mkanda EPA who have used their own land have maintained individ-
ual property rights; been offered various services and gained access to a guaranteed mar-
ket for their produce (cf. Prowse 2012). Interviewed small-scale farmers, on the other 
hand, have been excluded from contract farming because they have been deemed to lack 
the status of land; collateral; production capacity; business skills and ability to achieve the 
surplus value required in contract farming (cf. Shaba et al. 2017; Kumwenda & Madola 
2005). The emergent farmer informants who have produced seeds or crops through con-
tracts have increased their land size over the years. They have gained access to 
mechanised technology such as tractors; harrows; ploughs and motorised pumps for 
irrigation. They express how they have developed new skills and increased their market 
contacts. The more successful farmers have achieved higher agricultural productivity, 
crop quality and household income. 
In contrast, informants also describe how they and other contract farmers have 
experienced difficult situations when they have produced a smaller volume or lower 
quality of produce crops and/or seeds than expected. They have then not always been able 
to deliver the agreed goods and ended up in debts and had the contract cancelled. 
Emergent farmers’ capital growth through farmer groups and organisations 
A number of institutional models have developed in Mkanda EPA through Village Sav-
ings and Loans Associations (VSLAs); commercial banks;79 CSOs; development pro-
grams and farmer organisations. The various associations have helped small-scale and 
emergent farmers to improve their bargaining power; reduce the production and market-
ing costs; improve or gain new skills; share information and expand their network (cf. 
Mapila, Makwenda & Chitete 2010). Female and male farmers interviewed have experi-
enced how participation in the mentioned types of institutions has enabled them to gain 
better control of productive resources, earn higher incomes and develop more reliable 
sources of livelihood. Credit for inputs and extension services has remained limited if one 
is not part of a club; contract; organisation; scheme or microfinance group (cf. Kachule & 
Dorward 2006).80 Below is an overview of the impact of such institutions for farmers in 
Mkanda EPA: 
Microfinance institutions, including VSLAs, offer an alternative to the con-
ventional banking logic regarding how financial risks and markets are 
viewed in rural areas. In Mkanda EPA, they are organised through clubs or 
groups with 15-25 members. The institutions rest on principles such as joint 
liability; compulsory savings; participatory monitoring; loans granted to 
members based on collective efforts and the individual’s savings as well as 
flexible lending conditions and repayment schedules, where the loan terms 
do not require significant collateral (Chirwa 2004:11).  
79 There are emergent farmers who have a savings account in commercial banks. Some emergent farm 
actors in Mkanda EPA also receive loans and lend money with increased interest to farmers and small-scale 
business operators. 
80 Critical resources for extension services are controlled by major input suppliers. For instance, activities 
on demonstration plots – used in development programs and projects – are sponsored by agribusiness corpora-
tions, where the focus almost exclusively is on crop varieties and production conditions that reflect a limited 
view on food security and the value of agricultural resources (Chinsinga 2011b). 
Through VSLA membership, households with little capital can obtain 
credit for off-farm businesses; farm investments; household needs and 
dealing with vulnerable situations, but also developing their skills in 
business and production management. Some VSLA groups in Mkanda EPA 
include women who prepare and market food, manufacture household 
utensils and sell fish, vegetables or fruits. 
After all, the services provided in the VSLAs are limited – because of the 
institution’s interest in protecting the depositors from misusing the shared 
assets. Consequently, the withdrawals from the savings are small or slowly 
managed. Informants state that the associations tend to exclude members 
who are considered unreliable in terms of repaying loans. 
The members’ engagement is closely linked to the agricultural cycle and 
small-scale business opportunities during the harvest season. Several in-
formants have been part of VSLAs with unstable creditworthiness; dropouts 
during the food-deficit months; lack of interpersonal trust and access to 
long-term financing; social exclusion as well as weak governance (cf. 
Fisher, Pozarny & Estruch 2017:52). 
Development agencies; VDCs; Area Development Committees (ADCs);81 
traditional authorities and extension officers are engaged in various pro-
grams and projects aimed at natural resource management; animal hus-
bandry; reproductive health; food security; parenthood; education; financial 
management; business development and public work (e.g. construction of 
roads or buildings). Such programs are partly intended to help farmers 
refrain from offering labour for low pay during the food-deficit period and 
focus on their own farm and off-farm activities. However, the programs 
generally lack long-term funding that can create structural changes in 
smallholders’ livelihood portfolio (Slater & Tsoka 2007). 
Emergent farmers’ engagement in Nkhunguyembe Cooperative 
A farmer organisation worth noting in Mkanda trading centre is Nkhunguyembe Coopera-
tive.82 Prior to the growing season, the members and non-members affiliated to the coop-
erative receive seeds and other inputs on credit in proportion to their respective land size. 
After harvesting the crops, they sell them through the organisation. Unlike the affiliated 
non-members, the members (who pay an annual fee of 5 000 kwacha) store produce in 
the cooperative’s warehouse at no additional cost and are prioritised in the sale of prod- 
ucts through markets offered by the cooperative. The shareholders form the management, 
which mainly consists of emergent and large-scale farmers. The cooperative has sold 
groundnuts, soybeans, maize and sunflowers to intermediary buyers; wholesalers and 
processors (e.g. Sun Seed).  
81 A representative body of VDCs. 
      82 The cooperative was registered in 2014 and has about 500 members (including smallholders, emergent  
farmers and some large-scale farmers). About 70 percent of them are men and 30 percent women. About 50 of 
the members are shareholders. If the non-members are also counted, about 1 000 people are associated with 
the cooperative. 
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Unless the cooperative has entered into an agreement with a buyer before the growing 
season, the members discuss what to produce and later seek suitable buyers that demand 
the specific crop. After the sale, the members are paid according to the selling price and 
what and how much crops they have delivered. Interviewed members of the cooperative 
state that several factors have affected their possible surplus value created through the 
cooperative: the members’ respective production costs and how the agreement with the 
specific buyer has been made; infrastructural conditions (e.g. the access to electricity, 
telecommunication and passable roads); the market price levels; the timing of the sale and 
payment and the degree of vulnerability to fraudulent traders, intermediaries, managers or 
staff (cf. Nkhoma 2011:100-103).  
Value creation through Nkhunguyembe Cooperative 
One woman’s experience of being a member is that “during years when we have found 
buyers before the growing season, we have been able to plan our activities more thor-
oughly, including how much we can produce and sell through the cooperative”. The 
members have participated in courses focused on financial and business management; 
farming methods; natural resource use and household matters, but also been involved in 
community development projects. The same member says that she has improved her 
skills in calculating which products and volume she should save for household consump-
tion and how much she can sell to cover expenses and make investments. Through the 
membership, she has become less dependent on supplying labour to other farmers and re-
duced the risk of putting herself into debt. Another member is of the opinion that the par-
ticipation in the cooperative has given her more time to compare crop types and price dif-
ferences before deciding what to produce. She has started growing sunflowers and cow-
peas after meeting advisors and buyers who “tell us which commodities are in demand 
and can give a high price”. 
A recurring impression given by members is that they have strengthened their marketing 
and bargaining position. They have reduced their transaction costs (e.g. by sharing means 
of transport; critical infrastructure; technological services and other resources). By selling 
products in larger volumes, they have been able to devote less energy to find buyers who 
offer acceptable prices. They have experienced improvements in their ability to make 
investments and cover expenses for school fees; medicine; soap; salt; clothes and other 
basic needs.  
Membership differentiation in Nkhunguyembe Cooperative 
While farmers have benefited from being members in the cooperative, they have 
experienced challenges in arranging transport; finding reliable buyers; coordinating the 
handling of crops and delivering the goods to the buyer within a reasonable time. Part of 
the difficulty has been that the cooperative has competed with sellers who have had 
greater control over the means of production (e.g. large-scale estates or other resourceful 
farmers). Periods with few market alternatives and when the products have remained 
unsold for a long time have challenged the members’ endurance, trust in the man-
agement and willingness to deliver crops to the cooperative. A member comments: 
Sometimes we have had to wait for three to four months or more after the harvest before an acceptable 
market opportunity has arisen, our products have been sold and we have been paid. When the cost 
of storing the crops has increased, the cooperative’s margin has decreased and thus also the 
motivation of members to remain. However, those of us who can endure the time until the sale takes 
place are still likely get a higher price for our products than we would have received on our own. 
There have been members with small margins and lack of trust in the management who 
have removed their products from the cooperative’s warehouse and sold it directly to 
traders. Alternatively, they have avoided delivering crops to the organisation during the 
following season. In situations where the number of members and the fund in the cooper-
ative has decreased, the cooperative’s management ability, service provision and compet-
itiveness have been challenged (cf. Nkhoma 2011:107). Informants believe that more 
farmers then have been discouraged from participating in collective efforts and instead 
relied on individual market relations, where the buyer has had the upper hand.  
According to informants with experience of the cooperative, the organisation has mainly 
been characterised by members sharing educational background; market knowledge; so-
cial recognition; mutual trust in collective responsibility; financial means; collateral and 
goals that have enabled them to control and monitor how resources are used. Their joint 
actions through the cooperative have partly been driven by uncertainty among the 
members about who will make a profit in a given year and the belief that income dif-
ferences will even out over time for the benefit of the majority when parts of some farm-
ers’ surplus value is distributed among others. By sharing risks; funds; investments and 
costs of e.g. access to and responsibility for the use of credit, inputs and other resources 
for sustained or increased productivity as well as competence development, emergent 
farmers have positioned themselves on markets where they have created surplus value 
through trade in aggregated products and services (cf. Bebbington 1999:40). 
On the other hand, interviewed farmers with small margins have had little incentive to 
join organisations such as the cooperative where the ability to generate, hold and invest 
surplus value is required. They have lacked enough capital and ability to control and 
evaluate whether their contributions are being used for a common good that they can 
benefit from. Informants reflect that net-food buyers’ ways of trying to meet basic needs 
has undermined collective efforts among them, partly because of a belief within the class 
that potential participants would misuse shared resources for their own needs and 
benefits. 
Socioeconomic effects of natural resource pressure and competition 
The majority of the Malawian population is dependent on biomass energy sources for their 
daily needs (Munthali & Murayama 2013). Water services, electricity and other societal 
resources have been controlled by state-owned enterprises and partly funded by donors. 
The services have rested on a commercial logic (Chirwa 2004:19).83 High electricity 
charges and irregular power supply have meant that people connected to the mains have 
mainly used it for lighting, while charcoal and firewood have been used for cooking and 
heating (Munthali & Murayama 2013). In Mkanda EPA, most households have relied 
77 
on boreholes and wells where groundwater is pumped into a tank before it is distributed – 
a process that requires electricity (cf. Chirwa 2004:20). The lack of (accessible, reliable 
and affordable) electricity; telecommunications and tap water has limited farmers’ ability 
to process and add value to their produce and develop off-farm businesses (cf. ibid.:16). 
However, emergent farmers in the empirical material have had relatively good access to 
clean drinking water and electricity in their households, which has contributed to their 
wellbeing, status and income opportunities. Among the emergent farm actors, some have 
invested in diesel generators as a supplementary energy source when power outages oc-
cur.  
Patterns of the state of the soil 
According to interviewed farmers, the fertility of the soil in the area has decreased over 
time. In general, the average yield has declined among smallholders (Chirwa & Dorward 
2013:269; Chirwa & Zakeyo 2003). The crop production has been affected by agricultural 
methods such as continuous cultivation in the same field without proper fertilisation or 
with excessive use of inorganic fertilisers;84 late land preparation and planting; poor pro-
tection of the topsoil; lack of use of crop residues for green manure and inadequately ap-
plied conservation measures for biodiversity (cf. Chirwa & Zakeyo 2003; Stambuli 2002). 
The material from the fieldwork gives the impression that smallholders have had little or 
no margins or incentives to leave their plot(s) in fallow; apply crop rotation systems with 
any significant diversity; maintain the biomass in the soil and plant trees.85 In addition, an 
informant explains how the widespread use of manual tools – hoes; axes; shovels; sickles 
and machetes – have limited the depth of most farmers’ tillage, which has affected the nu-
trient uptake of the plants. Emergent farmers with access to mechanised technology; more 
labour power; livestock; larger landholdings and fertilisers have had better conditions for 
preserving or supplying nutrients to the soil in such a way that the yield per unit area has 
been maintained or increased.
Patterns of deforestation 
Forest products have functioned as a livelihood source (Munthali & Murayama 2013) and 
commodity within the local and regional economy. At the same time, residents in Mkanda 
EPA have experienced how the clearing of land for farming, housing and market areas as 
84 The degradation of the soil fertility has made the use of inorganic inputs more critical for farmers to 
maintain a certain level of harvest (Stambuli 2002). Informants state that organic fertilisation from farm animals 
and plants has been used only moderately – mainly by those who can afford the labour required; have the 
skills and capacity to manage and apply it correctly; can accept the time required the decomposition; own 
livestock and have access to grazing areas. 
85 The focus on maize as the most important crop in food security policies has discouraged farmers from 
growing legumes to any great extent. Consequently, such crops have only been included marginally in inter-
cropping models that can contribute to store carbon in the soil and provide nitrogen to the plants; link agricul-
tural and nutritional values; enable more efficient use of fertilisers and increase the protein value of the food 
(Snapp et al. 2010; Chibwana, Fisher & Shively 2012).  
While maize has a relatively high grain yield potential; allows labour efficiency and is adapted to high 
temperatures (Chirwa & Dorward 2013:255), the crop is sensitive to water and nitrogen deficiencies, dry spells 
and stock management. Over time, the dominance of maize has reduced the nitrogen of the soil and contributed 
to erosion (Ortega et al. 2016). 
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well as the use of wood for tobacco production; fencing; construction and consumption of 
firewood and charcoal has continued to cause deforestation and affected the hydrology, 
erosion control and carbon sequestration in the surroundings.  
According to interviewed farmers, the loss of wooded areas and the privatisation of com-
munal land have restricted residents’ access to timber; fuelwood; food; fodder; fibre; 
dyes; medicine and other non-timber forest products (cf. Bandyopadhyay, Shyamsundar 
& Baccini 2011). Several of the informants say that the pressure on natural resources has 
reduced the areas where, for example, women can find firewood, fetch and use water and 
gather wild edibles. As a result, women have had to walk longer distances and spend 
more time on activities such as preparing meals.  
Households in Mkanda EPA have become more dependent on buying wood products 
from local forest owners and traders (including emergent farm actors). Emergent farm ac-
tors with alternative sources of income and surplus value have had opportunities to ben-
efit from trade in wood and charcoal products, while small-scale farmers have had to 
spend more time on getting hold of forest raw materials (and consequently had less time 
to work in their arable fields).86  
Patterns of the state of the water and irrigation 
In Mkanda EPA, sand and gravel have been used for brickmaking, other building needs 
and the manufacture of handmade objects for everyday use. Farmers have extracted the 
resources from land on slopes and in catchments. Informants mention how silt in the sur-
face runoff (e.g. from irrigated land) has reduced the soil nutrient in the nearby land; 
caused pollution and altered the water flow in streams, wells and the Rusa River that runs 
through parts of Mchinji District. The way the river and other water sources have been 
used as a common-pool resource (Peters 1999:44) has restricted the residents’ access to 
water and deteriorated its quality. An informant comments on the state of the water 
sources on which the majority relies: 
There are few trees left on the riverbank, nutrients are flushed into the water and the water level has 
decreased. The water most of us depend on has not been purified properly. We do have boreholes, 
but they are inadequate and difficult to maintain. Fortunately, we have water taps in some places, 
which somewhat facilitates our household needs. 
Another informant, who has been a civil servant in the forestry sector and is now chair-
person of a VDC and runs a farm, shares his views on how government and NGO actors 
have handled food security and natural resource issues: 
I have experienced an increase in the presence of NGOs where the emphasis is on how much crops 
can be produced within a specific area and time. My impression is that their approach to food security 
has stimulated the opening of gardens and irrigation schemes near the riverbanks and at the foot of the 
86 A farm actor involved in charcoal production must spend days away from the farm and monitor the 
burning of the wood during the rainy season, when many poor households have depleted their food reserves 
and the rainfed cultivation requires a lot of work. Therefore, many small-scale farmers are excluded from en-
gaging in charcoal production (Munthali & Murayama 2013). 
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hills. After the vegetation has been cleared to create land for farming, the runoff of nutrients and water 
has increased. 
A form of agriculture that has required close access to water sources is irrigation farming. 
Emergent farmers irrigating their fields say that they have been able to harvest crops and 
make money for a larger part of the year, increase the value of their produce and utilise or 
increase their production capacity even when the rainfall is irregular (cf. Chizimba 
2010:87; Peters & Kambewa 2007).87 A type of irrigated land that has become more 
valuable, but also less accessible in Mkanda EPA (cf. Peters & Kambewa 2007), is 
streambed and wetland gardens (dimba).88 The gardens have been used by farmers to 
maintain tobacco nurseries and grow maize, rice and vegetables (e.g. Irish potato; sweet 
potato; cabbage; tomatoes and onions) – crops that have served as food and income 
sources during the dry season. While small-scale farmers have used watering cans and 
buckets to water their gardens, emergent farmers have invested in tanks, treadle pumps 
and motorised pumps – connected to the Rusa River and streams. 
For instance, an irrigation scheme with 69 members in Mkanda EPA have used three trea-
dle pumps on the land allocated to the participants. They have cultivated, marketed and 
sold produce cooperatively and used part of the revenue to buy inputs and plant new 
crops. The group’s leader describes how they have developed a learning environment for 
how crops can be irrigated; agreed on norms and rules on joint efforts; expanded their 
market access through contracts with buyers and reduced the vulnerability of individual 
members’ livelihood. 
Some of the irrigated crops grown by emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have been sold 
to end consumers (possibly through local traders); in the spot market in Mkanda trading 
centre or other trading centres and in urban markets. In cases where the producer has es-
tablished a relationship with large-scale buyers and exchanged information on the market 
availability, demand and price levels of irrigated crops, the person has reached a larger 
customer base. On the other hand, farmers who have sold irrigated crops at nearby mar-
kets have more likely been price searchers rather than price takers, since the value chain 
in such cases is relatively short (Chirwa & Matita 2015:27).  
The spread of irrigated agriculture has also affected the water flow (cf. Peters & 
Kambewa 2007) and limited livestock owners’ grazing and water sources for their 
animals. A farmer pays attention to the increased pressure on communal grazing areas 
and what it has meant for the farm animals: 
During the dry season, the water in the dambos dries quickly when people use it in their gardens. The 
grazing farm animals may need to move far to get water from the river. After the growing season, the 
livestock owners keep their goats, cattle or pigs on the farm and feed them with leftovers from the 
harvested crops. If your land is small and you have no other feed source, your farm animals will not 
87 Irrigation systems allow farmers to grow crops up to three times a year (Chirwa & Matita 2015:28). A 
farmer who cultivates irrigated crops often does so in combination with rainfed agriculture.  
88 Irrigation has been encouraged by national authorities; extension officers; donors and NGOs as a way to 
increase the food security and value of agricultural products (Peters & Kambewa 2007). 
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get enough to eat.89 You may have to sell an animal and buy fodder for your remaining animals. If you 
do not have access to extra fodder, you are limited to having a few chickens and goats. During the 
rainy season when the grass is plentiful, the livestock owners let their animals graze near the road. 
Those with enough money can hire a herder who cares for and moves the livestock depending on 
where there is grazing and water. 
The informant continues: 
Someone who owns a garden can have their crops destroyed by animals. If that happens, the landowner 
may request compensation for the lost value in the garden, but also be forced to seek livelihood 
options outside the landholding. Therefore, a farmer who expects a good return one day may lose the 
investment the next day. 
As described in other parts of the thesis, one’s farmer’s quest for survival and success can 
become another farmer’s adversity. 
Chapter analysis of emergent farmers’ materialisation through patronage 
From the 2000s, patronage linked to agricultural support programs and poverty alleviat-
ing interventions have been distributed through government-controlled and private corpo-
rate bodies (Cammack, Kelsall & Booth 2010:39). Corruption, clientelism (the provision 
of goods and services in exchange for political support) and opportunism have been insti-
tutionalised (ibid.). Corruptive modes of action have trickled down from the top of the 
government hierarchy to civil servants in the lower levels of public institutions. More 
civil servants and professionals have invested in agricultural commodities and services as 
a result of the worsening mismanagement of public resources; the increased legitimacy of 
private acquisition of agricultural values and the desire to secure alternative sources of 
livelihood. 
The narrow range of commercial input suppliers and their limited product portfolio and 
distribution channels has served as an instrument for patronage and enabled ways to 
acquire wealth for former and current seed company officials; contracted seed growers 
and retired or active public employees (cf. Chinsinga 2011b). For instance, it has not been 
possible to enter into agrodealership and sell inputs through the FISP without substantial 
financial and institutional support from a seed corporation (Chinsinga 2011a). Patronage 
has been allocated to emergent famers through contractual relationships with large-scale 
companies; institutions where credit is distributed; trade agreements with wholesale, retail 
and processing companies and the state’s recognition of customary estates and leaseholds 
as prioritised means of generating wealth from rural communities. 
89 The development of more intensive and separated feeding systems has required that livestock owners 
have sufficient purchasing power to afford fodder products without compromising the household’s food needs 
and use of crop residues for other purposes. 
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Chapter analysis of emergent farmers’
materialisation through the prevailing food regime  
Emergent farmers have been drawn deeper into corporate capital control and transna-
tional trade linkages (cf. McMichael 2013:6) in a world of speculation about future world 
market prices (McMichael 2005:266-267; Bernstein 2010:82-84, 99). Subsidy programs 
as a solution to food insecurity and land reforms where individual property rights are fa-
voured have expanded the privatisation of basic resources. Emergent farmers have mate-
rialised such interests in their local environment. They have become involved in agricul-
tural value chains that have reflected more complex national, regional and global trade 
patterns. They have been integrated into the creation and exchange of values that have in-
cluded supermarkets; animal protein; energy sources; retail and wholesale operations; ur-
ban consumption trends and simplified and standardised mechanisms for food production 
(cf. Bernstein 2010:81; Wittman 2009). 
The value of money circulating through emergent farmers has increasingly been deter-
mined by the extent to which credit can be charged, rather than how wages are formed 
(cf. McMichael 2000). Recurring social and ecological crises and a volatile agricultural 
economy have made capital owners and their intermediaries (e.g. emergent farmers) to 
extend the frontiers of accumulation through securitisation (tradable debt) – where money 
is created from expected revenue (McMichael 2005:296).  
In the absence of broad societal reforms that improve the structural conditions of 
wellbeing among the population, the path to wellbeing for the residents of Mkanda EPA 
has passed through inheritance or other forms of access to family-based capital; pos-
session of scarce natural resources; farm and off-farm investments with money from sala-
ries or businesses; income diversification; utilisation of market fluctuations and the lack 
of basic resources among the population; institutionalised forms of collective action and 
formalised trade relations with agribusinesses.  
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8  Social relations concerning how 
emergent farmers have materialised 
In this chapter, I develop the reasoning about how emergent farmers have materialised 
through social relations of production and reproduction within their class and in relation 
to the other classes described in the thesis. 
The significance of natural resource commodification
and gender relations for emergent farmers’ materialisation 
As shown in the thesis, the contemporary history in which emergent farmers have materi-
alised has been influenced by overall trends such as volatility in food prices; unpredicta-
ble weather patterns; ecological and socioeconomic crises; a growing population; land 
competition and more complex agricultural value chains. Farmers in Mkanda EPA have 
experienced how the entry and production costs in agriculture have increased (Bernstein 
2010:105) as a result of higher food prices, growing land shortages and increased market 
competition. 
There is a scramble for land in Mkanda EPA among actors who can profit from the demand for 
maize; groundnuts; soybeans; vegetables; livestock produce and other products in the region or 
further afield. We have relatively good rainfall patterns and fertile soil conditions compared to other 
parts of Malawi. (Emergent farmer and VDC chairperson). 
Social repercussions of the natural resource competition 
Manifestations of individual ownership of farm animals; crops; farmland; forests and 
water sources have spread in Mkanda EPA. The access to private property and how it is 
used has become central for farmers’ exchange value (from which one’s power to 
exchange commodities arises) (cf. Wood 2011:33). Informants note how the commodi-
fication and privatisation of land have made relatives, acquaintances and neighbors com-
pete more with each other in terms of land use. They have become less willing to lend 
each other fields or cooperate in other ways without compensation. An emergent farmer 
expresses that “relatives do no longer work together or share land, seeds, fertilisers and 
crops to the same extent as before. Instead, we are focused on our own survival and 
wellbeing.”  
Residents around Mkanda trading centre have experienced how the scarcity, fragile state 
and commodification of natural resources have resulted in fragmentation, tensions and 
conflicts within and between families; communities, institutions; farm actors; long-term 
inhabitants; newcomers; visitors and other groups about whose claims are legitimate in 
specific contexts (cf. Peters & Kambewa 2007).90 A farmer and retired teacher reflects 
that “we have problems with arable land because most people born here stay and die here 
– tied to the fields”.
90 For instance, while a garden is private property, the stream of the water source adjacent to it is controlled 
by state or customary institutions (cf. Peters 1999:44). 
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In other words, emergent farmers and other societal groups have extracted value from 
natural resources in ways that have undermined people’s modes of action, livelihood 
sources and survival (Peters 1999:42). The land that emergent farmers have inherited and 
claimed has given them a source of capital which they have used to transfer wealth 
between generations; acquire collateral for loans and investments; increase the household 
security and engage in relationships where wealth and prosperity may be close at hand 
(cf. Chamberlin & Ricker-Gilbert 2015).  
While farmers in Mkanda EPA have experienced trade-offs between their current biomass 
use and the consequences of an exacerbated deficiency or deteriorating conditions, the 
continued extraction of already insufficient resources may seem more reasonable for 
someone with small or no margins, or a person whose logic of production and 
reproduction is based on self-preserving interests, rather than engaging in communal 
efforts that risk being exploited by others and do not provide any predictable returns for 
the participant in the short term, but rather have effects on larger spatial and longer 
temporal scales (cf. Bandyopadhyay, Shyamsundar & Baccini 2011; Lipper 2000). 
Gender-related repercussions of property rights 
The matrilineal system practiced in Mkanda EPA has contributed to a relatively high pro-
portion of female-headed households, partly because divorces have resulted in the man 
leaving the household and returning to his original home, or moving to property he has 
registered. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the adult population has worsened the 
degree of insecurity that female farmers may experience (Mbaya 2002; Chirwa 2008; 
Matchaya 2009) in a context where the man has run a higher risk of dying from the dis-
ease and possibly leaving the woman as the sole breadwinner in the household.  
As disclosed in the thesis, few female-headed households have materialised as emergent 
farmers in Mkanda EPA. Through similar mechanisms of class relations examined in the 
study (e.g. between farm households with and without control over their labour power, 
entitlements and creation of surplus value), men have dominated women in agriculture. 
Cultural biases have often prevented women from controlling, owning and making 
decisions about the use and management of land and other household assets – even when 
the man has been cultivating his wife’s land (Mbaya 2003; Ngwira 2003; Muriaas et al. 
2016:22-23). The mixture of traditional customs and capitalist economics has favoured 
customs where the husband (rather than the head of the clan) has been regarded as the 
family head and expected to take care of the nuclear family; serve as the main 
breadwinner and make decisions about the household (including its property and 
economy) (Ngwira 2003). 
Whereas married women in a Malawian context have been recognised higher status, re-
spect and degree of responsibility, unmarried; divorced or childless women have gener-
ally been treated with less dignity. Married women, however, have often lacked rights to 
property ownership (ibid). Although the female lineage has had certain rights to custom-
ary land according to inheritance norms, registered and purchased land has tended to be 
in the man’s name (although the names of both spouses can be stated). Because the man 
has usually been responsible for the payment when property is purchased, he has gener- 
ally been considered to own it and entitled to decide who will inherit it. The recognition 
of formal rights has also made it possible for the man to use property as collateral; secure
credit; increase the production and sales (through inputs and technologies that require a 
certain type of capital); enter into market agreements and lease and sell property (ibid.). 
Female informants confirm that they have often lacked such control. In general, women 
in the region have achieved a lower level of education than men (Government of Malawi 
2017b:28), which has constrained their ability to interpret information required to access 
and fill in forms that formalise property rights (Ngwira 2003). Their average lower in- 
come level has also prevented them from paying the fees required to register land.  
As women in Mkanda EPA have often lacked control over more substantial capital and 
had low incomes, a divorce or the death of the husband can have a serious impact on their 
wellbeing, poverty level and exposure to shocks (cf. Doss 2006). When a man has died, 
land that he used may be taken over by his relatives and disputes arise among the ex- 
tended family members about who is entitled to it. As a result, customary land may be 
expropriated from the woman and her heirs (ibid.). Informants state that if the woman 
were to raise the issue of land rights in court, she may have to wait 6 to 12 months before 
the case is closed. The longer the court process takes, the higher the cost in time and 
opportunities it means for the claimants (cf. ibid.). Female informants have experienced 
that even when they have controlled property, they have often faced poor market situa- 
tions due to fraud; relatives who push them to share the money earned; the need to pay 
urgent debts or obligations to finance rituals such as funeral commemorations. 
Gender-related repercussions of farm and off-farm activities 
Women have largely been excluded from or undervalued on capital-intensive agricultural 
markets. During the period examined in the thesis, the production of most export and 
high-value products – especially tobacco – has been controlled by men. Membership rules 
in the tobacco marketing associations have discriminated women in Mkanda EPA. In ad-
dition, trade on markets that have required longer travels outside the area – including the 
time and effort needed to reach auction floors – has largely excluded women due to their 
duties in the household such as childcare, but also because adult men (if present in the 
household) have tried to exercise power over women’s sexuality and mobility.  
Female-headed households’ means of livelihood and access to marketing channels have 
generally been limited to low-return and low-entry-barrier activities within or near the 
household, including own food production; low paid agricultural wage labour and a nar-
row range of off-farm business activities (e.g. beer-brewing, pot-making and petty trad-
ing) (cf. Takane 2007). Because women have been restricted to income sources close to 
home (given their domestic responsibilities and social norms about activities that are con-
sidered appropriate for them), their level of return has remained low (Munthali & 
Murayama 2013). They have usually lacked initial funds, competence or appreciation 
from the surroundings to engage in more profitable off-farm activities, such as shop- 
keeping or crafts that require specialised skills (cf. Takane 2007). 
Women have tended to carry a double burden in terms of the hours they spend on unpaid 
or undervalued housework and the difficulty of finding time to study and do economically 
productive activities. In cases where a woman has been the only adult in the household, 
she has generally not had enough labour power, control over other means of production 
and time to do all the farming – not least labour-intensive production such as tobacco 
(Djurfeldt et al. 2018). In Malawi, female-headed households have had a smaller farm 
size with a lower maize production per hectare; used less fertilisers and owned fewer 
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livestock than male-headed households. They have also tended to have fewer adolescents 
or adults in the household. However, if grown-up children have lived in the household 
and contributed to labour and income or sent remittances, the woman has had a greater 
chance to expand the farm size and increase the degree of control over the productive re-
sources in the household (Takane 2008). 
In the focus group discussion with female small-scale farmers, participants mention that 
when they have lacked sufficient labour power and skills for a certain type of farming, it 
has become more challenging for them to maintain the fertility of the soil. In such situa- 
tions, they have tended to seek work as casual labourers. Women and their children in 
female-headed households have spent more days on farm work than in male-headed 
households, while they have received lower wages than men for the same type of task (cf. 
Centre for Social Concern 2015:21; Takane 2007). At the same time, because the nature 
of farm work in places like Mkanda EPA has caused recurring ill-health, illness and 
chronic weakness in farm households, it has contributed to the labour shortages, low 
productivity and burden of care in female-headed households who have not been able to 
compensate for losses with additional labour power (cf. Djurfeldt et al. 2018).  
In summary, female farmers have had a weak bargaining position tied to the lack of con-
trol over their labour power and access to land, which has been reinforced by customs on 
how women’s labour should be used. Socioeconomic and cultural conditions have often 
prevented them from investing in productivity-enhancing means of production, generate 
surplus value and make a profit from crops, livestock and off-farm activities.  
However, there have been socioeconomic differences between female-headed households 
in Mkanda EPA. Women in households that represent a higher a level of income, ability 
to make productive investments and less vulnerability to shocks have engaged in more 
income secure or high-return activities. For instance, they have worked as civil servants 
or permanent labourers; been involved in the service sector or traded tobacco through 
informal marketing channels (cf. Takane 2007). They have been members in VSLAs and 
farmer organisations where they have acquired business know-how; developed their 
financial skills; gained access to credit and inputs and expanded their sales options. They 
have had closer access to marketplaces and towns. They have used their social network 
(e.g. supportive relatives – including authorities in customary, public or private institu- 
tions) to gain access to labour power; obtain financing and find income opportunities. 
They have had more adolescents and adults present who, in the form of productive capi- 
tal, have been in balance with the household’s available farmland and other resource 
base. They have also been able to acquire or retain land by flexibly applying inheritance 
rules; utilising influential contacts and making investments in property control (cf. ibid.). 
Class relations in Mkanda EPA 
Based on the description of the farmer class characteristics in chapter 4 and the subse- 
quent account of which actors have been integrated into the food value chain in Mkanda 
EPA, certain traits of farmer classes can be distinguished based on their relation to means 
of production and reproduction: 
Concerning market positions: Net-food buyers (mainly poor small-scale farmers) have 
sold less maize than other groups, but the proportion of their total maize harvest marketed 
can still be significant. The poorest farmers have run out of food stock within a few 
months. They have had few alternatives to earn money other than selling common food 
crops and providing farm labour. This class has been the one that is most dependent on 
the market to obtain staple food. They have entered the agricultural market as labourers, 
buyers and sellers in situations where their main interest has been to meet their immediate 
needs. They have found it difficult to get access to financial resources or create margins 
that have enabled them to make more long-term or risky investments. 
Slightly more prosperous small-scale farmers have been relatively food self-sufficient 
(i.e. able to provide enough food for the household members’ needs until the next harvest 
through the value of their productive activities). More or less often, however, they have 
had to supply labour to better-off farmers.  
Emergent farmers have been able to obtain more food and get a higher harvest than 
poorer farmers. They have received income from other sources than what their fields 
have provided and had a greater chance to alleviate the effects of challenging situations. 
They have been able to produce the value of their subsistence needs while achieving sur-
plus value, which means that they have exchanged other products and services than what 
has been necessary to survive and accumulated capital for investments that have main-
tained or increased their monetary value (cf. Bernstein 2002).
Concerning production positions: Emergent farmers have harvested a variety of crops 
and extracted values from different kinds of livestock – e.g. cattle; goats; pigs and poul-
try. Resource-poor farmers may grow similar crops, but on a smaller scale and with a 
lower quality. They have had some chickens and possibly one or a few goats. 
Emergent farmers with larger or various pieces of land and who have used their fields ef-
ficiently have had a greater ability to adapt their production according to geographical 
and agronomic conditions; personal preference; production costs; market prices and ex-
pected return. What activities that have taken place on the land has also depended on 
where it is located. Land with fertile soil; water supply; wooded areas and proximity to 
markets has been more expensive to rent or buy than fields of lower quality and which are 
further away from the main trading activities. With relatively good access to water and 
other natural resources, emergent farmers have been able to experiment with crop va-
rieties and cultivation techniques. Unlike poorer farmers, they have often had formal land 
titles, which has given them security in market relations. 
Concerning socioeconomic positions: Emergent farmers have achieved relative social 
and economic security through interdependent relations with other farm actors above, 
within and below their class. They have attained positions in society where their role has 
been crucial for others’ living conditions and possible prosperity: e.g. as traditional 
leader; development committee representative; spokesperson in farmer organisations; 
association administrator; clerk; farm manager; employer; teacher; health professional; 
agricultural extension officer or policeman. 
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Emergent farmers have usually had several breadwinners in the household. At least one 
or more members of their extended family network have had a regular income outside the 
farm, or otherwise highly valued positions in the community. They have let their children 
study in primary and secondary school, or at a higher level of education. They have had a 
greater chance than small-scale farmers to transfer privileges to the next generation. 
Small-scale farm households with a weak socioeconomic position have usually consisted 
of adults whose productive power as breadwinners has been insufficient in relation to the 
children, disabled individuals and older people who have depended on them. Children in 
such households have tended to regularly assist with farming activities. Their educational 
prospects have been small. 
Small-scale farmers with insufficient food supply for the household’s needs have offered 
labour to emergent farmers and others who can pay them in food, or money to buy food. 
Net-food buyers have worked for, among others, emergent farmers during the growing 
season, which means that they have risked further reducing their ability to next year 
produce a value from their fields that meets their reproduction needs. Such residents have 
come to revolve in a cycle of poverty where low returns have held down their income 
levels; limited their use of inputs and financial resources; prevented them from securing 
basic needs and reduced their incentives to invest in own agricultural production. Low 
production and yield levels among small-scale farmers have led to higher maize prices; 
increased costs for and reduced access to inputs; greater food insecurity; worsening 
poverty; poorer diets; spread of diseases and deteriorating health. Such circumstances 
have further limited household’s production capacity and revenue, while providing profit 
opportunities for those who can take advantage of the situation (cf. Mvula, Chirwa & 
Kadzandira 2002). 
Main class characteristics and dynamics 
An emergent farmer exemplifies certain characteristics of farmer classes on the market:
While smallholders come to the marketplace on foot or by bicycle, emergent farmers use oxcarts or 
motor vehicles. Emergent farmers can sell produce to a wider range of buyers. They have 
done market research. They are patient. They have planned their activities and how they 
spend their money. Emergent farmers who store larger volumes of marketable products make it 
easy for traders to buy what they are looking for within hours or days. 
The informant notes that many farmers in Mkanda EPA have tended to decide what to 
grow based on which commodity gave a high price last year, with the hope that next year 
will be the same.  
Only a few farmers who have insight into the market, risk capability and ability to invest in produc-
tivity-enhancing inputs and appropriate technology act innovatively. 
At the same time, the contexts of the thesis illustrate that someone’s class affiliation has 
been fluid, where farmers have moved between a small-scale and emergent state of 
being. Farmers’ movements upward and downward have been affected by circumstances 
such as whether loans have been paid; how the harvest has become; at which time and in
what negotiation situation a particular product or service has been traded or sold and to 
whom; the access to investment sources outside the farm; what types of investments 
within and outside the fields that have been made and whether they have been profitable 
or caused losses; the response to price differences; the ability to productively combine 
sources of income and skills; the degree to which income sources have been reliable; 
whether the search for revenues in other places has been successful and how it has 
affected the own agriculture; what demand that has existed for one’s assets; if cheating, 
fraud or underpayment has characterised one’s market relations; one’s inclusion and 
exclusion as well as ability to participate in agricultural institutions; to what extent 
collective efforts have added value or been abused; how the household has managed 
socioeconomic and ecological shocks; the social and economic condition of the 
household members (which has been influenced by factors such as the age; gender; 
number; health status and competence of the individuals); the need for assistance among 
relatives and the extent of help to them in relation to one’s capacity; the degree to which 
family members and acquaintances have been able to provide support; who has had 
influence over the land and other property that one has used; one’s relative cost of and 
access to labour power and how one’s labour power has been used. 
In other words, farmers’ movements in the class hierarchy have been drawn between so-
cial and economic as well as location-dependent and location-independent directions that 
have affected whether their livelihood margins have increased or decreased within and 
between years. Depending on the difference between what farmers have had to pay for 
and what they have been able to sell (at what price), they have received; held; calculated; 
reused; transformed and increased monetary value or lost it; got rid of it; repaid it; paid 
debts for it and fell back after exchanging it. After all, what has been a shared experience 
among small-scale and emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA, despite their different class 
positions, has been having to rely on market exchanges for their production and repro- 
duction (cf. Bernstein 2010:65, 103-104). 
Class relations among emergent farmers 
Emergent farmers’ forms of capital have not only served as means through which they 
have made a living, but also caused them to be and act in certain ways (cf. Bebbington 
1999:6): In the focus group discussion with male emergent farmers, the impression arises 
that they have recognised each other through shared cultural values; agricultural objec-
tives; educational background; household status; proficiencies; societal positions; 
agribusiness directions, control over certain capital and connections with civil servants; 
businesspeople; professionals; traders and political and traditional authorities. The access 
to farm labour has been crucial to their materialisation, not least because other resources 
that can be used productively have been limited and irregularly available. 
A participant comments about his peers that “we can trust each other because I know that 
someone who is on the same level as me cannot run away if we have an agreement about 
something. He has collateral such as a nice house and other valuable assets. I also know 
how the farmer has performed and behaved in the past.” Another participant fills in 
regarding the social cohesion between emergent farmers: “If I have a problem, I can go to 
my friend and ask for help. That person will probably help me, because he knows that I 
can offer him something in return that is in his interest.  
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The male farmers in the focus group discussion talk about how emergent farmers have 
collaborated with each other and coordinated market-related information and activities, 
such as which buyer can be trusted and what price is reasonable for a commodity. They 
have shared advices; ideas, activities; loans; investments; risks; methods and practices 
about crop and livestock production and off-farm business ventures. As lead farmers, 
some of them have been responsible for maintaining demonstration plots and testing crop 
varieties and production techniques with the support of extension officers. They have 
mobilised community members for meetings; disseminated information to farmers and 
offered others training and contacts to external actors.  
They have used each other’s means of transport. They have agreed on common sales 
strategies and techniques in relation to the buyer. They have rented and borrowed 
mechanised technology (e.g. tractors) to and from each other. By doing so, they have 
reallocated labour power to farm and off-farm activities that have given higher returns in 
relation to the cost of production. The focus group participants also highlight how they 
have exchanged inputs and labour in ways that have reduced their labour input per 
hectare and freed up off-farm work opportunities (cf. Jayne et al. 2019).  
Emergent farmers’ involvement in institutionalised forms of dishonesty and corruption 
Various examples were given during the field work of how emergent farmers have influ-
enced how agricultural resources have been controlled, used and transformed through 
forms of fraud and bribery. An element of emergent farm actors’ institutional influence is 
characterised by how they have bought and sold crops in certain situations. Stories are 
told about how they, among other traders, have used manipulated weights and measures 
or denied the producer or consumer to see the reading on their scales when selling or 
buying products. By doing so, they have lowered the actual buying price or increased the 
consumer price. At the same time, there have been situations where farmers have offered 
traders crops that have been soaked and therefore weighed more than if they had been 
dry, which has caused significant losses to the buyer (cf. Jayne et al. 2010:54).  
Emergent farmers have also sold contracted crops outside their agreements and avoided 
repaying credit by utilising the weak tobacco tracking system and selling the commodity 
in another seller’s name. Such acts have been performed in situations where the farmer 
has concluded that the cost of losing the contract is acceptable in relation to the potential 
benefits that can be achieved or challenging household situation that can be handled (cf. 
Shaba et al. 2017).  
Although ADMARC should give priority to provide markets for small-scale farmers, 
informants disclose how emergent farm actors have bribed staff at the depots to buy 
larger quantities of maize at the side of the official trade. The price paid by the emergent 
farm actor has been higher than the official selling price for maize. The officer has kept 
the difference, while the emergent farm actor has sold the purchased product to 
consumers for a comparatively higher price after ADMARC’s stocks have been depleted 
empty and when food is scarce.  
Officially, each buyer should queue and wait for their turn to buy the specified maize quota per person. 
What happens, however, is that an officer may agree with an emergent farm actor to sell maize to 
them in the afternoon or at night. The trader might bring a large amount of money and buy several 
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hundred bags of maize. The civil servant can document the transaction as if many buyers have paid 
for a small amount of maize. Eventually, the officer announces that the maize stock has run 
out for the season – which tends to be sooner than later. (Emergent farmer). 
Emergent farmers’ class relationships with small-scale farmers 
An informant comments that 
after the harvest, small-scale farmers may need to sell about 6-8 bags of maize to afford a 
bag of fertiliser. If a drought or flood occurs during the next growing season, there are few 
smallholders who can produce a lot of crops. 
Emergent farmers’ relationship with poorer farmers has been reproduced in labour ex-
changes: 
I usually pay labourers little by little over the season. If I plan to buy a motorised pump, lorry 
or oxcart; prioritise to meet a specific harvest target or need to spend money on family needs, I 
adjust my labour costs depending on my situation and how the market develops. (Male 
emergent farmer). 
Emergent farmers have acted as intermediaries by receiving inputs on credit from large-
scale farm actors and transferring part of it to small-scale farmers, who have been in-
structed to produce e.g. maize; tobacco; groundnuts; soybeans or sunflowers and give 
them back a specified amount of the agreed crop or seed. Part of what the emergent 
farmer has received from the smallholder has been transferred to the large-scale farm ac-
tor in the form of produce or monetary value. Emergent farmers have also entered into 
production agreements with small-scale farmers without the involvement of large-scale 
farm actors where they have distributed inputs, food or animals in exchange for seeds, 
crops or livestock. By exchanging resources with smallholders, emergent farmers have 
spread risks, shown social care and increased their profits. An emergent farmer indicates 
what he expects from sharing seeds with small-scale farmers: 
If I give a small-scale farmer a bag of groundnuts for sowing, I can expect that person to give me two 
bags of harvested groundnuts in return. When I lend seeds to a smallholder, I can assure myself that 
even if I do not produce a lot that season, the small-scale farmer will provide me with some produce. 
Another emergent farmer talks about how his confidence in small-scale farmers has been 
challenged: 
It happens that I provide smallholders with a bag of fertiliser that they have to pay back after the 
next harvest by giving me some bags of maize, groundnuts or soybeans. Sometimes I also give 
food or money in advance to smallholders who have agreed to work for me. Later, when I need 
them in the fields, some of them show up while others have disappeared. I have to change my 
plan and risk getting a worse harvest. I can ask relatives for help with the cultivation and trade, 
but I have to be careful so that they do not become too dependent on me in terms of food or money. 
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One male emergent farmer among others mentions the benefits of distributing animals 
such as pigs among small-scale farmers: 
I can give a smallholder I trust a female and male pig. We agree that once the pigs have received 
piglets, the farmer will give them to me and keep the adult pigs. If I had raised the farm animals myself 
and they got sick or stolen, I could have lost them all. By letting someone else raise the pigs, I reduce 
my efforts to take care of the animals and feel more confident that I will make money. At the same 
time, I give the small-scale farmer the opportunity to increase the number of pigs, start selling them 
within one or two years and make a profit. 
Such resource exchanges based on mutual interests have given rise to new emergent 
farmers. Other informants highlight more exploitative elements in their relationship with 
small-scale farmers: They have provided local seed varieties on credit, while claiming it 
is certified seeds. They have charged a higher price when smallholders have rented an ox-
cart or some other asset, compared to what emergent farmers have paid. They have re-
quired smallholders to repay loans with a certain interest rate, while the repayment cost 
has been lower among their peers. An informant in the focus group discussion with male 
emergent farmers expresses how he and his acquaintances view smallholders – an 
interpretation shared by the other participants:  
We tend to look down on farmers with less capital than us. We interact with them when we want to 
hire their labour, get them to perform services for us, buy or rent something from them or they buy 
or rent something from us. 
A participant who has increased the monetary value through his means of production 
talks about who he now identifies with: 
I have experienced how I and others who have been smallholders and advanced materially have 
tried to distance ourselves from our previous life situation. We start socialising with people 
who have bank accounts, money and coveted assets. We buy fertilisers, a radio or a motorbike. 
We drink tea with milk. We buy meat; sugar; bread and butter. We want to emulate those who have 
nice clothes; different furniture; electronic equipment and motor vehicles. We begin to think that 
people without money have nothing to teach us anymore. 
Emergent farmers talk about how they in comparison with each other and their neigh- 
bors’ life situation can worry that they will slip back to a level they may have left and do 
not want to belong to. Their confrontation with the difference between poorer and more 
privileged residents and the identification with an often volatile and individualised type 
of success has characterised how they have defended their interests. While exploiting 
smallholders to afford their life situation and maintain a self-image of someone who has 
managed to climb in the tough competition, emergent farmers have also responded to the 
community's moral expectations of them. For instance, emergent farmers express how 
they at times have hired more labourers than they needed to support members of the 
community during the months with food shortages. Such acts have potentially given 
them better opportunities to recruit labour or gain access to other capital, including land, 
when needed. A male emergent farmer explains:  
If you hire someone as a labourer and do not pay them according to what they expect or otherwise 
let them down, that person can avoid you and give you bad reputation. On the other hand, if you 
fulfil your obligations and show care, people will probably be more willing to work for you when you 
need it and see you as a good person. 
Emergent farmers have also found themselves in situations where they have written off 
small-scale farmers’ loans and shared food; fertilisers; manure; seeds or wood products 
with them. Several informants also give examples of how they have paid medical costs 
for small-scale farmers or transported them to a hospital or places in Mchinji Boma 
where they can sell products or perform errands. An emergent farmer comments: “If I do 
better than my relatives, they expect me to help them when they experience difficulties or 
emergencies.” 
In other words, emergent farmers have maintained or improved their living conditions by 
securing their existing assets and transforming resources into capital through interdepe- 
pendent, supportive as well as exploitative resource exchanges with smallholders (cf. 
Bebbington 1999:20). 
Emergent farmers’ class relationships with large-scale farmers and other elites 
As described in the thesis, emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have through capital own-
ers in the agricultural value chain been given opportunities to increase their production, 
productivity and income to a level that could not be achieved for an individual producer 
(cf. Bernstein 2010:16-17). Political, private and civil actors belonging to the upper and 
middle class have integrated emergent farmers into markets; production models; forms of 
ownership; institutions and revenue channels that they otherwise would not have had 
access to (cf. Bebbington 1999:40-41). As shown in the thesis, capital owners’ and their 
distributors’ expansion of their resource domain in Mkanda EPA has enabled emergent 
farmers to invest their profits in sources that can generate more profit (cf. Bernstein 
2010:21) and navigate in the ecological, social and economic impermanence that has 
characterised the capitalist mode of production. However, emergent farmers also express 
in individual interviews and focus group discussions how they have experienced forms of 
exploitation by large-scale farm actors, including overpricing for leasing land and 
transport or requirements for disproportionately high interest rates on loans.  
Since most large-scale farm actors have lived outside Mkanda EPA and had their head-
quarters in urban areas, they have had relatively weak social ties in the communities 
where they have invested in agricultural production. Their expansion has been dependent 
on risks and transaction costs being managed through emergent farmers as intermediaries 
and local “interpreters” with the required skills, reliability and knowledge of the place. 
Emergent farmers have also had specific assets that large-scale farmers have needed, such 
as warehouses; housing; irrigation technology and complementary food for their labour- 
ers. Such forms of exchange have helped large-scale estate farmers to make investments 
in the area and successfully run their farming operations – both down-stream (through 
commodities leaving the farm) and upstream (through how production conditions are 
secured before farming is performed) (cf. ibid.:91).  
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An informant who is a retired teacher and comes from Zimbabwe has rented out one of 
her houses to a large-scale farmer, whose labourers have stayed there. She says that if she 
has needed assistance from the large-scale farmer with transportation or any other service, 
“it has not been a problem”. 
A woman engaged in small-scale fish trade has lost customers when a large-scale farmer 
has replenished the stock of fish used as food for the labourers. On the other hand, when 
the estate farmer has run out of fish, he has bought supplies from her. 
A male emergent farmer, who also works as a teacher, has hired tractors, ploughs and 
harrows from large-scale estate farmers. One estate farmer in particular has provided him 
with mechanised technology. In return, the emergent farmer has transported goods from 
the estate with his lorry. The farmer emphasises individualistic elements in his view of 
how he has used capital made available through large-scale farm actors:  
I prefer to decide for myself how I cultivate the fields. If I would have shared the tractor with others, 
there would be different views on how it should be used and who has access to it during which time. 
I may have to wait before I can use the tractor in my fields. Meanwhile, the rain may fall. My 
prospects for the season are deteriorating. I risk falling behind my friends, while they are making 
progress. 
Through their positioning in the agricultural value chain, emergent farmers as a class 
have made a profit for themselves, while sanctioning the legitimacy of the dominant 
classes; supporting the interests of non-agricultural actors in society and contributing to 
state representatives’ and private actors’ social control over rural activities. Some of their 
surplus value has financed the reproduction of landlords; labourers; civil servants and 
traditional authorities as well as functions such as schools; health centres; electricity 
companies; water suppliers; manufacturers; retailers; wholesalers; processors; agribusi- 
nesses; traders and lenders in Mkanda EPA. 
Emergent farmers’ labour relations 
A way for emergent farmers to increase their surplus value has been to keep down the la-
bour costs. Informants talk about how they have done so by reducing the labourer’s 
means of subsistence (e.g. by providing food and other basic needs of poor quality or 
quantity that limits the possibility of wellbeing) – which has been noticeable not least for 
women and children. They have transferred parts of the responsibility for livelihood to 
the labourer (e.g. by letting the labourer bear costs of food; shelter; sanitation and health 
care (cf. Araghi 2003). The labourer’s living conditions have also been affected by the 
length of the working day and by what forms compensation has been given for his or her 
sale of labour (e.g. the fact that the labourer may have to wait until after a certain task has 
been completed or the crops have been harvested before he or she is paid). Empirical 
facts reveal that labourers’ bargaining power regarding the working conditions has partly 
depended on the extent to which the person has had access to any real reproduction 
alternatives outside the current labour relationship – something that women have lacked 
to a greater extent than men.  
As described in parts of the thesis, the cost of casual farm labour (i.e. piece work where 
people are hired on a daily or weekly basis for specific tasks) in Mkanda EPA has de- 
pended on factors such as the labourers’ age, skills and bargaining power; the location 
where labour is demanded and the time of the year. In general, casual labourers have not 
received other resources besides their wage. Their wage level has been based on the type 
of work to be performed. For instance, four casual labourers may be given a task that 
includes intensive work within a given time and size of land – e.g. weeding or preparing 
ridges. Depending on the crop in question and how many hours the group works per day 
(up to 8 hours a day or more during peak seasons, 6 days a week), the workload on 1 
hectare of land can be completed within a week. Under such conditions, a group of four 
labourers can on average earn about 75 000 kwacha per hectare, which corresponds to 18 
750 kwacha per person.  
In reality, however, few labourers have had such work for several weeks at a time, as the 
same type of work has been demanded almost simultaneously on different farms. This 
means that when a work effort has been completed on a farm, there have rarely been 
other employers in the vicinity who in direct connection have demanded more labourers 
– because other labourers have already done or are doing the work needed there. Casual 
labourers with more long-term income opportunities are those who have worked for 
farmers with ability and willingness to use the same individuals for different tasks that 
can be performed one after the other in the fields. However, as illustrated in the study, 
depending on how much time and under what conditions residents have worked on other 
farmers’ fields, they have run a smaller or greater risk of reducing their ability to control 
their labour power (where women have been more vulnerable than men).
Permanent labourers (mainly men), who have predominantly worked on estates and per-
formed tasks such as crop production, crop monitoring and labour supervision, have been 
paid at the end of the month or season. Permanent labourers have earned at least the 
minimum wage (Chirwa & Matita 2015:35), which is about 1 000 kwacha per day. 
Depending on their qualifications, permanent labourers in Mkanda EPA can earn up to 
about 50 000 kwacha per month, while estate managers have received 80 000-150 000 
kwacha during the corresponding period. In addition to the salary, informants explain that 
the employer can also provide the permanent labourer with food; soap; salt; seeds and a 
piece of land where they can grow crops for themselves. 
Emergent farmers’ involvement in family-based and wage labour 
There have been advantages for emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA to integrate family 
members in the household production. The competitiveness of family labour has partly 
been in social relations that have reduced the costs of e.g. access to inputs; credit; labour; 
land and technology – such as in situations where relatives have shared workloads; seeds; 
fertilisers; food; housing; household necessities; machines; household chores; market 
contacts and transportation without necessarily charging for it. In such circumstances, 
farmers have often had an implicit expectation of services in return when the need has 
arisen (cf. Bernstein 2010:91-92).  
Therefore, emergent farmers have been able to lower the labour costs (wages) by using 
family members whose reproduction needs have not been fully met in monetary terms, 
but supplemented with the household’s own farming and other productive activities. This 
has been made possible in part because activities for production and reproduction have 
been divided between men and women (and where the women’s labour power has been 
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valued comparatively low). A result of the fact that the monetary value created by the 
household members through the cultivation of land has been partly hidden in the family’s 
calculations of their expenses and expected income has been a kind of concealed subsidy 
in the family-based farming system (cf. ibid.:94-95). Emergent farmers’ ability to replace 
certain market costs with social resources has been made possible not least because they 
have been embedded in the place (a context where economic values are organised through 
forms other than markets, or where markets function as social entities – including 
families; institutions; networks; organisations and groups) (cf. Polynai 1971; Granovetter 
1985).  
However, family members’ bearing of hidden costs of production and reproduction has 
also potentially led them to cultivate the land more intensively and with lower produc-
tivity than wage labourers (Chayanov 1966). The materialisation of emergent farmers 
must therefore be understood in relation to how non-capitalist elements of resource 
exchange have meant that farmers involved in family labour may have bought or rented 
land at higher prices and sold products at lower prices than what has been acceptable to 
capital owners (cf. ibid.). 
Despite the relatively low cost of family labour, it has been important for emergent farm-
ers to find labourers outside the household, not least as a complement in cases where 
members have been busy with their occupations, studies or other non-farm activities. 
Also, as previously discussed, the privatisation of land and other agricultural resources 
has limited emergent farmers’ labour supply within the extended family network. In addi-
tion, because emergent farmers have been involved in directing farm activities towards a 
higher degree of capitalisation (the amount of capital required to establish and reproduce 
a certain type of farming) (cf. Bernstein 2010:93), they have, depending on their socioec-
onomic position and household orientation, needed labour with skills to perform specific 
tasks – including management; administration; ploughing; spraying; driving; construc- 
tion; mechanics; carpentry and other crafts. 
Emergent farmers’ navigation in capitalist and non-capitalist logics 
Emergent farmers’ production conditions have been intertwined in different logics: They 
have been involved in a barter economy (e.g. when exchanging local seeds with other 
farmers); monetary economy (e.g. when buying and selling crops) and credit economy 
(e.g. when receiving inputs through loans). 
While large-scale farmers have been preoccupied with making profits and expanding the 
territories for the production and reproduction of commodities, emergent and small-scale 
farmers have also been involved in relationships and livelihoods that have not been en-
tirely dominated by monetary value, but rooted in people’s lived experiences (cf. 
Bernstein 2017). Emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have been partially fixed in place, 
while capital is placeless – because monetary value in itself is interchangeable and de- 
void of substance. Emergent farmers have facilitated the movement of capital in history 
by incorporating it in social practices that have incarnated and reproduced monetary 
value. 
9  Concluding remarks 
The thesis has focused on how emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have materialised 
through relations of production and reproduction among themselves and in relation to 
other farm actors. I have explored how emergent farmers as a class have appeared and 
what impact they have had on social, economic and ecological conditions in a specific 
place and over time. I have traced how social relations between capital and labour have 
been manifested through them as forms of monetary value, resource exploitation and 
commodity. 
A reason for my interest in studying the materialisation of emergent farmers has been the 
recent rapid growth of this group in parts of the African continent. The appearance of the 
class in Mkanda EPA has raised questions about how rural societies are transformed 
when specific groups bring new sources of capital and expand their interests in 
agriculture; accumulate and distribute surplus value; make profits and change their own 
and other peoples’ means of livelihood. 
Factors contributing to the materialisation of emergent farmers 
Three main political economic factors are useful for describing how emergent farmers 
have materialised: their involvement in land and other natural resources; their household 
conditions and their embeddedness in public, market and civil society institutions. 
Some emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA are part of families who settled relatively early 
in the area and acquired large tracts of land and other sources of capital, which later 
generations have inherited and expanded. There are also former smallholders who have 
increased their control over land with profits from agricultural sales; off-farm incomes; 
investments and exchange of means of production through the financing and positions of 
relatively influential or wealthy relatives, acquaintances or large-scale buyers. Others 
have moved to the area as civil servants; professionals; businesspeople and retirees and 
used non-agricultural incomes as sources of investment in arable land.  
Emergent farmers’ control over land and other natural resources has been consolidated 
through their individual property rights; surplus value used to lease or buy arable land 
and extraction of resources from water sources, forests and pastures. Their ability to 
acquire and commodify land has depended on the extent to which they have had enough 
capital that can be put into monetary form. 
Emergent farmers’ household conditions have been affected by the extent to which the 
family members have regularly sold agricultural products without compromising their 
basic livelihood needs. Other factors are whether and how they have combined own farm-
ing with off-farm activities; farm labour; employment; pension; access to resources 
through public and customary institutions, organisations, acquaintances, agribusinesses 
and elite groups as well as support from extended family members. The fact that emer-
gent farmers have had relatively good access to services from public; traditional; private 
and civil actors (e.g. inputs; credit; extension services and the recognition of property 
rights) and some of them or their family members have had positions in such institutions 
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has contributed to their influence in social, political and economic areas that have served 
as entrances to more easily accessible capital and profitable markets. 
Emergent farmers’ strategies and combination of livelihood sources have made it possible 
for them to cope with household challenges; achieve livelihood security and make pro-
ductive investments. They have also materialised by exploiting the struggles, mishaps, 
losses and weak labour power and property control of poorer farmers in the context of po-
litical changes and economic, social and ecological risks and crises on various scales. 
Materialisation of emergent farmers in historical phases 
In the postcolonial era, emergent farmers’ materialisation has facilitated the expansion of 
the capitalist mode of production into new territories and domains. In the agricultural 
value chain, they have linked the place of production and extraction of natural resources 
with new sources of trade; processing; consumption and profit.  
Emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have appeared during periods of 1. state monopoly 
capitalism – when selected groups of leaseholders and small-scale farmers were favoured 
by the government; 2. neoliberal market reforms – when markets were deregulated and 
the cultivation of burley tobacco and hybrid maize increased among farmers and 3. 
expansion of corporate financing of and investments in arable land and agricultural 
production. During the most recent period, various types of crises have brought new or 
reshaped interests in agriculture; transnational state-private partnerships have gained 
market shares and in-creased their influence over production and trade conditions; land 
and other natural resources have been further commodified; products and services have 
diversified and class differences have increased. 
Emergent farmers’ impact on the surroundings 
Emergent farmers in Mkanda EPA have enabled relative prosperity, a reasonably diversi-
fied economy and a more attractive environment for investors; companies; NGOs and 
professionals. They have served as a lever for investments in infrastructure such as roads; 
electricity and water pipes. They have contributed to new market connections between 
rural and urban areas within and outside Malawi’s border. They have played a key role in 
increasing the value of agricultural products and specific rural activities. They have 
contributed to the national food security and stimulated the agricultural labour market and 
secondary industries. They have stimulated competence development in agricultural and 
non-agricultural markets.  
Yet it seems that only a few (especially male) farmers have been able to pass the narrow 
passage that has led to increased prosperity in a place where the investments and revenues 
have been intended for selected groups, rather than the citizens. Those who have already 
had difficulty reproducing themselves and lacked sufficient means of production; higher 
education; regular income; collateral; influential contacts and relatively high social status 
have continued to be at a distance from where emergent farmers been positioned. Others, 
who have had the means and ability to create a certain surplus value, have potentially 
risen to a higher socioeconomic level and become emergent farmers. Emergent farmers in 
the study have materialised as a class that has created new social and economic values 
and practices in rural areas and in relation to urban areas, but whose existence has de-
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pended on private accumulation of basic assets and needs in a context where social rela- 
tions have created and recreated inequality. 
The study gives rise to new questions worth exploring: 
• How can segments of differentiation within the emergent farmer class be further dis-
tinguished and what socioeconomic, social or sociocultural consequences it has?
• What specific types of skills; methods; practices; livelihoods and ways of organising
themselves do emergent farmers acquire, apply and share with each other and other
farmer groups?
• How will surplus value be achieved and distributed in a context where the majority’s
livelihood depends on agriculture linked to resources that are overutilised or insuffi-
cient for most people’s subsistence needs and possible prosperity?
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